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ABSTRACT 
Multi-organisational environment is demonstrating more complexities due the ever-increasing 
tasks’complications that are arising in modern environments. Disease outbreak coordination is 
but one of these complex tasks, which requires multiskilled and multi-jurisdictional agencies 
to coordinate together in dynamic environment.  
This research discusses theoretical foundations and practical approaches to suggest 
frameworks and methods to study the outcome of some aspects of the complex inter-
organisational networks in dynamic environments, specifically coordination during disease 
outbreak. This dissertation studies coordination as being an interdisciplinary domain, and then 
uses social network theory to model such coordination.  
As part of the investigation, I have surveyed about 70 health professionals from different 
skillsets and organisational positions whom have participated in the swine influenza H1N1 
2009 outbreak. The interviews collected both qualitative and quantitative data in order to build 
a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the inter-organisational 
network that evolved during that outbreak. Then I use three main components of the network 
theory, namely: degree centrality, connectedness and tie strength to construct a performance 
model. This performance model uses these three network theory components as independent 
variables and disease outbreak inter-organisational performance as the independent one.  In 
addition, we study two types of networks that exist during the inter-organisational 
coordination being the formal networks and the informal ones. Formal networks are the ones 
that develop based on the standard operating structures, and the informal ones emerge based 
on trust and mutual benefits and relationships.  
Empirical results suggest that the proposed social network components (centrality, 
connectedness and tie strength) have positive effect on coordination performance during the 
outbreak in both formal and informal networks, except centrality in the formal ones. In 
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 addition, results suggest that none of those measures influence performance before the 
outbreak. 
The practical implications of such results are that increasing the communication frequency and 
diversifying the tiers of the inter-organisational links will enhance the overall network’s 
performance in the case of the formal coordination.  
In the case of informal coordination, the reasons for creating the links are different from the 
formal ones. These links are created with the intention to “improve performance”. Therefore, 
all the suggested network measures are relevant and result in improved performance during 
the outbreak.  
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce briefly and broadly the direction of this dissertation. 
The chapter starts by introducing coordination as a concept that is widely researched and 
needed in many disciplines. New theories of coordination emphasise that it is a 
multidisciplinary domain, with a range of methods for its investigation, from a mechanistic 
view to the new-networked view. The concept of disease outbreak is introduced next, with a 
historical view ranging from the great Spanish flu to the more recent swine flu (H1N1) of 
2009 which created a global phenomenon within less than one month, boosted by globalisation 
and ease of travel, hence creating a complex coordination problem. The chapter then focuses 
on one of the methods to study coordination, namely social network theory and briefly 
overviews the different types of formal and informal network structures and network types. 
Subsequently the chapter provides an overview of the context of the research, discussing the 
main Australian approach to dealing with pandemics and introducing the main bodies and 
organisations that are responsible for the intervention policies and practices. With a basis in 
previous literature, the chapter then outlines the main questions that guide this research, along 
with a high-level conceptual framework, and concludes by providing a basic summary of all 
subsequent chapters. 
1.1. Introduction to the research  
This section introduces the main themes in this research, in particular coordination, as the 
main method through which complex tasks are organised. Secondly, the chapter introduces the 
influenza disease outbreak, with some historical background and consideration of its impact 
on human welfare. 
- 1 - 
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1.1.1. Coordination 
The concept of coordination has been a central issue for many researches, studies and 
investigations over a long period in academia as well among professional practitioners 
(Malone and Crowston, 1994). Interest in studying coordination arose not just in one 
discipline but rather in a wide range of disciplines including economics, psychology, medical 
sciences and computer science (Richardson et al., 2007, Hollingsworth and Boyer, Tjora, 
2004, Swaminathan et al., 1998). The importance of coordination cannot be understated, and 
many people have an intuitive sense of its meaning. It is actually the lack of coordination, 
which leads to failure of a project that emphasises its significance and essentiality. 
Coordination has been proven to enhance performance in different settings such as 
organisational learning (Cha et al., 2008), the product development cycle (Ancona and 
Caldwell, 2007) and customer support teams (Rathnam et al., 1995), to name just a few.  
Many theorists have explored the need for coordination from diverse organisational 
perspectives, as illustrated by some examples since the 1950s: 
1. Task design and assessment (March and Simon, 1958) 
2. Decision-making among choices for actions (Radner and Marschak, 1954) 
3. Design response to different interdependencies among actors (Thompson, 
1967) 
4. Designing patterns of information processing in organisations (Tushman and 
Nadler, 1978) 
Coordination is mostly needed and useful when there is need to manage simultaneous 
constraints.  
The importance of coordination has only been emphasised by the increased specialisation of 
tasks and skills, which also has also increased the number of individuals and factors needed to 
perform any specific project. Such diversity has been accompanied by great development of 
communication techniques, methods and protocols. If these two factors together were not 
enough, a third factor has arisen: the high sophistication and complexity of many projects in 
modern life that utilise both specialisation and communication in the interest of complex and 
contextualised projects (Rathnam et al., 1995, Moore et al., 2003) . All these factors have 
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paved the way for coordination to develop from being seen as either a parallel or a series 
layout of tasks, or a combination of both; to being perceived rather as a mesh of complex 
relationships embedded in a societal ecosystem. Task relationships now dictate that the 
activities must occur according to certain order and exchange of information to achieve the 
desired goal. A simple example of this is the coordination that can be seen in manufacturing, 
where a product is passed along the assembly line as each stage in the production process is 
performed properly and timely. In the modern business world, however, coordination is 
looked upon more as an action to “bring different elements of complex activity or organisation 
into a harmonious or efficient relationship” (Melin and Axelsson, 2005) 
These factors have been the main influences in developing coordination theory both 
conceptually and laterally. The concept of coordination developed from being task design and 
assignment (March and Simon, 1958) to being the additional activities that must be performed 
so as to synchronise differentiated work efforts so that they function properly and 
harmoniously during the course of achieving desired goals (Haimann and Scott, 1970), 
composing purposeful actions into larger purposeful wholes (Holt, 1988), and entailing the 
integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts towards the accomplishment 
of a larger goal (Singh, 1992). Finally Malone and Crowston (1994) redefined coordination as 
an interdisciplinary domain that involves the act of managing interdependencies between 
activities performed to achieve a goal (Malone and Crowston, 1994). That definition reflects 
that one of the aspects of coordination is that it is multidisciplinary. 
This acknowledgement of the interdisciplinary nature of coordination provided the momentum 
to consider it not as a monolithic framework. Thus, laterally coordination research in practice 
became contextualised across many disciplines. To name just a few of these: there is 
coordination in hospitals (Uddin and Hossain, 2011), in construction management (Xue et al., 
2005), in software development (Kraut and Streeter, 1995), in crisis response (Comfort et al., 
2001), in bushfires (De Sisto, 2011).  
On the other hand, coordination is no longer perceived as based on relationships that are 
normally the result of the organisational blueprint. Another form of coordination has been 
acknowledged and in most cases tolerated, which is informal coordination. This is the organic 
coordination that evolves from the social relationships between individuals, which do not exist 
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on any organisational plan or structural draft but rather exist simply because humans are social 
beings who interact with each other outside the charts that decorate managerial whiteboards. 
This interaction is based on many factors, such as trust and mutual benefit, and is a conduit in 
many coordinated tasks (Chisholm, 1992). These informal lateral relationships, which some 
call a grapevine, has proven to have a significant positive effect on knowledge sharing among 
different units in large multinational corporations and to comprise a more voluntary and 
personal mode of communication (Tsai, 2002). This is due to the fact that “most of the activity 
in an organisation does not follow the vertical hierarchical structure” (Galbraith, 1973). These 
informal lateral relationships become important as they coordinate activities across different 
organisational units and substantially improve the design of the formal organisation, and these 
interactions provide channels for information exchange (Homans, 2013), increase access to 
resources (Gupta et al., 1999), diffuse new ideas within multi-unit organisations (Ghoshal et 
al., 1994), and support the formation of common interests that underlie the building of new 
exchange or cooperative relationships (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
1.1.2. Disease outbreak 
The emergence of new infectious diseases and the resurgence of diseases previously controlled 
by vaccination and treatment have created unprecedented public health challenges (Hitchcock 
et al., 2007). Disease outbreaks are facets of both human and animal life, and diseases can 
even cross life-form borders as in the case of zoonotic diseases. Outbreaks have different 
magnitudes and forms. One example is a localised salmonella infection resulting from food 
poisoning at a wedding party, in which case the spread is most usually constrained to the 
attendees and their direct relatives. Such outbreaks that initiate from the food chain are called 
foodborne diseases and have their own pathogens and treatment mechanisms. These do not 
usually constitute global phenomena, and hence are not reported as global hazards or crises – 
except perhaps in few cases like foot-and-mouth disease (Kitching, 2005). 
On the other hand, last decade’s disease outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola viral haemorrhagic fever, West Nile viral 
encephalitis, intentional anthrax, and H5N1 viral infections in humans have heightened 
concerns about global health security and global economic stability (Hitchcock et al., 2007). In 
- 4 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
response to these challenges, and acknowledging their seriousness, the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) were revised in 2005 (Baker and Fidler, 2006). The IHR mandated that all 
countries must develop and maintain surveillance, reporting, verification, and response 
mechanisms at local, intermediate and national level. Any country with knowledge of a 
disease outbreak of international concern must report it to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) within 24 hours, regardless of where the emergency is located (Fidler, 2004). These 
important policy changes are necessary for timely recognition and effective containment of 
disease outbreaks of international public health significance; however, they may not be 
sufficient, and concerns about global capacity persist (Hitchcock et al., 2007).  
Some outbreaks easily become global phenomena, for many reasons: 
1. Globalisation and the ease of rapid travel from one continent to another  
2. The nature of the pathogen and its infectivity, such as being airborne and hence 
the virus can travel from one host to another through breathing or sneezing 
3. The severity of the disease itself and its expected mortality and morbidity rate 
4. The economic impact of the pandemic due to imposed quarantine and 
restrictions on the movement of people and goods. 
Among the main outbreaks that bear the distinction of combining all these factors is influenza. 
Influenza, however trivial and minor it can be, has proved to be the deadliest disease in human 
history. The main example is the 1918 Spanish flu, which became a global infection claiming 
the life of 50-100 million humans according to current estimates, which in turn have been 
updated from the earlier estimates of 40-50 million (Knobler et al., 2005). This pandemic has 
been described as "the greatest medical holocaust in history" and may have killed more people 
than the Black Death. It is said that this flu killed more people in 24 weeks than AIDS has 
killed in 24 years, more in a year than the Black Death killed in a century (Knobler et al., 
2005).  
The most recent influenza pandemic that rapidly became a global concern was the H1N1 2009 
swine flu. It arose as a total surprise in small village in Vera Cruz, Mexico in early April 2009, 
then quickly spread worldwide through human-to-human transmission, thus generating the 
first influenza pandemic of the 21st century (Girard et al., 2010). The virus was found to be 
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genetically unrelated to human seasonal influenza but genetically related to viruses known in 
pigs. In view of its likely swine origin, it is often referred to as “swine flu” or H1N1, with 
2009 attached as its year of discovery (Girard et al., 2010). The pandemic spread globally, 
with the result that on June 11, 2009, the WHO raised the pandemic alert to level 6 in response 
to the number of countries that had reported H1N1 cases in their communities. The pandemic 
spread rapidly around the globe, and it was anticipated that it would particularly affect the 
elderly segment of the population. However, it appeared to affect primarily children and 
young adults, as well as those with an underlying lung or cardiac disease condition (Malik 
Peiris et al., 2009). 
The actual number of people infected by this pandemic worldwide is still unknown. Most 
cases were diagnosed clinically and were not laboratory-confirmed, as in most countries the 
“capacity for laboratory diagnosis was severely stressed” (WHO, 2009). It is likely that the 
total number of cases of H1N1 2009 worldwide was in the order of several tens of millions of 
cases. An early estimate of the extent of the disease in the USA was about 50 million cases 
(Presanis et al., 2009). A recent estimate was of about 200 million pandemic H1N1 cases 
worldwide, of which about 10 million occurred in France (Hannoun, 2010). There is still 
controversy about its toll, with estimates ranging from 14000 to 18000 deaths (Control, 2010). 
This pandemic challenged the existing coordination mechanisms in many countries and forced 
many others to revisit their disaster plans. Coordination was global, starting from the WHO, 
moving to national health authorities, and reaching persons such as a local health practitioner 
in Lismore, is about 750 km north of Sydney, Australia.  
This coordination was by no means either in accordance with the organisational blueprints nor 
confined to some simple emails bouncing among the mailboxes of intensive care specialists, 
health bureaucrats, epidemiologists or pathology experts. It constituted a web of 
interrelationships that linked all those who had a role in the pandemic management and 
containment. Hence, as the first wave of influenza pandemics of the 21st century, with two 
more waves still expected before the calendar reaches the 22nd century, the coordination 
process of H1N1 2009 deserves to be well studied and researched. 
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1.2. Overview of the research 
This section discusses coordination and its research methodology through social networks, 
with application to pandemic coordination. 
1.2.1. Studying coordination through social networks 
Coordination can be discussed or presented via different methods such as the hierarchal 
method or the “conveyer belt” metaphor. Yet a modern and emerging methodology for 
examining coordination is to view it as a “networked system” that is interconnected by nodes 
(Hossain and Kuti, 2010). These nodes can be anything from individuals to cells to 
organisations. These networks have characteristics which can vary widely according to the 
media of communication, the types of node, the environment in which the system is 
embedded, and the context of coordination (Ahuja and Carley, 1998). The conceptual study of 
social networks has suggested some concepts that can be used to study the structure of such 
networks, and these concepts can then be measured empirically. Categorisation of a network 
as centralised, decentralised or distributed is but one of the major concepts that can be 
investigated in any network, as shown in Figure 1-1 
 
Figure 1-1 Different types of network structure 
 
In a centralised structure, all nodes are linked to single central node. This type of network 
structure can maintain formal hierarchical network control (Hinds and McGrath, 2006). 
However, this structure has the risk of failing if the central node becomes unavailable for any 
reason. A decentralised structure comprises multiple central sub-networks that are connected, 
thereby reducing the risk of single node dependency. These nodes can be thought of as a 
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geographically distributed hubs interconnected by a system of links. In such networks, if one 
of the hubs’ central node fails, that will affect only its directly connected nodes while other 
hubs of the network will continue to function. In a distributed structure the notion of central 
node is replaced by total connectivity. This eliminates any node dependency, so that a failure 
of one node will only affect itself, since the communication will be routed easily though other 
links, thus providing a high level of tolerance. Despite this merit of being highly redundant 
and tolerant, distributed networks also have their own shortcomings. Major shortcomings are 
the cost to maintain such a large number of links and the cost of receiving redundant 
information, since it is expected that information will be carried via multiple channels (Baran, 
1964). The formation of social networks as described here is a direct indication that actors, 
whether they are humans or organisations, need each other, and the links between these nodes 
are the channels through which they exchange information, goods or resources. Hence these 
social networks represent a form of social exchange and hence coordination. (Powell, 1990). 
Social network theory can identify and quantify informal networks. Investigating informal 
networks is very useful for identifying network properties such as finding the most influential 
actor or the opinion leaders (Mullen et al., 1991). The structural attributes of networks (such as 
centrality, which has been discussed) now can be quantified and used to determine certain 
qualities of the nodes’ attributes based on their structural position. Thus network centrality is 
now a measure that determines the relative importance of an actor within a network (e.g. how 
much influence can an actor exert on other people and on how many of them?). There are 
numerous network measures that are discussed in many social network researches 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1995); however deciding on which ones to adopt in a particular 
research depends on the constructs that the researcher deems suitable for his study. Hence 
social networks represent a way of mapping and measuring relationships between actors 
(Carrington et al., 2005) that can be presented visually and calculated empirically, introducing 
the notion of social network analysis (SNA).  
Once new empirical and mathematical methods had been developed to assess position of 
nodes within a network, and to evaluate a network’s whole structure, SNA became an 
attractive, feasible technique to apply to many types of relationships and situations. Some 
examples of situations are the spread of infection or the dissemination of innovation (Borgatti, 
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2005), the relationships of inter-organisational board members (Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001), and measuring social capital and self-esteem (Steinfield et al., 2008); the list goes on 
and on.  
From this perspective, Malone’s (1990) definition of coordination as managing 
interdependencies works together with the concept of SNA as a system and medium to 
manage these interdependencies. Coordination serves the needs of people to share 
information, delegate and decompose tasks, or cooperate to solve problems. Social networks 
are the medium by which those activities are performed through the combination of nodes and 
links. Such networks would evolve during the course of attaining goals or completing tasks.  
Furthermore, SNA provides the visualisation and mathematical procedures to further analyse 
node and network characteristics as means of measuring the properties associated with a 
particular outcome of coordination (Chung et al., 2005). Such an approach for studying 
coordination helps to provide insight into network conditions such as the level of network 
involvement for certain actors, the existence of any structural holes, and any other enabling or 
inhibiting factors that may produce a particular coordination outcome. It is now possible to 
quantify the positions of each actor within this network and to conceptualise the impact of 
different network positions of actors: actors’ positions in social networks affect their ability to 
coordinate and the structure of the network as a whole affects the coordination of 
performance. 
1.2.2. Overview of the context of the research 
Pandemics not only have economic and social impact on the affected community, but a major 
impact on human health, welfare and life. Usually, public health authorities are the primary 
agencies that lead the response to the disease. This response generally begins with horizon 
scanning and surveillance. New communication technologies and international treaties have 
globalised the surveillance task, and hence many notional health authorities are both suppliers 
and consumers of global surveillance systems that are mainly managed by the WHO.  
In Australia, the Australian Health Protection Committee (AHPC) is chaired at Deputy 
Secretary level by the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA), and 
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its core includes the Chief Medical Officer; each State and Territory Chief Health Officer 
(CHO) (and, if required, public health or emergency personnel nominated by the CHO for 
relevant agenda items); health disaster officials (up to 3) nominated by States and Territories 
or the Commonwealth; the chairs of each of the three sub-committees (Communicable Disease 
Network Australia (CDNA), Public Health Laboratory Network (PHLN) and the 
Environmental Health Committee (enHealth); the Director General, Emergency Management 
Australia; the Head, Defence Health Services; a representative of the New Zealand Ministry of 
Health; a representative of Emergency Management Australia; representation from the 
National Mental Health Disaster Response Committee; and clinical experts and others to be 
co-opted as necessary (AHPC), Figure 1-2 below shows the organisational diagram of the 
AHPC.  
 In the state of New South Wales (NSW) the Public Health Act designated the NSW Ministry 
of Health (NSWH) as the lead combat agency during the H1N1 2009 outbreak. NSWH has 
prepared plans to deals with different types of pandemic, including the human influenza 
pandemic; some of these plans are the State Disaster Plan (DISPLAN), Human Influenza 
Pandemic Plan (HIPP Plan) and NSW HEALTHPLAN. The HIPP plan was drafted based on 
more severe types of influenza such as H5N1 whereas H1N1 was relatively “mild” (Health, 
2010b) The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI) 
categorises five management phases: Delay, Contain, Protect, Sustain, and Control that were 
later collapsed to three: Delay, Contain and Protect. These plans should be updated upon the 
conclusion of any event for which the plan was activated, on the introduction of major 
structural, organisational or legislative changes in NSW, or at least every five years (Health, 
2010a)  
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Deputy Secretary of DoHA
Chief Medical Officer CHO (of Each State)
Health Disaster Officials (up to 3) CDNA Chair
PHLN Chair
enHealth Chair
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Emergency Management Australia Defence Health Services
NZ Ministry of Health
Representative of National Mental 
Health Disaster Response 
Committee 
Clinical experts (co-opted as 
necessary)
 
Figure 1-2: Organisational diagram of the Australian Health Protection Committee (AHPC) 
NSWH is responsible for the management effort, which starts with surveillance and passes 
through different components, some of which are (Health, 2010a) 
• Various laboratories notify confirmed cases of influenza. 
• The Public Health Real-time Emergency Department Surveillance System 
(PHREDSS), which monitors near real time for influenza-like illness from most 
Emergency Departments (ED) in NSW. 
• Public Health Units (PHUs) receive reports from clinicians or institutions of 
unusual cases 
• Sample of general practitioners (GPs) contribute data on influenza-like illness 
to sentinel surveillance systems 
• The Australian Government supplies absenteeism data. 
During the H1N1 outbreak, NSWH implemented additional monitoring and surveillance 
measures, including: 
• Active public health follow-up of possible and confirmed cases of pandemic influenza 
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• Border screening for influenza-like illness in travellers from affected regions 
• Data provided through collaborative efforts of multiple hospitals (e.g. national data on 
intensive care or paediatric admissions) 
During the pandemic NSW was divided into eight local health districts, each with a local PHU 
that managed communication locally with health facilities such as hospitals, laboratories, and 
community health centres. Those laboratories and hospitals in turn communicated with NSWH 
directly, especially with specialised units within them, such as intensive care units (ICUs). 
GPs in turn had different bodies to regulate them, and at the same time they communicated 
with the local and sometimes federal health authorities.  
The previous paragraphs provide just a small example of the different organisations that 
needed to communicate and collaborate during the H1N1 2009 outbreak. All these 
organisations created a mesh of interconnected nodes comprising a large network of formal 
and informal relationships.  
1.3. Research questions 
This dissertation presents a study of the certain network measures on the robustness of 
coordination during a disease outbreak.  
This research will focus on studying the dynamics of the networks during large pandemic 
outbreak. The social network theory will provide the theoretical foundation for the discussion. 
Moreover, the social network tools will be the basis for the empirical verifications for the 
proposed models and hypotheses. 
The questions that motivate this research will be divided to two groups. The first group is 
related to the traditional social and organisational science that will describe the coordination 
phenomena, and the second group will be related to the research design and verifying in 
empirically. 
 Group 1: Coordination as a social networked phenomenon. 
1. What are the characteristics of the informal social network that evolves during 
the outbreak? 
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2. Does social network measures (namely: centrality, interconnectedness and tie 
strength) affect the overall formal coordination performance during the 
outbreak 
3. Does these social network measures exhibit different influence on formal 
coordination before and during the outbreak? 
4. Are these network measures applicable to informal networks investigation? 
5. Does informal networks improve coordination during the outbreak and why? 
Group 2 Research design and empirical verification  
1. Use a proven methodology to develop an instrument to map the inter-
organisational coordination during the outbreak and validate the results 
statistically. 
2. Are the reasons that promote informal coordination the same as for formal one?  
 
1.4.  Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework of the research centres on the notion of determining the effect of 
social network measures (centrality, tie strength, connectedness) on disease outbreak 
coordination performance. Figure 1-3 presents this concept.  
Social Network 
Measures
Tie Strength 
Centrality
Connectedness
Coordination 
Performance 
Measures
 
Figure 1-3: Conceptual framework 
This modelling is based on the discussed literature, and uses network measures as a means to 
study coordination as a flat structure rather than hierarchical one. Hence the important node is 
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not the one that is at the top of the hierarchy, but rather the one that has more connections 
initiated from it or that is more “connected to”. Such connections reflect the importance of the 
specific node with which everyone is trying to communicate. In some instances such 
importance might be due to the hierarchical position of that node but in other instances it is 
due to the acknowledged importance of that node due to the services or resources it provides 
to others. Hence the coordination is conceptualised as a mesh of interacting nodes embedded 
in a coalition network of organisations.  
1.5. Introduction to the following chapters 
This dissertation is comprised of six chapters including this introductory one. The structure of 
the subsequent chapters is as follows.  
Chapter 2 surveys the historical and current literature related to coordination theory. It then 
considers the dichotomy within coordination theory and the different literature concerning two 
facets of coordination: formal and informal. The most complex situation requiring 
coordination is a disaster; therefore three studies are reviewed that explore network theory 
during disasters: Kapucu studied networks and disaster coordination; Comfort investigated 
complexity and increased efficiency in disaster response; Zhiang detailed the inter-
organisational dynamics during disaster. The tool used in the present study of coordination is 
social network methods. Thus social network theory is introduced and the work of some of the 
pioneers in that domain is detailed, such as Granovetter’s work on strong and weak ties, 
Bavelas’ work on network structure and performance, and Burt’s work on structural 
redundancy. The chapter then moves into the disease outbreak domain, introducing literature 
on influenza history and outbreaks, then discussing some of the research that has been done in 
outbreak management and intervention, and locating the gaps in research on inter-
organisational outbreak coordination using network methodology. The chapter concludes by 
introducing the model and the hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 provides the methodological foundation to test the hypotheses proposed. First it 
provides a brief introduction to SNA and its different aspects including social network data 
collection, data analysis and overall investigation approach. Then, conceptual descriptions of 
SNA measures are considered for the coordination models of this study, along with their 
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mathematical formulae. This is followed by a brief discussion of the qualitative and 
quantitative forms of data collection. After these theoretical introductory summaries, the 
chapter moves into particularities of the practical data collection used in the research, first 
explaining the data collection questionnaire design and how it was piloted to senior health 
officials. The chapter then details how this instrument was used to build the questionnaire that 
was the main tool for data collection in the second wave of interviews. The chapter then 
moves into describing the data collected and how it was synthesised and structured to prepare 
it for further investigation, as well describing the mathematical method – Ridit analysis – that 
is used to transform data to the format that allows mathematical and statistical handling. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the data limitations. 
Chapter 4 mainly reports data analysis and findings, stating the results without further 
elaborating their meanings. This chapter starts with presenting descriptive statistics about the 
research dataset. Then the methods used to elicit the results from the dataset are detailed. The 
statistical results and findings are presented for each hypothesis for both formal and informal 
coordination. For formal coordination, results are presented for both before and after the 
pandemic. These results demonstrate whether the null hypothesis is correct or incorrect, in 
turn paving the way for Chapter 5 to elaborate on the results. 
Chapter 5 starts by re-stating the primary objectives of this research. Then the results of each 
hypothesis are presented one by one, along with a comprehensive synthesis of the findings 
from the network theory and coordination theory in the disease outbreak context. The results 
are also linked back to the historical research presented in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 6 first presents the general findings of this research with regard to theory, method and 
context. Then the research implications are presented, along with some practical suggestions 
for inter-organisational network design. Future research directions are suggested, using the 
methodology of the present study and the dataset collected. Finally, the chapter states the 
drawbacks of this research.  
 
 
- 15 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Chapter 2 
2. Towards a Dynamic Coordination Networks for Disease 
Outbreak 
Understanding the coordination required for disease outbreaks is a compelling subject, 
involving unique complexity in a setting of multi-skilled and multiple agencies that need to 
utilise existing ties and forge new ones in a dynamic and evolving environment. This chapter 
reviews theories of social networks and coordination in order to develop a model that 
determines the influence of some network measures on coordination performance during a 
specific form of disaster, which is pandemic. 
The chapter begins by introducing coordination theory development in the academic 
literature, examining the facets of coordination and highlighting the importance of both formal 
and informal coordination. Then complex environments and their characteristics are discussed 
as a prerequisite to explaining the need to provide new theoretical and modelling techniques 
for coordination in such increasingly prevalent systems. It is proposed that network analysis 
method is a good candidate to capture the complexity of such coordination, which leads to a 
discussion of network theory. A new extension to coordination theory is then proposed, 
involving formal and organic coordination that will facilitate understanding and modelling 
coordination in complex environment. 
2.1. Coordination Theory 
The concept of coordination was born when humans first recognised that they needed to put 
their efforts together in order to accomplish a goal that none of them individually could 
achieve, like killing a mammoth. The reward was also shared among all the participants. As 
the complexities of human life increased and organisations evolved, the importance of 
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coordination was emphasised (Malone and Crowston, 1990). Along with this arose the need to 
formulate coordination, and researchers and scientists approached it from diverse perspectives. 
2.1.1. Overview of coordination theory 
Coordination theory and definition can be traced back to the 1950s with the early definition of 
March and Simon (1958). Figure 2-1 elaborates the development of coordination theory 
thinking by superimposing it on a timeline.  
 
Figure 2-1: Timeline development of coordination theory 
 
The above timeline is also illustrated in Table 2-1 (Weigand et al., 2003): 
Table 2-1: Some definitions of coordination partially adopted from (Weigand et al., 2003) with some 
additions that reflect updated definitions 
Coordination can be achieved by standardisation (March and Simon, 1958).  
Coordination is structuring and facilitating transactions between interdependent components 
March and Simon: 
Coordination can be 
achieved by 
standardisation.
Chandler: structuring and 
facilitating transactions 
between interdependent 
components.
Thompson: protocols, 
tasks and decision-making 
mechanisms to achieve 
concerted actions between 
interdependent units
Lawrence and Lorsch: 
describe the integrative 
devices for interconnecting 
differentiated sub-units.
Kaufmann: Different 
actions of various actors 
become linked to 
constitute chain of actions
Koningsveld and Mertens: 
Timely actions of 
individuals within an 
organisation to realise its 
aim.
Holt: Composing 
purposeful actions into 
larger purposeful wholes
NSF: The joint efforts of 
independent 
communicating actors 
towards mutually defined 
goals
Singh: The integration of 
individuals' work efforts to 
accomplish the larger goal
Malone and Crowston: 
Managing 
interdependencies 
between activities 
performed to achieve a 
goal
Reezigt: Attunement 
between tasks to execute 
separate tasks is timely, in 
the right order and of the 
right quantity.
Comfort: Aligning one’s 
actions with those of other 
relevant actors and 
organisations to achieve 
shared goal
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Timeline development of Coordination theory
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(Chandler, 1962).  
Coordination consists of the protocols, tasks and decision-making mechanisms designed to 
achieve concerted actions between interdependent units (Thompson, 1967).  
Coordination describes the integrative devices for interconnecting differentiated sub-units 
(Lorch, 1969).  
Coordination happens insofar as different actions of various actors become linked to 
constitute a chain of actions (Kaufmann, 1986). 
Composing purposeful actions into larger purposeful wholes (Holt, 1988).  
Networks of human action and commitments that are enabled by computer communications 
technologies (NSF, 1989) 
Actions and decisions of individual actors within an organisation which need to be timely 
attuned for the organisation as a whole to realise its aim (Konigsveld and Mertens, 1986).  
The integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts towards the 
accomplishment of a larger goal (Singh, 1992). 
Coordination is the act of managing interdependencies between activities performed to 
achieve a goal (Malone and Crowston, 1994). 
Establishing attunement between tasks with the purpose of ensuring that the execution of 
separate tasks is timely, in the right order and of the right quantity (Reezigt, 1995). 
Coordination means aligning one’s actions with those of other relevant actors and 
organisations to achieve a shared goal (Comfort, 2007). 
 
In the above literature on coordination, the early definitions primarily focused on 
departmentalisation of the organisations in an era when the organisations and departments 
were considered static entities. March and Simon (1958) argued, “under some conditions, 
coordination can be achieved by standardization”. An important assumption is that applicable 
situations are relatively stable, repetitive, and few enough to permit matching of each situation 
with appropriate rules (Thompson, 2003). March and Simon (1958) also introduced the 
concept of “coordination by feedback” that can be applied to reduce the communications 
required from day to day. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) described coordination as entailing the 
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integrative devices or integrators that “are designed to facilitate collaboration among 
functional departments at all management levels.” 
Coordination is analogous to glue, according to Holt (1988); purposeful actions are composed 
into purposeful wholes. Thus coordination serves to establish relationships between tasks and 
their products and is a prerequisite to accomplishing other purposes.  
Comfort (2007) studied coordination during crisis management and linked it to 
communication and control as being the triple c’s; hence “coordination means aligning one’s 
actions with those of other relevant actors and organisations to achieve shared goals” and “the 
capacity for coordination depends on effective communication”.  
The later literature evolved by introducing “interdependency” as a key term to describe 
coordination. This was accompanied by the advancement of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) as well as by organisational development from hierarchical structures into 
more complex ones that could not be handled by a single person’s perspective (Weigand et al., 
2003); hence completely centralised control became simply infeasible (von Hayek, 1945).  
Hierarchal Organisations Networked Organisations
Coordination characteristics:
-Formal Structures.
-Interfaced through Protocols.
-Top down.
-Production line oriented (Chain 
of actions)
-Support the hierarchal 
backbone.
Coordination characteristics:
-Interdependency is the norm.
-Using informal networks.
-Support peer networks.
-Create shared understanding.
-Bottom up.
-Designed around autonomous 
agents.
-Facilitated by new technologies  
Coordination characteristics attuned to organisational 
structures. 
Mutual adjustment 
(in hierarchy) Direct Supervision
Mutual adjustment 
(in network )
Standardization of work
Standardization of outputs
Standardization of skills
 
Figure 2-2: Coordination development with organisations along with the evolution of coordination 
mechanisms (lower part adopted from (Mintzberg, 1979) 
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Figure 2-2 further illustrates the different characteristics of coordination as it phases between 
hierarchical structures and networked ones, superimposed on Mintzberg’s well-known 
coordination mechanisms. The new mutual adjustment or horizontal coordination (Weigand et 
al., 2003) are the most significant contemporary development in organisation design 
(Mintzberg, 2007). 
From the above it can be concluded that coordination in its simplest concept is the genre that 
brings activities together to achieve one goal (Chisholm, 1992). It describes both a process and 
the goal. Coordination is further seen as deserving importance due to the complexity and 
lengthening of chains of interdependent actions (Kaufmann and Franz-Xaver, 1986). The 
Oxford Dictionary defines coordination as “harmonious combination of agents or functions 
toward a production of result” (Chisholm, 1992). The concept of coordination has evolved 
significantly along with its mechanisms, hence it is important to introduce new practical 
research that reflects these new developments yet is founded on solid theoretical background. 
This last sentence provides a motive for presenting a new paradigm of disease outbreak 
coordination.  
2.1.2. Review of coordination theory 
Coordination is increasingly seen as important as organisations are becoming more reliant on 
interdisciplinary teams of specialties and distributed operations for addressing complex 
situations demanding multi-organisational responses (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). (Malone and 
Crowston, 1990) were the first to propose an interdisciplinary science of coordination 
(Weigand et al., 2003). They defined coordination as “managing interdependencies between 
activities” (Malone and Crowston, 1990). This definition is consistent with a long history in 
organisational theory of emphasising the importance of interdependence (Thompson, 2003, 
Lawrence and Lorsh, 1967, Pfeffer, 1978, Roberts and Gargano, 1989).  
Malone and Crowston (1994) tried to quantify these dependencies, along with the basic 
processes involved in the coordination act, by providing a non-exhaustive table (Table 2-2) for 
the processes and dependencies.. 
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Table 2-2: Examples of common dependencies between dependencies and processes (Malone and 
Crowston, 1994) 
Dependency Examples of coordination processes 
Shared resources First come first serve, priority order, budgets, managerial 
decisions (hierarchy), market-like bidding (markets) 
Task assignments  
Producer / consumer relationships  
Prerequisite constraints Notification, sequencing, tracking 
Transfer Inventory management (e.g. “just in time”, 
“economic order quantity”) 
Usability Standardization, ask users, participatory design 
Design for 
manufacturability 
Concurrent engineering 
Simultaneity constraints Scheduling, synchronization 
Task / subtask dependencies Goal selection, task decomposition 
 
This approach enables the identification and analysis of a wide variety of dependencies 
between tasks and their associated coordination processes, followed by allocating them to the 
relevant actors (Grant, 1996). It sets the task in focus as the goal and then builds an actor-
dependency relationship with it. Such typology provides a theoretical framework to propose 
coordination structures that are needed for successful modelling of coordination. This model is 
the “pattern of decision making and communication among a set of actors who perform tasks 
in order to achieve goals (Malone, 1987). Malone suggests four coordination models that 
conceptualise centralised and decentralised market and product hierarchies. These models 
require identifying the task that is the subject of coordination, and then selecting the 
appropriate structure. These models are: 
1. Product hierarchy: This term is used for “mission oriented” divisions or separate 
product divisions. These divisions might be based on products, geographical 
regions or market segments. Each division has a manager – who can be called a 
product manager – and has separate departments supporting different functions or 
specialised processes such as marketing, manufacturing and engineering. Each one 
of these divisions is a processor. As a task arises, the product manager assigns it to 
the suitable processor. The product manager is the link coordinating between 
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different processors for any interdependent tasks. The consequence of this is that if 
a processor fails, only the product division it supports will be affected. An example 
is the production of flu-related drugs and other equipment (such as ventilators or 
personal protective equipment (PPE)). So if Tamiflu production – or even 
distribution – is disrupted, it should not affect PPE production or distribution since 
each is considered a separate product and has discrete distribution networks.  
2. Functional hierarchy: This is when number of processors of similar types are 
pooled in functional departments under a functional manager shared among 
products. This reduces duplication of effort and may allow processing loads to be 
balanced over all products. Each functional department has a functional manager 
connected to an executive office at the top of the hierarchy that decides which tasks 
need to be done to produce all the products of the organisation. This structure is 
more complex than the product hierarchy structure because of the extra layer of 
management involved. This can be exemplified in pandemic management if a 
hospital becomes infected. Eventually, all the patients that might be admitted to 
this hospital need to be reassigned to other ones. This structure is also susceptible 
to another type of failure: if the product manager or the executive office fails, then 
the processing of the entire organisation may be disrupted. One example of this is 
when the functional department responsible for the distribution of vaccines fails, 
which will disrupt the whole distribution process.  
3. Decentralised markets: In such markets, all buyers are in contact with all possible 
suppliers and they make their own decisions about which transactions to accept, 
without a middleman. Here suppliers play the role of processors and buyers that of 
product managers. It is assumed that each buyer has a communication link with 
each supplier. This decentralisation implies that if one processor fails the task can 
be can be reassigned to another one. An example of the market model is when 
patients have the freedom to buy Tamiflu from any private pharmacy as they are 
using their own financial means. 
4. Centralised market: In a centralised market, brokers mediate between buyers and 
all possible sellers. This centralisation of decision-making means substantially 
fewer connections and messages than in a decentralised market. The broker plays 
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the role of the functional manager and has communication links to each buyer and 
supplier. The broker then plays the role of assigning tasks to the best supplier. For 
an illustration of this in the disease outbreak coordination context one can look at 
how some specific services or resources are aggregated under certain agencies. For 
example, “ambulance” distributes the stockpile of vaccine whereas “population 
health” disseminates information to Area Health Service agencies. Hence 
ambulance is the broker for the vaccine, and population health is the broker for 
information. The processors are pharmacies and general practitioners (GPs) for the 
former, and any agency that distributes information directly to the public for the 
latter (like public health units). 
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Table 2-3: Coordination models according to Malone 1987, along with their advantages/disadvantages and 
examples from disease outbreak management 
Malone’s coordination models 
 
Advantages/Disadvantages Example(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advantages: 
-Processor failure will affect 
only one product division. 
Disadvantages: 
-Duplication of effort can 
occur between product 
divisions. 
Production of flu 
drugs and PPEs. Each 
is a different product 
that is manufactured 
by a separate 
functional division.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advantages: 
-If a processor fails the task 
is reassigned to another 
processor. 
Disadvantages 
-High communication cost 
per task. 
Patients approaching 
pharmacies to buy 
Tamiflu or vaccine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advantages: 
-One general contractor 
(product manager) can fail 
without disrupting 
production of other products. 
Disadvantages: 
-Production is disrupted if 
broker (or functional 
manager fails) 
Resources aggregated 
under specific 
agencies, e.g. 
ambulance distributes 
stockpile of vaccine 
whereas population 
health disseminates 
information to Area 
Health Service 
agencies. 
Product hierarchy
Decentralised market
Centralised market
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Advantages: 
-Reduces duplication effort 
and allows loads to be 
balanced across products. 
Disadvantages: 
-If a functional manager 
fails, the processing for the 
whole organisation may be 
disrupted. 
Hospital admissions in 
pandemic case: if a 
hospital is infected or 
full, patients can be 
reassigned.  
Key
       Product Manager
       Functional Manager
       
                    Task Processors of Different types
 
  
 
In summary, Malone and Crowston’s (1987) main contribution in defining coordination theory 
is: 
• A succinct and actionable definition of coordination. 
• A framework for task analysis and modelling for collective processes. 
• The beginning of a typology of dependencies and coordination mechanisms 
(Crowston and Rubleske, 2004). 
2.1.3. Evolution of the coordination research 
Coordination theory definition has progressed since its inception around the middle of last 
century, as discussed. This progress was guided by market theory and the development of new 
Functional  hierarchy
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communication and collaboration tools. Market specialisation has put more emphasis on 
coordination, since any task will need the combined expertise of many parties.  
Historically, most coordination research is affected by the factory-product theory. This means 
that coordination takes place in a static environment where the final product is defined and the 
tasks and dependencies are identified accordingly. Coordination in such environments enjoys a 
long dormant period of planning and preparation before application in the workspace. In this 
situation, coordination occurs between formal channels, with minimal surprises or external 
perturbations; hence it can follow the four models proposed by Malone.  
With the advancement of technology and evolution of complex products and organisational 
structures, research started to discuss coordination systems as complex adaptive systems 
(CASs) (Comfort et al., 2001, Uhr et al., 2008). Hence coordination inherits some of the 
characteristics of CASs’ important aspects being self-organisation and system emergence 
(Drabek and McEntire, 2002). Most of this research is performed in the relation to disaster 
coordination scenarios, where it is widely acknowledged that coordination is necessary and 
that it does not follow structured or planned procedures, but rather it rightfully trespasses into 
the complexity domain.  
Adding the social context to coordination resulted in discussing two branches for coordination, 
the formal and informal coordination (Chisholm, 1992).  The formal one is the one according 
to the structured organisation, and the informal one is based on the social interaction and 
influence.  
Coordination as a theory has further progressed; especially with the acknowledgment that it is 
an interdisciplinary domain. This is expected to have the positive effect of making the concept 
itself flexible. It is evident that coordination is contextualised in different applications and 
domains. This contextualisation also applies to coordination mechanisms, modelling and 
measures (Comfort, 2007, Harris et al., 2008, Krauss et al., 2004, Abbasi et al., 2010). Thus 
researchers are developing different coordination models and mechanisms for different 
environments (Dawes and Government, 2004, Denis, 1995, Edgington, 2010, Moore et al., 
2003). Some of these, as we have seen, are based on product or market hierarchy or 
centralisation; other mechanisms are based on direct supervision, standardisation (Mintzberg, 
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1979) or feedback (March and Simon, 1958). An evolving trend is the use of network 
structures to model complex coordination situations, especially in large environments 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003, Kwait et al., 2001b). This aspect is further elucidated in later 
sections of this dissertation.  
Frameworks have been proposed to model coordination in complex and dynamic 
environments, and scholars have considered how such frameworks can be systematically used 
to develop a coordination model for a specific type of network situation in a complex and 
dynamic environment (Hossain and Uddin, 2012). A continuing deficiency in coordination 
research is the lack of generic performance measures as determinants for coordination success 
or failure. This probably due to the fact that coordination covers a wide spectrum of domains 
and activities, so that measures are inapplicable across all domains. 
2.1.4. Limitations of current coordination research 
Malone’s seminal studies have successfully established coordination as an interdisciplinary 
approach. Its strength is the recognition of the complexity of interdependencies in 
organisational work. It is a step forward from previous coordination models, yet there is still a 
need to address certain limitations. Some of these are: 
• High velocity environments: Conceptually this notion was introduced by Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) . These environments are 
characterised by rapid and continuous change in four domain; demand, competition, 
technology and regulation (Vilkamo and Keil, 2003). In these environments there is the 
need for rapid and error-free decision making (Faraj and Xiao, 2006). There are also 
competing needs for formal hierarchal structures versus flexible ones, on-the-spot 
decision making, and informal coordination modes. In these contexts organisations 
paradoxically emphasise both formal and improvised coordination mechanisms (Faraj 
and Xiao, 2006, Bigley and Roberts, 2001, Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997).  
• Modelling dynamic coordination: The four coordination models proposed by Malone 
(1987) impose the precondition that the environment is perceived or predictable 
enough to allow interdependencies or activities to be characterised sufficiently for 
predefined mechanisms to be designed for various contingencies. In other words, the 
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processing demands of the predicted environment are matched by the interdependent 
activities that are generated by those interdependent organisational units (Faraj and 
Xiao, 2006). In dynamic environments like disaster management, however, such 
models fall short of reflecting the true complexities, uncertainties and the variability of 
the needs and tasks that will be driving coordination processes. 
• New breed of tasks: Nowadays organisational tasks are not limited to manufactured 
products. New products have evolved, such as information and knowledge that are 
sometimes are far more complex than factory-produced products. Hence there is the 
need to reconceptualise coordination to focus on the content (what is being 
coordinated) as the mode of coordination rather than the traditional emphasis on how 
(i.e. the mode) and when (circumstances) to coordinate. This distinction becomes 
increasingly important in complex knowledge work where there is less reliance on 
formal structure, interdependence is changing, and work is primarily performed in 
teams. Complex knowledge work requires the application of specialised skills and 
knowledge in a timely manner; difficult coordination issues are raised in dynamic and 
time-constrained environments (Faraj and Xiao, 2006, Faraj and Sproull, 2000, Gittell, 
2002).  
• Measuring coordination performance: As Malone stated, “We sometimes notice 
coordination most clearly when it’s lacking”, that is, when a supposedly coordinated 
task fails – such as when we spend hours stranded on an airport runway because the 
airline cannot find a gate for our plane (Malone and Crowston, 1990). Yet there is no 
unified framework to measure the efficacy – or lack – of coordination. Each 
environment develops its own framework to measure coordination gaps, based on the 
contextualised situation (Rathnam et al., 1995).  
2.2. Coordination in Dynamic Environments 
Organisational structures have developed from monolithic closed systems based on 
mechanistic and “centralised communication network for the performance of certain classes of 
tasks” models to open, dynamic, nonlinear systems subject to internal and external forces 
(Comfort et al., 2001). These systems consist of interconnected components and exchange 
resources with the environment where “the appropriate structure for an organisation depended 
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on the nature of technology and task environment” (Scott, 1981, Galbraith, 1973, Lawrence 
and Lorsh, 1967). These concepts began to diffuse in the 1960s (Anderson, 1999). Daft and 
Lewin (1990) suggest that organisations are enormously complex and therefore cannot be 
dealt with using a normal mechanistic mindset (Thiétart and Forgues, 1995, Jauch and Kraft, 
1986, Fombrun, 1986, Quinn and Cameron, 1988, Weick, 1977). 
Acknowledging the complexity of organisations requires new approaches to understanding 
coordination and to modelling the “interdependent delivery systems” (Hage, 1975) between 
organisations to achieve goals that are “too big for one organisation to handle” (Alexander, 
1993, Ven et al., 1975). This makes organisations reliant on each other and hence increases the 
need for coordination to achieve tasks that no single organisation has the skills or resources to 
address (Coze, 2005). According to Thomson (1967), “the complex organisation is a set of 
interdependent parts which together make up a whole in that each contributes something and 
receives something from the whole, which in turn is interdependent with the larger 
environment.” Much research literature has followed this line of thinking, contributing to 
understanding of the nonlinearity dynamics of organisations (Gemmill and Smith, 1985, 
Smith, 1986, Rasmussen and Mosekilde, 1988, Stacey, 1993). Such understanding only 
emphasises the importance of coordination in today’s multi-tasked specialised world. 
2.2.1. Dichotomy in coordination research  
“The increased complexity of the organisational coordination approach created new avenues 
to study effective coordination”, as has been articulated by Chisholm (1992). Although the 
contention that higher levels of interdependence in a system demand more coordination is 
empirically strong, the argument that only formal schemes of centralised character can provide 
coordination remains weak. Because “that position has been held so tenaciously, other highly 
effective devices for coordination have been ignored, and their latent utility wasted” 
(Chisholm, 1992). 
Thus a dichotomy in coordination research appeared, giving rise to studies of formal and 
informal coordination. Formal coordination is mechanistic, in accordance with standard 
operating procedures, whereas informal coordination is “organic”, developing spontaneously 
within – and extending beyond – organisations (Hobday, 2000, Lansley et al., 1974). 
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2.2.2. Formal coordination in dynamic environments 
There is much more to be said about the new dynamic organisational structures; however, the 
best conclusion that can be drawn from the above elaboration is that organisations are now 
more networked (Salancik, 1995). They are more interdependent on each other to deliver the 
intended service or product. This networked system is further supported and assisted by the 
spread of reliable, low-cost technological communication solutions and collaboration tools. 
Most if not all organisations or departments, except perhaps military ones, no longer have a 
single line of authority. There are multiple lines of communication, some of them 
authoritarian, some advisory, some with information flow, and some concerning resource 
distribution. Most of these lines of communication or coordination are established according 
to need, i.e. are not permanent. They are initiated and dropped and then initiated again … 
multiple times if both organisations at both end points deem it worthy to communicate. This 
means that these communications are temporal, ad hoc, mutually adjusted and hence dynamic 
(Mintzberg, 1979). In such new dynamic and complex organisational environments, the 
standard hierarchal coordination structures are no longer adequate. We need to look at 
coordination in dynamic contexts to adapt to complex environments. Such coordination is 
looked upon as an emerging type that is a typical CAS (Atkinson et al., 2005, Uhr et al., 2008, 
Comfort et al., 2001). 
2.2.3. Informal or organic coordination 
Another important form of effective coordination is what Chisholm (1992) calls “coordination 
without hierarchy” otherwise known as informal coordination. 
(Roethlisberger et al., 1939) stated, “Too often it is assumed that the organization of a 
company corresponds to a blue print plan or organization chart. Actually it never does”. 
Historically, organisations have been viewed through the organisation chart lens (Chung et al., 
2005) that shows formal relationships like reporting lines and work divisions. However, 
research confirms that humans transfer their social behaviour to their organisations (Mayo, 
1949), thus creating informal networks virtually in every organisation. Organisations are more 
and more conceived as embedding a web of coalitions which is an important dimension of 
- 30 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
organisational life (Waldstrøm, 2001, Morgan, 2006). Cross, Borgatti et al. (2004) even 
specified that “work increasingly occurs through informal networks of relationships rather 
than through channels tightly prescribed by formal reporting structure of detailed work 
processes”. They deduced that “supporting collaboration and work in these informal networks 
is increasingly important for organisations”. These networks are not part of the design of the 
organisation, yet they are pervasive factor of the life of organisation; they cannot be 
controlled, merely observed and influenced at best (Waldstrøm, 2001).  
One reason to establish informal networks is “to get things done”, when individuals in 
organisations tend to seek help and exchange favours with others (Baker, 1981, Han, 1983). 
Hence informal coordination fills the vacuum that exists in formal coordination. It capitalises 
on existing coordination channels to circumvent their complications, inefficiencies, even their 
inaccuracies. To better understand how formal and emergent coordination work, the self-
explanatory illustrations from Chisholm (1992) are presented in Figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3: Formal and informal channels, from Chisholm (1992)  
Situation A shows how the formal channels operate between organisations 1 and 2. Intra-
organisational communication must go through the formal layers of the hierarchical structure 
before inter-organisational communication occurs through the designated channel. This is 
usually somewhat laborious and time consuming. In situation B, where emergent informal 
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communication occurs, there are more direct and shorter communication channels between the 
same two organisations, meaning that people needing to talk to one another simply do so 
directly.  
Informal emerging communication is built around reciprocity and trust that cut through the 
layers of authority, enabling direct contact between parties and providing an effective remedy 
for slow formal channels. It helps when formal structures mal-adapt to their environment such 
as forcing the formal structure into a situation when the design is inappropriate. Informal 
structure will solve these problems without formal redesign, and without failure. Going even 
further, Landau (1979) suggested that all formal structures have built-in obsolescence; thus, 
informal mechanisms need to be developed for an organisation to continue to prosper while 
buying time to make careful changes.  
2.2.4. Ambidexterity in organisations 
Another way to look at organisational operations in dynamic environments is ambidexterity. 
As a concept, ambidexterity refers to that the organisation needs to master two diametrically 
opposed qualities, adaptability and alignment. An example given of this is tennis players using 
both hands, separately, to play strokes during a rally (Birkinshaw, 2005). Adaptability means 
that organisation should quickly seize new opportunities and rapidly adjust to new situations. 
They must avoid complacency. An adaptable company is nimble, innovative and proactive. 
On the other hand, as well as adapting to new circumstances organisations need to make the 
most of an existing situation. This is where the quality of alignment is important. Alignment is 
about exploiting proprietary assets, rolling out existing business models quickly and stripping 
costs out of existing operations (Birkinshaw, 2005).  
It is very difficult to strike a good balance between the two. Focus too much on alignment and 
the short-term results will look good, but changes in the industry will blindside the 
organisational management eventually. Equally, too much attention to the adaptability side of 
the equation means building tomorrow's business at the expense of today’s one (Bröring and 
Herzog, 2008). 
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2.3. Theories of Social Networks and Analysis 
Network analysis provides the opportunity to visualise the coordination matrix and investigate 
the relationships in correlation with coordination requirements, outcomes and performance. 
For correct assessment, the most appropriate measures need to be applied when the whole 
networked structure is examined. These measures are called social network measures and this 
field of study is interdisciplinary in origin. Its concepts have developed from social theory and 
its application has been linked with mathematical, statistical and computing methodologies 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003).  
By virtue of his “inventing” the sociogram, Moreno (1953) can be depicted as the father of 
sociometry, which in the early days was defined as “the measurement of interpersonal 
relations in small group” (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). Sociometry led to deeper insights 
about group dynamics (Forsyth, 2009). Simply, the sociogram is a depiction in which people 
are represented as nodes in two-dimensional space and the relationships among pairs are lines 
linking the corresponding points. Subsequently, sociograms became multidimensional 
(Laumann and Pappi, 1973, Laumann and Knoke, 1987) and have been used to study group 
corporate interlocks (Levine, 1972), roles, and structures in groups (Burt, 1976). Sociometry 
was further strengthened by the introduction of analytical techniques which brought the power 
of mathematics to the study of social systems (Forsyth and Katz, 1946). 
Soon enough, especially with the maturity of its mathematical, empirical and statistical 
techniques, social network methods of analysis became attractive to researchers in a wide 
range of domains such as organisational relationships (Alter and Hage, 1993). On the 
empirical side, some organisation researchers began to use network concepts (Chapple and 
Sayles, 1961, Whyte, 1943, Tichy et al., 1979). On the experimental side, the studies of 
Bavelas and Leavitt conceived of group structure explicitly in network terms (Leavitt, 1951, 
Bavelas, 1950).  
2.3.1. Introduction to Network Theory 
This section begins by discussing network concepts and then elaborates on how they can be 
used in analysis of inter-organisational coordination. 
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Certain notions lie in the heart of network analysis modelling: namely actor, relational ties, 
and groups (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). A brief definition of these follows: 
1. Actor: The term “actor” is used to represent the social entity, or node. Actors can be 
individuals, corporates, or collective social units (departments, nation states).  
2. Relational ties: These are ties that represent the existence of relationship between a 
pair of actors. These relationships can have different manifestations, some common 
examples of which are: 
a. Evaluation of one person by another (friendship, liking or respect) 
b. Transfer of material resources (business transaction, borrowing or lending 
things) 
c. Association or affiliation (belonging to same organisation) 
d. Communication interaction (talking together, sending messages) 
e. Movement between places or statuses (migration) 
f. Physical connection (road, river, or bridge connecting two points) 
g. Formal relations (authority, marriage) 
h. Biological relationship (kinship) 
i. Geographical proximity (actors in the same place at the same time) 
j. Partnership (marriage, corporate board, shared project).  
These ties on a small scale are represented as dyads (relationships between a pair of actors) 
which are helpful in understanding the type of relationship between those actors, for example, 
whether the relationship is reciprocal or not. Another building block for networks is the triad, 
which is the relationship between three actors and the possible ties between them. 
3. Groups: The power of network analysis lies in the ability to model the relationships 
among systems of actors, and that is where groups come in play. A group is a 
collection of all the actors whose ties are to be measured for conceptual, theoretical or 
empirical reasons.  
Although the network structure was originally used to analyse human social structures, the 
modelling technique became attractive to other fields including inter-organisational 
coordination. In that context, the definitions can modified to (Alter and Hage, 1993): 
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1. Networks are clusters of organisations operating as non-hierarchal collectives of 
separate units. This structure permits inter-organisational interactions of exchange, 
concerted action or joint production. 
2. Networking is the act of creating or maintaining organisational clusters for the purpose 
of exchanging, acting or producing among the member organisations. This act results 
in creating the network ties discussed above.  
3. Boundary spanners are individuals who engage in networking activities and employ 
methods of coordination across organisational boundaries (Katz and Kahn, 1978, 
Aldrich, 2007).  
Adopting network theory to investigate organisational theory and coordination resulted in new 
methods for explaining and quantifying the configuration of relationships among 
organisations. These stemmed from investigating dyadic relationships between two 
organisations and trying to understand relational properties such as the resources transacted 
between them. More interesting, however, was the application of network theory to triads and 
larger inter-organisational networks (IOR). This provided a wealth of information about lateral 
non-hierarchal linkages and clusters formed between agencies (Tichy et al., 1979, Van de Ven 
et al., 1979). 
The next section presents three theories that have greatly shaped and enhanced network 
theory. These theories have explained the network’s structural influence on communication 
and collaboration. Some of these theories consider only node level attributes whereas others 
inspect network level properties. These theories are used as building blocks for further 
analysis in later sections and chapters. 
2.3.2. Bavelas on network structure and performance 
Alex Bavelas conducted his experiment in the Small Group Network Laboratory at the 
Massachusetts Institute of technology (MIT) in the late 1940s. This experiment began with the 
realisation that problems of working relationships, especially communication, arose when 
tasks needed to be performed by groups rather than individuals. Hence Bavelas (1950) 
designed an experiment to investigate the effect of group structure on group performance. It 
involved the communication patterns in Figure 2-4: 
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Figure 2-4: Communication patterns investigated by Bavelas 
 
This experiment addressed the questions: What are the effects of these communication 
patterns on the emergence of leadership, development of organisation, Subjects’ morale, 
Communication effectiveness, and task performance?  
In the experiment, five people were placed in enclosed cubicles and were able to communicate 
only by passing messages through opening slots to solve a puzzle. The slots were arranged so 
that any desired communication pattern of the images in Figure 2-9 could be imposed. Each 
subject was given cards showing the symbols O, *, ◊, ∆, +, □, with one symbol per card. Four 
of the symbols appeared at most four times, and one symbol appeared only five times 
representing the solution for the puzzle. Each cubicle had six switches corresponding to the 
symbols, and subjects could press a switch when they assumed that they had solved the 
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puzzle. The experiment was considered solved when all five subjects pressed the common 
symbol. The process was repeated 15 times. The aim was to find the common symbol in 
shortest time and with the minimum possible communication among the subjects. 
Analysis of the structural properties showed that the centralised structure resulted in higher 
performance than the circle structure. The highest performer was the star structure (called 
wheel) followed by the “Y”, then the line, and last came the circle. When a central node 
existed, it was used as the main forwarding point for all subjects. Then this node made 
decisions to transmit messages, resulting in a shorter time and lower number of messages to 
solve the puzzle (Bavelas, 1950). 
Behaviour-wise, node level analysis revealed that a leader emerged in the wheel structure by 
the fourth or fifth trail, as the centre of the wheel, and remained in use throughout (Leavitt, 
1951). This emergent leadership led to better performance and higher morale across the 
structure in comparison to other structures. Expectedly, the next best structure was the “Y”, 
followed by the line and finally the circle.  
These results proved that centralised networks are more efficient in transmitting information 
and hence in performance than decentralised ones, in which the information is routed around 
inefficiently. The results seemed to go hand-in-hand with the hierarchical structure 
methodology prevalent in the organisational domain at that time. 
Bavelas’ experiment was followed within five years by an experiment conducted by Guetzkow 
and Simon (1955), who evaluated different structures for solving complex tasks. They 
examined three structures, as shown in Figure 2-5: 
 
Figure 2-5: Communication patterns investigated by Guetzkow and Simon 
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It was realised that the performance of a structure depended on how well the channels of 
communication were used rather than on the structure per se. So, assuming that there is no tie 
overload, the “all channels” structure has reconfigurable capacity for task-relevant 
communication. The actors enjoy the following benefits: 
1. Having the opportunity to negotiate the direction of communication 
2. Communicating details about the type of the task 
3. Electing whether specific nodes are brokers of communication.  
Also, the actors need to solve two problems: 
1. Developing an organisational scheme suitable for finding the common symbol 
2. Finding the common symbol. 
Guetzkow and Simon (1955) proved that, when tasks become more complex, decentralised 
network structures tend to be more efficient than the rigid network structure with pre-defined 
communication patterns. 
The experiment of Bavelas (1950) was an eye-opener to the correlation between network 
structure and its effect on task solving. It highlighted the correlation between performance and 
network structure, and motivated more researchers to study for such correlations for both 
simple and complex tasks (Chung et al., 2005).  
2.3.3. Granovetter on strong and weak ties and diversity of performance 
Bavelas and others demonstrated the implications of network structure on information flow. 
However, another avenue to be investigated was the effect of the actor’s location on such 
processes.  
To elaborate, the location of an actor in a network is a function of its relations with other 
actors. The number of these relations and their strength has perceptual consequences on the 
embeddedness of the actor within the whole structure. On the other hand, these relations 
determine the novelty of the information to which this node has access from other nodes. This 
is what the theory of “the strength of weak ties” explores. Granovetter (1973a) analysed the 
process of interpersonal network to provide “the most fruitful micro-macro bridge…where the 
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interaction in small groups aggregates to form large scale patterns” (Granovetter, 1973c). His 
argument starts from the fact that actors with similar characteristics or interests tend to cluster 
together such that they all become mutually connected. These strongly tied cliques have 
information shared and circulating quickly within them. As a result, this information becomes 
redundant or obsolete in a short time. On the other hand, links to actors or nodes outside these 
cliques have the advantage of passing novel information not shared among the clique 
members.  
Yet subsequent research by Krackhardt (1992) emphasised “the strength of strong ties”, 
especially in the generation of trust within propagators of major organisational change (Chung 
and Hossain, 2009) . This dichotomy was further investigated by Hansen (1999a), who studied 
the association between the characteristics of knowledge transferred and the tie strength. He 
proposed the conceptual model shown in Table 2-4. Knowledge association with tie strength 
Table 2-4. Knowledge association with tie strength, adapted from Hansen 1999. 
Knowledge Tie strength Tie strength 
 
Strong Weak 
 
  
Non-codified, 
dependent 
Low search benefits, 
moderate 
transfer problems 
Search benefits, severe transfer 
problems 
Codified, independent Low search benefits, few  
transfer problems 
Search benefits, few 
transfer problems 
 
Hansen’s (1999) findings showed that weak ties help a project team to search for useful 
knowledge in other subunits but impede the transfer of complex knowledge, which tends to 
require a strong tie between the two parties to a transfer. Having weak ties speeds up projects 
when knowledge is not complex but slows them down when the knowledge to be transferred is 
highly complex. 
 Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) further illustrated that where knowledge-intensive work is 
involved and where knowledge transfer and receipt of useful information is crucial for 
performance, then strong ties rather than weak ones facilitate complex knowledge transfer, 
especially to heterogeneous audiences .  
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2.3.4. Burt on structural redundancy 
Burt published his influential contribution to network theory in 1992. His proposal represented 
a new paradigm, where the focus was on network positions besides network structure and 
network relations. His theory elucidated that actors will gain competitive advantage if they 
efficiently and effectively optimise their network connections. His contribution is known as 
the “structural holes” theory.  
As early as the mid-last century, it has been noted that research on groups has identified that 
there is a limit for the individual’s ability to maintain large number of ties with other actors 
(Hare, 1952, Bales, 1950). Then Burt formalised this by arguing that there are limits to the 
volume of information people can use intelligently as well as to the links they can maintain. 
Therefore contacts should be established “where useful bits of information are likely to air” 
(Burt, 1992). Those who seek novel and, more importantly, non-redundant information, should 
consciously and selectively establish links to network clusters with which they, or any one 
from their own cluster, do not currently have a relationship. This chasm is what Burt defined 
as a “structural hole”. It is the nonexistence of a tie that would otherwise link unconnected 
clusters. Actors who bridge these holes will have access to information and control benefits 
not obtained by others. They will enjoy competitive advantage and elicit opportunities 
otherwise absent for those who do not span the chasm.  
Chung (2006) noted that “closer examination on the crux of structural holes theory reveals that 
it is based on the assumption of betweenness centrality: that power and influence accrue to 
those who broker connections between unconnected groups of people”. Burt capitalised on 
and extended betweenness centrality to “explain the role of brokerage as a form of obtaining 
structural autonomy which leads to improved performance, getting ahead and obtaining good 
ideas” (Chung and Hossain, 2009) .  
2.3.4.1. Redundancy types 
Burt (1992) differentiated two types of redundancy, redundancy by cohesion and by structural 
equivalence. 
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Redundancy by cohesion is when contacts are connected by strong relationships and the ego 
(you) is connected to all of them, as illustrated in Figure 2-6. An example is the family 
relationship (father and sons, brothers and sisters). Relationships with these contacts provide 
the same network benefits. 
Redundancy by structural cohesion is when the ego is connected to contacts that in turn have 
the same contacts, as in Figure 2-6 each one of these contacts has no direct ties to one another, 
yet each leads to the same cluster of more distant contacts. The information that comes to 
them, and the people to whom they send information, are redundant.  
Whereas cohesion concerns direct connection, structural equivalence concerns indirect 
connection by mutual contact. In both structures, ties from the ego to the first level contacts 
will carry the same redundant information. This means that the ego will be carrying the “cost” 
of three connections for the actual benefit of one, which is inefficient. Burt then developed 
two terms to measure network efficacy.  
2.3.4.2. Network efficiency and effectiveness 
As network size increases; the number of structural holes is expected to increase as well (Burt, 
1992). To harvest the information benefits associated with those holes efficiently, two design 
principles need to be satisfied: efficiency and effectiveness.  
Efficiency is maximising the number of non-redundant contacts in the network. Comparing 
networks A and B in Figure 2-6, one can easily observe that they both have the same number 
of contacts (16); network B, however, is more efficient as the ego has to establish only four 
links to non-redundant contacts as opposed to 16 links in network A.  
  Network A   Network B 
Figure 2-6: Inefficient (A) and efficient (B) networks, adapted from Burt 1992 
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If the ego wants to manage her network efficiently; then she can reinvest the saved time and 
effort in developing primary contacts to new clusters and expanding contact diversity. 
Efficiency therefore maximises the yield in the structural hole per contact.  
Effectiveness denotes the number of people reached by all primary contacts or the yield of 
network. It targets a network with few primary contacts, each having access to a cluster of 
many secondary contacts. This principle means moving from left to right in Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7: Strategic network expansion, adopted from Burt 1992 
 
Network C includes more contacts, ensuring access to more volume and diverse information. 
Each cluster of contacts is an independent source of information (Burt, 1992). Being at the 
centre of the structural hole will ensure that the ego is the first to know of new opportunities 
created by needs in one group, giving her the advantage in coordinating their activities.  
Burt (1992) proceeded to critically compare Granovetter’s “strength of weak ties” theory and 
his own structural holes theory. He argued that his theory captures the causal agent of the 
phenomenon, which is not the weakness of the tie between two clusters but the structural hole 
it spans. Also the weak-tie theory obscures the control benefits of structural holes, which are 
in some ways “more important than the information benefits of structural holes”. Burt 
considered that structural holes are the “chasm spanned and the span itself”, so it is the 
structural hole that generates the information benefits, regardless of whether the tie is strong or 
weak over that hole.  
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Figure 2-8 is a relationship matrix between the network theorists discussed and the relevant 
concepts they studied or developed in network theory analysis.  
Bavales
Grano-
vetter
Burt
Guetzkow
Information 
Communicati-
on
Task 
complexity
Structural 
effects 
Actor 
characetristic-
s
Node location
Structural 
holes
Information 
novelity
Network 
Efficiency
 
Figure 2-8: Network theorists and theory concepts relationships.  
 
Figure 2-8 elaborates some of the main social network concepts that were researched; 
especially network structure, task complexity, information communication and novelty, and 
the researchers who investigated them. One of the most researched topics was the structural 
effect of networks, which four scholars investigated. Also “structural holes “and “node 
location” can be considered part of the structural characteristics. This further emphasises the 
importance and the impact of network structure on the discipline and subsequently on practical 
applications, as discussed further in the next sections. 
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2.3.5. Using network theory to model coordination 
With its definition as a multidisciplinary domain, coordination means that different players 
will be interacting together using sophisticated means to achieve a certain task. One of the 
challenges remaining is how to model this process: namely, what is the best representation of 
the structures and processes of coordination. As discussed earlier, Malone (1990) proposed 
some modelling structures, which nevertheless remain as some form of modified hierarchical 
structures. Yet one of the developing methods for modelling coordination is network 
modelling.  
The network model has its origins in the social network structure where nodes represent 
individuals and links relationships. This modelling method focuses on the horizontal pattern of 
exchanges, interdependent flows of resources and reciprocal lines of communication (Powell, 
1990). This approach de-layers the coordination structure. An inter-agency network is 
modelled as a pattern of inter-relationships between meshed organisations in a social system 
of exchange to attain collective and self-interest goals or to solve specific problems for the 
target population (Van de Ven et al., 1979). It is not unusual to use networks to model 
interagency coordination in normal or in crisis situations (Harris et al., 2008, Kwait et al., 
2001a) . 
One of the advantages of such a method is that it develops systems understanding that 
facilitates analysing how different parts relate to each other (Comfort et al., 2001). This 
modelling technique and de-layering approach results in new conceptualisations of agencies’ 
roles within the structure. These roles need to be explored by reframing the traditional 
questions to accommodate the new methodology. So the question “Which agency is located on 
the top layer of the coordination hierarchy?” can be reframed as “Which agency is more 
central in the coordination structure?” where centrality is determined by the number of links 
to and from this agency (represented as node). These new questions can also be extended 
further by investigating connections as being either outbound – established by the organisation 
to seek information or resources – or inbound – other organisations seeking information or 
resources from this agency. This depicts an emergent bottom-up coordination architecture that 
can be envisioned as agents interacting on a need basis rather being dictated as to whom to 
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interact with. This framework better suits multi-resourced multi-skilled decentralised 
environments, disaster management being one clear example of such systems. 
2.4. Coordination complexity in disasters 
Complexity arises when multiple agents interact with each other and their environment. 
Coordination is necessary when a task needs to be accomplished by interdependent activities. 
These two concepts seem close. Conceptually, there is difference between complicated 
problems and complex ones. In complicated systems, the problems might be sophisticated; 
however, there is high degree of certainty in the outcome. The problems – and hence its 
solution – are repeatable to great extent like sending a rocket to moon increases assurances 
that the next mission will be successful as well. However, complex problems like raising up a 
child where the uncertainty of the outcomes remains even though raising up the first one 
provides experience but no assurance of success with the next whereas every child is unique 
(Glouberman and Zimmerman, 2002) 
Yet perhaps the best theatre that exposes coordination complexity is the disaster phenomenon. 
Disaster usually puts into action an emergency response system which is regarded by many 
researchers as a complex adaptive system (CAS) (Uhr, 2009). However, can the standard top-
bottom mechanistic hierarchal command and control structure deal with such complexity? 
Disasters are inevitable in life. However, as Barkun (1986) wrote, “a disaster is perhaps easier 
to recognise than to define”. No definition of disaster is accepted universally (Turner and 
Pidgeon, 1997), because the definition is dependent upon the discipline using the term (Shaluf, 
2003). Quarantelli (1985) collected statements reflecting “what the social and behavioural 
scientists assume when they use the term disaster”, some of which are:  
1. Physical agents or the impact of such agents 
2. The social disruption resulting from an event with physical impacts 
3. An imbalance in the demand-capability ratio in a crisis occasion. 
Parker (1992) reviewed the concept of disaster. He suggested that the preferred definition of 
disaster is an “unusual natural or man-made event, including an event caused by failure of 
technological systems, which temporarily overwhelms the response capacity of human 
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communities, groups of individuals or natural environments and which causes massive 
damage, economic loss, disruption, injury, and/or loss of life”. This definition encompasses 
medical accidents and disasters such as “ whooping cough vaccine and HIV/AIDS 
haemophilic cases” (Shaluf, 2003). Here the concept of disaster is broadened beyond the 
agents that create physical destruction to those that creates social disruption such as disease 
outbreaks.  
Discussion of disasters leads directly to discussion of responses. Comfort and Kloos (1988) 
summarised the debate and challenge of effective disaster response well: “Creating effective 
organisational response under the complex, uncertain operating conditions of a major disaster 
poses a sobering challenge to public service”. The generic approach for managing response to 
disaster is the command and control one. 
David Neal (1995) contended, “ The bureaucratic, command and control approach can provide 
an effective means for accomplishing goals under two conditions. The organisational 
environment around the bureaucracy must be both predictable and stable.” (Perrow et al., 
1972). However, these structures are not designed for effectiveness in dealing with complex 
situations such as disasters (Perrow, 1999) . 
Yet, “four decades of systematic research show that rigid, bureaucratic command and control 
approach to emergency management generally leads to an ineffective emergency response.” 
(Neal and Phillips, 1995). Other researchers and organisational theorists have a negative view 
of command and control as the basis for disaster management or as a basis for management in 
general (Uhr, 2009). Drabek and McEntire (2002), Denis (1995), Comfort (1999), Wise 
(2006), Takeda and Helms (2006), Neal and Phillips (1995), Mendonca, Jefferson and Harrald 
(2007) have criticised the command and control. Comfort and Kloos (1988) elucidated the 
argument neatly: “The emergency response process, initially designed in standard, hierarchical 
organisation format for reactive agency operations, demands careful consideration in the 
rapidly changing, increasingly independent social environment of 1980s”. Quarantelli (1998), 
a sociologist and disaster researcher, explained that even though there is strong tendency to 
assume that the best model for disaster organisational preparedness and management is what 
has been called the “command-and-control model” which adopts from the military a top-
down, rigidly controlled, and highly structured social organisation, direct studies in disaster 
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areas have shown not only that command and control models are seldom organisationally 
viable, but also that they are poor models for disaster planning.  
2.4.1. The need for networked enabled approach 
The problem during disasters is that of coordination not of control (Quarantelli, 1998). Hence 
new methods to achieve successful coordination in disasters have been researched, namely 
networked coordination (Uhr, 2009, Comfort et al., 2004b, Kapucu, 2006, Naim, 2005, Kwait 
et al., 2001b).  
Network theories deals with coordination using the systems approach. That approach makes it 
possible to look at the relationship of different parts of the system and their interactions (Uhr, 
2009). The process begins by identifying the nodes, which can be individuals, agents, or 
organisations. The next step is to collect data about the relationships between these nodes, and 
about the new nodes to which the relationship develops This is a typical method for studying 
distributed coordination (Hossain and Kuti, 2010).  
Basically, network modelled coordination uses social network analysis modelling, deriving its 
procedures and techniques to apply them in the organisational interaction context. Next, two 
seminal studies are briefly discussed. These studies used networked analysis to study 
coordination and communication during emergencies and disasters. 
2.4.1.1. Kapucu on networks and disaster coordination 
Interaction among agents (organisations) within the coordination system engaged in crisis 
response results in the emergence of nonlinear system in theory and of a CAS in practice. This 
system responds to both the demands from the environment and the degree of pressure or 
support from other organisations (Comfort and Kapucu, 2006). The dynamics of complex 
adaptive systems are ever changing. Kauffman (1993), a research biologist, described these 
systems as residing at the “edge of chaos”, where there is enough structure to hold and 
exchange information, and sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. In this region, 
organisations are self-organising and are able make the most creative responses and reallocate 
resources and actions to meet changing demands from the environment and to achieve a better 
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fit with it (Kauffman, 1993, Holland, 1995, Wasserman and Faust, 1995, Alter and Hage, 
1993).  
Using CAS theory, Kapucu (2005) analysed the inter-organisational interactions among 
public, private and non-profit organisations that evolved in response to the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks. He identified the primary organisations that were involved in the 
response to the attack and then elicited the primary nodes of interactions among those 
organisations in order to model the inter-organisational coordination that evolved during the 
response process. He used situation reports from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and interviewed selected public and non-profit managers involved in the response. 
He then identified reciprocal organisational interactions and constructed a matrix for network 
analysis, proceeding to analyse the network data to measure the degree of closeness 
betweenness centrality and cliques and groups using UCINET (Version 6). The FEMA 
situation report included 41 actors (organisations), as depicted in Figure 2-9: 
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Figure 2-9: Organisational Network – FEMA situation reports 
Content analysis indicated that interactions were limited and occurred primarily between 
organisations of similar types, but were infrequent across jurisdictional lines. For example, 
public organisations interacted most frequently with other public organisations of the same 
jurisdiction. The same applied to private and non-profit organisations (Kapucu, 2005). 
Evaluating the location of actors in the network is one of the methods used to understand both 
networks and their participants. The centrality measure is the basic tool to determine the 
importance of a node in the network (Everett and Borgatti, 1999). It describes the locations of 
individual organisations in terms of how close they are to the centre of action in the network 
(Kapucu, 2005). Kapucu calculated and discussed three measures of centrality: group, 
closeness and betweenness.  
Group degree centrality is defined as the number of non-group nodes connected to group 
members. By having more ties to other actors, these have access to more resources (Everett 
and Borgatti, 1999). Kapucu’s (2005) calculations showed that FEMA was the most central, 
hence most influential organisation.  
Using closeness centrality, which accounts for the immediate ties an actor has (Wasserman 
and Faust, 1995), results again showed FEMA as the most central actor, followed by the US 
Military Armed forces, the NY Government/Mayor and Health and Human Services. On the 
other hand, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) had the greatest farness.  
Betweenness centrality measures an actor’s position on the geodesic paths between all pairs of 
actors. Higher betweenness centrality means that the actor is more independent as how it 
decides to route its communication to others. This analysis also revealed that FEMA was the 
most central node, followed by the NY City Government/Mayor (Kapucu, 2005).  
Kapucu then proceeded to briefly analyse the groupings of the response network, namely the 
cliques. This approach is important in understanding the structure of the network by 
emphasising how dense connections are compounded and extended to develop larger cliques 
and subgroupings (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). Understanding the embeddedness of an 
organisation in the structure of groups within a larger network is important for understanding 
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its behaviour, such as acting as a bridge between groups. The way the organisation is 
embedded has “profound consequences for the ways that these actors see the network, and the 
practice that they are likely to practice to sustain or dysfunction the collaboration” (Kapucu, 
2005). Calculations using UCINET showed that FEMA, Verizon, HHS, NY City 
Government/Mayor, NYCEMO, USDA and the US Military Armed Forces were in the middle 
of the action in the sense that they were members of many of the groupings and served to 
connect them by co-membership (Kapucu, 2005). 
2.4.1.2. Comfort on complexity and increasing efficiency in disaster responses 
Comfort, Dunn et al. (2004) argued rightly that rapid response to extreme events is one of the 
least understood problems in administrative practice. Hence, coordination in multi-
organisational settings is extraordinarily difficult to achieve, as it is perceived as a conflict 
between order and flexibility. They used CAS theory as the basis to study the multi-
organisational coordination process in disaster mitigation and response. They propose that 
such coordination can be viewed as a self-organising process whose main foundation lies in 
the quick information exchange and feedback that leads to mutual adaptation and reciprocity. 
This extensive information exchange process is beyond the cognitive capacity of human 
decision makers, hence the need for coordination.  
Comfort, Dunn et al. (2004b) then proposed a socio-technical system (STS) which uses the 
flexibility of current information technology systems to support adaptive behaviour by 
individuals and organisations (Coakes et al., 2002). In practice, a STS represents an interacting 
set of individuals, organisations and technical entities that are capable of adjusting their 
behaviour reciprocally to one another and to their operating environment in order to achieve a 
shared goal of improved performance (Comfort 1994). There is a reciprocal relationship 
between the technical components of the system and the individuals and organisations they 
support. The technical systems extend the knowledge base, memory and reasoning capacity 
for those individuals and organisations, whom would in turn monitor the performance of the 
technical components to ensure that they are functioning as expected.  
Then Comfort et al. (2004a) trailed decision support demonstration project to implement a 
STS called an interactive, intelligent spatial information system (IISIS) for disaster mitigation 
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and management in the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region. An important characteristic of the 
IISIS is that it is a decision support system that adapts advanced information technologies to 
support increased coordination among multiple organisations at different jurisdictional levels 
engaged in risk reduction and response operations. The system used three technologies to 
create the event-based prototype IISIS:  
1- Interactive communication via both Internet and secure intranet networks 
2- GIS and remote sensing imagery to provide graphic representation of the area 
3- Intelligent reasoning to provide estimates and probabilities of known losses and 
likely consequences. 
The trial demonstration linked the following jurisdictional levels: 
1- University of Pittsburgh, with a daytime population of 32,000 
2- Three municipalities (Pittsburgh, Penn Hills and Wilkins Township), population 
about 400,000 
3- County level represented by Allegheny County, population 1.26 million. 
As a result of the simulation, 100% of the participants, who were emergency management 
managers, reported favourably on the innovative use of information technology in disaster 
management and considered that IISIS would improve the daily operations of the agencies. 
They also reported that they would be willing to invest time and resources in learning more 
about IISIS system.  
Furthermore, findings from a set of expert interviews with responsible emergency managers 
identified five critical issues that affected performance in inter-organisational disaster 
management operations: 
 1- Intermittency in assessment 
 2- Lack of timely information about the impact of an impending threat on critical 
infrastructure for the community  
 3- Loss of information when an emergency escalates from one jurisdictional level to 
the next  
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 4- The lack of real-time monitoring of threatening events as well as the lack of 
capacity to transmit this information between field operations units and emergency 
operations centres.  
 5- The lack of systematic means of monitoring multiple sites simultaneously in order 
to provide practising managers with a comprehensive profile of the evolving disaster in 
a region-wide event. 
When the results above are considered, communication, which is a form of coordination and a 
prerequisite for it, represents a main concern for disaster management practitioners and is 
attributed to the high risk that exists in some impending threats. This is especially relevant 
when coordination is multi-jurisdictional and spans multiple geographical sites. 
2.4.1.3. Zhiang and the dynamics of inter-organisational ties during crisis  
Zhiang (2002) investigated the dynamics of inter-organisational coordination during crisis 
situations from the perspective of the usual process organisations would use and the efficiency 
of this process. He noted that researchers have devoted much less attention to the underlying 
dynamics of how and why inter-organisational ties are used He also argued that on the there is  
a lack of exploration into the role of resources in social networks at the organisational level. 
He discussed that organisational effectiveness, and ultimately survival, is not just a matter of 
intra-organisational design but also a matter of how they rely on each other. In crisis those ties 
become more important. 
Zhiang first explored the dynamics of inter-organisational relationships from a resource 
dependence perspective; then he used an agent-based modelling technique to build a 
computational model to simulate those dynamics.  
Putting the above methodology into perspective, ties between different organisations have a 
purpose being resource access. Hence, two nodes connect to each other in the hope of 
extending resource access that will be mutually beneficial (Blau, 1986). These ties are also 
directional, reflecting the amount of resources one node receives compared to the other node. 
The content of the ties reflects the different resource needs of the organisation, and their 
strength reflects the quantity and the content of the contacts.  
- 52 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Zhiang (2002) applied this method to analyse the Hurricane Andrew incident in August 1992. 
Hurricane Andrew hit southern Florida, causing billions of dollars in damage to the social, 
biological and economical systems. The crisis began at the local level of organisations, being 
the county government agencies (police, public works), which had frequent communication 
due to their formal relations and geographical distances. One level up from the local 
governance level was the Florida state level (Florida State Government, Florida National 
Guard). Links established to those agencies were not as strong as connections at the local 
level. The third level was the Federal level, including the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Government executive office, and US Public Health services. Links from 
the local to the federal level were weak due to infrequent use of the connections, with an 
exception being the American Red Cross which maintained local branches in the South 
Florida area.  
We will look at the stages through which links were activated or mentioned but not activated: 
Stage 1: On 23rd of August; the day prior to Hurricane Andrew hitting the southern Florida 
area, local agencies relied on their strong ties to provide resources to the local community but 
they soon recognised the potential impact of insufficient resources. The tie with the state 
government was mentioned but not activated, the National Guard was alerted, and the tie with 
the American Red Cross (ARC) began to be used, see Figure 2-10. 
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Figure 2-10: Reported dynamics of organisational ties in the Hurricane Andrew incident on August 23, 
1992. (Lin, 2002) 
 
Stage 2: Ties with Florida State Government were introduced along with ties to National 
Guard troops, the National Hurricane Centre in Florida and the Coast Guards. Figure 2-11 
shows those links. 
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Figure 2-11: Reported dynamics of organisational ties in the Hurricane Andrew incident on August 24, 
1992 (Lin, 2002) 
Stage 3: From August 25 to 27, the second to fourth days of the Hurricane, the tie with the 
Florida State Government was more intensively used along with the Florida Department of 
Health and Rehabilitation. The State Government and the County requested urgent help from 
the State Government; see Figure 2-12:  
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Figure 2-12: Reported dynamics of organisational ties in the Hurricane Andrew incident from August 25 
to 27, 1992 (Lin, 2002) 
 
Stage 4: From August 28 to September 8, state and local governments realised that tier 
resources were insufficient to resolve persisting problems such as providing home and shelter 
for homeless residents and raising funds for wide-scale reconstruction. Ties with the Federal 
Government and FEMA were intensified. Also any weak ties that could bring possible 
resources were enlivened; this is illustrated in Figure 2-13. 
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Figure 2-13: Reported dynamics of organisational ties in the Hurricane Andrew incident from August 28 
to September 8, 1992 (Lin, 2002) 
 
This case analysis provided interesting results. Firstly, when faced with situations with huge 
resource demands, organisations rely on their stronger ties first to satisfy those needs and later 
on the expansion of weaker ties. The rationale is that the organisations’ bounded rationality 
limits their foreseeing the impacts of the crisis. Secondly when they don’t have enough 
resources, the organisations start cascading their links. The results also indicated that 
organisations used these links to exchange resources without diffusing decision powers to the 
upper levels. 
The three cases discussed above illustrate the complexity of disaster management and the 
different approaches to tackling such topics. Kapucu’s work represents a formal investigation 
on how “organisational design can be used to help track the inter-organisational coordination 
- 57 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
in emergencies” (Kapucu, 2005) by investigating interdependencies in complex environments. 
Comfort, Dunn et al. (2004a) emphasised the complexity of this topic and piloted a socio-
technical solution for managers. Zhiang (2002) used network principles and the concept of 
weak and strong ties to study how networks are formed and then cascaded based on resource 
needs. Yet all these researchers approached multi-agency coordination as a dynamic subject 
and applied the networking perspective, using social network principles to model this 
complexity.  
2.4.2. Comparing standard coordination theory and dynamic coordination in 
complex environments 
Dealing with coordination as a dynamic system creates new challenges, qualitative and 
quantitative, theoretical and analytical. In preparation for addressing those challenges later, 
Table 2-5 highlights the similarities and differences: 
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Table 2-5: Comparing standard to dynamic coordination 
Standard coordination Dynamic coordination 
Predefined tasks and boundaries.  Most of the time, tasks have no defined 
boundaries. 
Modelling is based on conventional 
organisational structures. 
New modelling techniques: organisations 
are autonomous agents interacting with 
each other on a needs basis. 
Coordination structure is pre-determined. Coordination structure is emergent; might 
use existing structures as blueprint for the 
emerging one. 
Uses standardisation (work processes, 
outputs, and skills) as a form of 
coordination. 
Standardisation is not always achievable 
due to different organisational 
cultures/methodologies. 
Limited degree of flexibility due to 
predefined structures/tasks/boundaries. 
Flexibility is the norm to deal with 
variability of environmental demands. 
Considers ad-hoc coordination, mutual 
adjustment, as a phase of the coordination 
process. 
Ad hoc coordination is an integral part of 
the coordination process. 
Usually bureaucratic, based on norms and 
procedures (Neal and Phillips, 1995). 
Non-bureaucratic, loosely coupled 
organisational approach (Dynes, 1983). 
Accepts a certain degree of 
decentralisation, like Malone’s 
decentralised market structure.  
Has a high degree of decentralisation 
where organisations are loosely coupled. 
Top down. Bottom up. 
 
The overview above demonstrates the necessity for a distinctive view about dynamic 
coordination in complex environments. It is important to note that one of the prevalent 
illustrations used for dynamic coordination are disasters, which require multi-agency 
coordination in changing environmental demands.  
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Such complex environments “need an enormous coordination effort and are implemented 
through both types of mechanisms: structural and formal, plus informal and subtle” (Jon and 
Jarillo, 1989, Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). Thus, neglecting one facet of coordination does 
not constitute a complete coordination framework. In this thesis I propose to use a “hybrid 
coordination” method in researching and creating coordination models. This hybrid 
coordination is designed to create a complete coordination overview by viewing formal 
mechanistic coordination with the left eye and informal organic coordination with the right 
eye. Merging both represent a unique opportunity to model “realistic” coordination 
mechanisms and structures, especially when moving from a uni-dimensional to a multi-
dimensional perspective. Other researchers have agreed that informal and subtle coordination 
mechanisms must be added to existing structural and formal mechanisms to cope with 
complex conditions (Lawrence and Lorsh, 1967, Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986).  
This integrated networked coordination strategy must include new coordination tools besides 
the earlier ones. These new tools might contain lateral relationships that cut across the formal 
lines of the macro-structure such as teams, task forces, committees and integrative 
departments (Jon and Jarillo, 1989). Hybrid coordination emphasises the need to be responsive 
to different strategic requirements in today’s complex and diversified environments. It will 
enhance the development of sophisticated coordination mechanisms, avoiding the simplistic 
centralisation-decentralisation dichotomy. All informal mechanisms must be used, so that 
organisations have sufficient flexibility to be responsive and adaptive to changes in 
environment and conditions (Bartlett and Goshal, 1999).  
2.4.2.1. Proposing Open System Coordination 
It is evident from the coordination literature presented earlier that extension of theory into 
more dynamic environments (Kapucu, 2005) which demand “interdependent delivery 
systems” (Hage, 1975) to achieve goals that are “too big for one organisation to handle” (Ven 
et al., 1975, Alexander, 1993) is lacking to date. Capitalising on the discussion in Sections 
2.2.2–2.2.5 above, one can deduce that coordination theory needs to be extended to cater for 
such dynamic, complex environments. I propose to call this extension “Open Systems 
Coordination” (OSC). I use the term “system” because such coordination exhibits systems 
thinking characteristics such as dynamism, interdependency between components (agencies) 
- 60 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
and complex behaviour (Leischow and Milstein, 2006, Trochim et al., 2006). Some of the 
characteristics of this coordination would be: 
1. Emerging structures: New structures emerge when dynamic interaction between the 
micro parts of the system creates a coherent emergent macro-level structure. It is 
desirable that this structure is self-organised (De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005). Such 
structures are heavily reliant on communication facilitated by today’s advanced IT 
structures. The self-regulating process is mutually adjustable, multi-directional, and 
even asynchronous.  
2. Ad hoc coordination: This resembles the “adhocracy” structure described by 
Mintzberg (1979) but on larger scale. It is mutually adjusting, decentralised, 
horizontal and organically structured. Warren (1974) described “mobilization 
coordination” as activities set in motion by a single organisation gathering 
resources and forging ad hoc relationships as needed to pursue the organisation’s 
objectives. An ad hoc coordination structure emulates organisation adhocracy in 
that it is based dynamically on functional requirements and not on rigid predefined 
structures. Warren also pointed out that ad hoc mobilisation is an important source 
of coordination, although it is frequently overlooked because of an implicit 
equating of coordination with “structural coordination alone” (Ven and Gordon, 
1984). The initiation of OSC might not be an organisation seeking its own 
objectives; rather it might be originated by many based, on their interest in the task.  
3. Anticipated heterogeneity: Not all of the organisations have the same intra-
organisational structure, nor skills or products. Of course, this does not suggest that 
homogeneity does not exist. Rather, some organisations with homogeneous natures 
are part of the coordination consortium, but they are not the exclusive case. The 
coordination process can be viewed as a joint task force or a coalition network of 
hybrid entities. To illustrate the concept, a small-scale example would be a call to 
an emergency call centre reporting an accident. The different organisations 
involved would be the person making the call, the customer service centre 
receiving the call and then instigating requests to fire brigade, police, ambulance 
and other private agencies (car-towing, private health care providers) to attend the 
accident site. The person making the call is an end user who will benefit from the 
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service. The call centre is an organisation both receiving and disseminating 
information to coordinate appropriate parties. The teams attending the site have 
different skills, organisational hierarchies, even communication protocols and 
objectives. They coordinate with each other for the benefit of the end user, without 
further direction from the call centre. They assess the end user’s needs and the 
local environment and might arrange more teams from their parent organisations or 
from other organisations as per need. 
4. Information decentralisation: With this coordination there is no single organisation 
sitting at the top of the coordination hierarchy that has the complete information, or 
what is called a single cognitive entity. Every organisation has partial information 
that it shares with others in order to build, and help others build, a better 
understanding of the environment. Sometimes localised and/or specialised 
information is what each organisation seeks to collect. An example of specialised 
data is that in a disaster situation, medical teams will be more interested in 
collecting epidemiological data rather than collapsed building and structural data. 
One can even anticipate that there are organisations whose sole task is to process 
data and relay it to interested parties, bridging information gaps and holes.  
5. Diversity of goals: In OSC, it is tolerated that each coordinating party might have 
slightly different objectives. The combination of these objectives should comprise 
the overall goal behind the coordination process. Such tolerance of goal diversity is 
rarely present in other coordination models. A good example of this is the civil and 
military cooperation during complex emergencies, presented by (Rietjens et al., 
2009) regarding Afghanistan. It has been always the case that the military, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and local government have different 
objectives. These objectives might overlap, and may even conflict. However, the 
total goal for all is stabilising the country and enhancing the population’s living 
standards. The diversity might be due to different reasons: an organisation’s 
mission statement, culture, stakeholders, beneficiaries, skills, etc. As well, there are 
variables imposed by the environment, including population, security, culture, 
religion and need. By agreeing to coordinate, the military, NGOs and local 
government acknowledge that none of them is able to meet the final goal alone. 
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Hence a coordination mechanism needs to evolve that enables each party to 
achieve its own goals. This need is appreciated and tolerated by all. 
6. The coordination structure demonstrates self-organising behaviour. Nodes route the 
communication through the most efficient path and seek to acquire the information 
or resources they need by using the routes they learn through their connections. 
The structure re-organises if a node is disconnected or a new one is added. This, it 
can be added, is a typical characteristic of biological networks such as fungal 
networks.  
In OSC, each organisation is an independent entity making its own decisions, but 
interdependent on others to manage the larger task. In this sense every organisation is an 
“agent”, extending relationships with other “agents”, resulting in a multi-agent dynamic 
environment. This emergence process is called an evolving dynamic coordination, and is 
expected to be temporal in that it will last as long as the task entails. 
OSC can be used in uncertain or loose coupled coordinating environments where coordination 
mechanisms cannot be perceived enough to be structured beforehand. It is comprised of a 
coalition of multi-skilled organisations that want to deal with a situation in hand. Some of 
these scenarios might be: 
1- Disasters such as earthquakes and disease outbreaks 
2- Decentralised military operations where units need to organise with each other most of 
the time rather than with the command and control centre  
3- Huge project consortiums, especially during the early beginnings of their formation  
4- Coordination between civil and military organisations during complex emergencies or 
in the aftermath of war. 
OSC coordination can provide a theoretical framework for dynamic environments, and yet 
there remains the need for a method to quantify and measure such coordination. For this, 
network theories and measures for analysis of OSC are introduced in the next section. 
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2.5. Disasters in the medical context 
Disaster management is inherently complex due to the interdependent nature of the responses 
from multiple organisations that have responsibility for dealing with the situation collectively 
(Comfort et al., 2001). An infectious disease outbreak can be considered a particular example 
of a disaster where the dynamics of the situation are particularly important. It is distinct from 
earthquakes, bushfires or floods that affect only a particular geographical area (that might be 
large but is nevertheless bounded). Another difference is that the microbial world is complex, 
dynamic and constantly evolving. Pathogens proliferate rapidly, mutate frequently, and mutate 
with relative ease to new environments and hosts as well as developing resistance to the drugs 
used to treat them. The phenomenal growth of international travel has vastly increased the 
speed with which pathogens, incubating in unsuspecting human beings and animals, can cross 
continents, invade new territories and set up residence (Heymann and Rodier, 2001). Table 2-6 
is a comparison chart highlighting some differences between disease outbreak and bushfire or 
flood disasters. 
  
- 64 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Table 2-6: Differences between disease outbreak and bushfire/flood disasters 
Disease outbreak Bushfire/flood 
Wave pattern behaviour determined by the 
pathogen infectivity; might re-infect the same 
affected area/population. 
After burning a certain area, does not return to it. 
Can arise out of another disaster (flood or 
earthquake) due to environmental and population 
behavioural changes.  
Rarely preceeded by other disasters.  
Outbreaks can cross geographic boundaries to 
become a global phenomenon (e.g. H1N109, 
SARS). 
Bounded by geographical characteristics (Bush, 
river locations)  
Population discriminative; usually some 
population segments (elderly, children) are more 
vulnerable than others. 
Population is targeted based on geographical 
location vulnerability alone.  
Mutative and adaptive (influenza is the best 
example). This antigenic drift adds to the 
complexity of spread patterns. 
N/A 
Spread patterns are influenced by different 
factors including pathogen contagion, 
demography and behaviour. 
Spread is based on simple factor(s), mainly 
geographical characteristics. 
Might have a deterministic effect on health 
workforce (health workers will have families to 
protect; more infection in health workforce as a 
result of greater contact with pathogens). 
Relief effort workers can relocate family to safe 
location.  
 
Creates dymanic clusters that “move”, “die” or 
fragment to hundreds of other locations 
depending on population movements. 
Hotspots are population independent. Can be 
predicted based on geography and meteorology. 
Can be nature made or human-made 
(bioterrorism). 
Can be nature made or human-made (arsonists). 
 
Infectious or communicable diseases have been a risk for human society since the onset of the 
human race. The large-scale spread of infectious disease can have a major impact on the 
society and individuals alike, and sometimes has determined the course of history (McNeill, 
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1977). Infectious disease can originate from natural causes or be introduced by terrorists who 
may choose to attack by deliberate transmission of infectious disease using biological agents. 
Whether the origin of the infectious disease is natural or bioterrorism, it can spread at a rapid 
rate due to expanded trade and travel, resulting in potentially significant loss of life, major 
economic crises, and political instability (Chang et al., 2003). 
One of the intriguing facts is that outbreaks have different transmission and infection rates not 
only between countries but between different states in a single country, as well as within each 
state of similar demographics and geographic characteristics. As an example, Table 2-7 shows 
the reported cases of infection in Australia for the H1N1 2009 outbreak (Eastwood, Durrheim, 
Massey, and Kewley 2009): 
Table 2-7: Confirmed H1N109 infection rates in Australian states and territories at the end of the Contain 
phase, 17 June 2009, from Eastwood, Durrheim, Massey and Kewley 2009 
 
Table 2-7 shows that within the same country the infection rate differed by up to five-fold 
from one state to another (e.g. compare the New South Wales (NSW) rate to those of Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory). Table 2-8 disaggregates information about outbreaks 
within the same state (Eastwood, Durrheim, Massey, and Kewley 2009). 
- 66 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Table 2-8: Confirmed H1N109 infection rates within NSW at the end of the Contain phase June 2009, from 
Eastwood et al. 2009 
 
From Table 2-8 , the Hunter New England (HNE) area had the lowest transmission rate (0.9 
per 100000 population), whereas an adjacent health area (North Coast) had a transmission rate 
more than twice as high (2 per 100 000). Also, HNE had the lowest number of confirmed 
cases in the state of NSW (only 8). Table 2-8 indicates that within the same state there was 
about an eight-fold variation in infection rates. Taking into consideration that demographics 
were similar and the pathogen was the same, then management and coordination of the 
response to the outbreak were factors influencing the number of cases. This effort was led by 
corresponding agencies in each individual state and area health service within the states.  
Outbreak detection and intervention plans usually standardise each type of outbreak according 
to disease type. Hence, researchers and epidemiologists prepare tuberculosis plans, influenza 
plans, etc. In contrast, coordination of the multi-agency response is left to public health 
officials, with very little academic research to support their decisions (Chen et al., 2008, 
Comfort et al., 2004a) . As a result, there are discrepancies in the application of resources, 
which impact on infection rates and may partially explain the variation in the rates shown in 
Table 2-7 and Table 2-8. 
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2.5.1. A quick overview on disease outbreak research 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined a disease outbreak as “the occurrence of 
cases of disease in excess of what would normally be expected in a defined community, 
geographical area or season. An outbreak may occur in a restricted geographical area, or may 
extend over several countries. It may last for a few days or weeks, or for several years. A 
single case of a communicable disease long absent from a population, or caused by an agent 
(e.g. bacterium or virus) not previously recognised in that community or area, or the 
emergence of a previously unknown disease, may also constitute an outbreak and should be 
reported and investigated” (WHO, 2011). Such outbreaks are usually beyond the capacity of 
single jurisdiction or agency. Rather, they require the collaboration of a distinctive pool of 
skills, resources and authorities. The success of such coordination effort requires that “all 
relevant agencies be involved in the response and that effective structures are in place to 
coordinate them” (Jackson et al., 2006).  
Infectious disease outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics attract enormous research efforts both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. According to the ARC journal list of March 2010, there are 68 
journals specialising in that domain. The esteem of these journals is partially reflected by 
some of their high rankings: Lancet Infectious Diseases (15.58), Journal of Infectious Diseases 
(5.81), Clinical Infectious Diseases (8.20), and Emerging Infectious Diseases (6.79) (Reuters, 
2011), based on 2009 rankings. Many other journals publish on disease outbreaks without 
specialising in this domain.  
Another related research field, namely “disease outbreak coordination research” has gathered 
momentum specifically in the last decade after the swine influenza (H1N1 2009), and Severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks as well as following the interest in surveillance 
due to public health concerns and bioterrorism (Edgington, 2010, Eizenberg, 2009, Franco-
Paredes et al., 2009, Gerberding, 2003, Jackson et al., 2006, MacLehose et al., 2001, Neumann 
and Kawaoka). However, the outcomes of these researches are scattered among non-
specialised journals and publications such as Disasters, Disaster Prevention and Management, 
British Medical Journal, Social Science and Medicine, Journal of Immune Based Therapies 
and Vaccines, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: biodefense strategy, practice, and science, 
Science, Foodborne Pathogens & Disease and the Journal of Public Health Management and 
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Practice, to name just a few. Some of this research has focused on the coordination of outbreak 
surveillance (Olsen et al., 2000, Guardado and Clará, 2004, Levy et al., 1998), others on post-
mortems and lessons learned (WATERER et al., 2010, Eastwood et al., 2009), and yet others 
have dealt with policies and practices (Beyrer et al., 2006, Aday, 2005, Wolfe et al., 2001). 
Since diseases spread through different mediums, outbreak coordination research has followed 
the same trend; respiratory intervention and coordination has had a good share of such 
research since it was relevant to most recent outbreaks such as influenza, SARS, and H1N109 
(Heymann, 2004, Tan, 2006, Gerberding, 2003, Abdullah et al., 2003). Other research has 
focused on foot and mouth disease coordination (Sutmoller et al., 2003, Rweyemamu et al., 
2008, Rich et al., 2005), coordination of zoonotic outbreaks (Jackson et al., 2006, Dudley, 
2004, Leslie and McQuiston, 2007), foodborne diseases (Todd, 1997, Sobel et al., 2002, 
Majkowski, 1997), waterborne diseases (Frost et al., 1996, Cassady et al., 2006, O'Brien and 
Stelling, 1995), and sexually transmitted diseases (Chen et al., 2002, Catchpole, 1996, Chen et 
al., 2003).  
Organisational network analysis has been extensively used in political and private 
organisational analysis but has only recently appeared in public health studies (Luke and 
Harris, 2007, Borgatti and Foster, 2003). These studies have looked at specialised public 
health collaboration systems such as AIDS service organisations (Kwait et al., 2001a, Wright 
and Shuff, 1995, Shumate et al., 2005), services for the mentally ill and mental health (Albert 
et al., 1998, Kawachi and Berkman, 2001), health policy (Cattell, 2001)  , services for the 
social wellbeing (Rook, 1984) and health promotion (Bandura, 2004) . Coordination in the 
case of disease outbreak has been researched mostly from the surveillance and evaluation 
perspective (MacLehose et al., 2001). Here the focus is extended the management and 
intervention perspective. 
2.5.2. Influenza H1N1 disease spread phases 
A considerable amount of research has been undertaken into infectious disease outbreaks from 
an epidemiological perspective, including analysis of the role of pathogen transformation, 
mutation and infection (Fraser et al., 2004a) , and the modelling of disease spread (Newman, 
2002).Some of these approaches represent epidemics of communicable diseases as Markovian 
- 69 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
(Zhang et al., 2007)  or non-Markovian processes (Becker, 1977)  and apply stochastic 
epidemic threshold theory to guide public health measures aimed at preventing major 
outbreaks (Becker, 1977, Gani and Jerwood, 1971, Streftaris and Gibson, 2002); Other 
approaches identify general properties of emerging infectious agents to determine the success 
of different public health measures such as isolating symptomatic individuals or tracing and 
quarantining their contacts (Fraser et al., 2004b) . There has also been a promising attempt to 
develop a disease outbreak event corpus (Conway, 2010) 
2.5.2.1. A brief introduction to influenza  
“Influenza killed more people in a year than the Black Death of the middle ages killed in a 
century; it killed more people in twenty-four weeks than AIDS has killed in twenty-four 
years.” So wrote John M. Barry in his bestselling account of the horrific “Spanish flu” 
pandemic of 1918-1920, The Great Influenza (Barry, 2005). The “Spanish flu” was a global 
phenomenon – see Figure 2-14 – that caused the death of 40 to 100 million humans at a time 
when the communications and means of transport were not as fast and efficient as they are 
today (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009).  
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Figure 2-14: Transmission of Spanish flu around the world, from Nicholson GK et al., eds. Textbook of 
influenza, 1998 
 
The 1918 influenza pandemic was not the only one that the 20th century witnessed. It was 
followed by another in 1958-1959 and finally the one in 1968 (Davey, 2007, Taubenberger 
and Morens, 2006). 
The first decade in the 21st century welcomed what will be known as the first influenza 
pandemic of the 21st century: H1N1 2009, or what is commonly called “swine flu”. The first 
cases were reported in early April 2009, characterised by acute respiratory tract infections in 
individuals in Mexico City and the state of San Luis Potosi and Oaxaca, Mexico. The cases 
were young adults with increased duration of transmission of seasonal influenza. To the 
bewilderment of microbiologists, the influenza A virus that was isolated could not be typed in 
the reference laboratory (Fraser et al., 2009). On April 13, in the capital city of Oaxaca, a 39 
years old female died of severe atypical pneumonia. On April 17, Mexico issued a national 
pandemic alert, and the necessary steps were taken to prevent the population from attending 
crowded places. On April 23, laboratory tests fully identified the virus as influenza A (H1N1) 
from a virus strain unknown until then, which means that its behaviour, virulence, 
transmission capacity origin, susceptibility to the available antivirals, and pandemic potentials 
were all unknown (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009). On April 25, the WHO declared a “public 
health emergency of international concern” (Bishop et al., 2009). On 29 April, the WHO 
announced that H1N1 warranted moving the global pandemic alert to level phase 5 
(www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/). Phase 5 indicates “sustained human-to-human 
transmission of a novel influenza strain of animal origin in one WHO region in the world, and 
exported cases detected in other regions” (Fraser et al., 2004b). 
The pathway to communicate and achieve such results in one month (from pandemic 
discovery to identifying and isolating the virus then to announcing phase 5 pandemic) 
branched all around the globe. Mexico sent samples to Centres for Disease Prevention and 
Control (CDC) and then to Winnipeg laboratory in Canada (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009). 
The WHO communicated with health authorities all around the world and many activated their 
influenza pandemic response plans in response to WHO’s announcements (Bishop et al., 
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2009). This network formed a unique coalition of nations and organisations that worked 
collectively and swiftly to understand the new threat on hand.  
The official number of deaths from laboratory-confirmed pandemic influenza A H1N1 2009 
infection worldwide reported to the WHO as of 28 March 2010 was 17 483. The economic 
impact of the outbreak in Mexico was estimated at more than $3.2 billion, but the global 
economic impact of the pandemic is uncertain at the present time (Girard et al., 2010).  
2.5.2.2. Influenza background information 
Influenza is a highly contagious viral disease of the respiratory tract. It can spread rapidly 
through populations and has a tendency to mutate, which can lead to new strains of the 
disease. It spreads by large droplets when infected people cough or sneeze. It can spread both 
directly (such as by shaking hands) or through indirect contact with objects contaminated with 
droplets from an infected person (such as a contaminated tissue or door handle).  
Influenza is generally categorised into three types A, B and C. Influenza A and B outbreaks 
occur as seasonal influenza. “A” is the type that usually causes pandemics (Yang et al., 2009).  
Influenza A subtypes are characterised by distinct features in the surface proteins (antigens) of 
the virus. Small mutations regularly occur in these surface proteins, creating new variations. 
This phenomenon, called antigenic drift, means that seasonal influenza vaccines often need to 
be modified each year to better match the circulating strains. Aquatic birds are the natural 
reservoir for influenza A viruses but various subtypes also circulate in humans and other 
animals, including pigs and horses.  
Unpredictably, entirely new influenza A subtypes can emerge with the capacity to infect 
humans. This comes as a result of a large mutation in the virus (called antigenic shift), or 
when the genes of two type A viruses mix to produce a new strain (called re-assortment). The 
virulence of the virus (how sick it makes people) and its infectivity decide the impact of the 
pandemic, with the most severe types being both highly transmissible and causing severe 
illness. For influenza pandemic to occur, three criteria must be met: 
1. A new influenza virus must emerge to which humans have little or no immunity. 
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2. The new virus must be virulent enough to cause death in humans.  
3. The new virus must have the capacity to spread efficiently (sustainably) from person to 
person. (Tobin, 2010) 
2.5.2.3. H1N1 spread model 
A novel pandemic brings many challenges stemming from many uncertainties about all the 
aspects of the outbreak, including the virulence, transmissibility, and origin of the virus. This 
in turn results in uncertainty in judging the potential of the pandemic and the appropriate 
reactive public health measures such as decisions for school closures (Fraser et al., 2009). 
Hence, scientists have used mathematical models to understand the spatial-temporal 
transmission dynamics of influenza. These have been used as tools to predict the effect of 
public health interventions on mitigating pandemics (Coburn et al., 2009). Early in the 20th 
century Kermack and McKendrick (1932) developed the first mathematical model that could 
be used to describe the influenza pandemic. This model is known as the Susceptible-
Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model and is shown in Figure 2-15. 
 
Figure 2-15: SIR model of disease transmission, from Kermack and McKendrick, 1932. 
 
In this model, the population is segmented into three classes: susceptible (S), infectious (I) and 
recovered (R). Individuals who become infected proceed from class S to class I at a rate 
determined by the infectiousness of the virus and the prevalence of the infection. Infectious 
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individuals recover and move to class R, at which point they are immune to future infection. 
This model can be and has been extended to include immunity that wanes over time. Hence 
other models were developed like the SIRS model – the last S standing for the recovered 
population that is susceptible again (Coburn et al., 2009).  
2.5.3. Disease outbreak workflow and tasks 
Managing disease outbreaks is an information-intensive task that relies substantially on 
information collection, validation, sharing, and visualisation (Baber et al., 2007). (Tschoegl et 
al., 2006). This leads to the need for establishing a multi-agency coordinating complex system 
consisting of cross-disciplinary public and private health professionals supported by advanced 
information systems. This can be described as infectious disease informatics (IDI), which is 
“an interdisciplinary research area that focuses on the design, implementation, and evaluation 
of advanced systems, techniques, and methods for managing infectious disease and epidemic 
outbreaks, ranging from prevention to surveillance and detection” (Hitchcock et al., 2007). 
Approaching the same issue from a different angle, the organisations interacting during the 
disease outbreak process represent a unique form of inter-organisational coordination. They 
create a matrix of interdisciplinary agencies coordinating within certain time constraints 
(disease infectivity characteristics). To understand the complexity of such a task, it is 
necessary to review some of the activities usually performed during disease outbreaks. The 
general schemes of these tasks are shown in Figure 2-16. 
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Figure 2-16: Schematic diagrams for the tasks during the outbreak 
 
Some of these tasks are: 
1- Horizon scanning: Horizon scanning is done to provide advance notification and 
understanding of the new and re-emerging infectious diseases. It is also used to 
communicate knowledge and technologies to health departments and policymakers to 
avert such potential risks.  
2- Surveillance and detection: Disease surveillance is a basic tool for discovering the 
initiation of infectious diseases. It is the ongoing collecting, reporting, and analysing of 
public health data in a systematic manner to detect and monitor those diseases. Public 
health authorities use this term to define systems that use different methodologies to 
collect data and monitor outbreaks origination and progress. Surveillance keeps the 
world alert to changes in infectious disease threat and provides the background data 
needed to detect any unusual up-surge in cases of well-known endemics, the 
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appearance of a previously unknown pathogen, or an outbreak caused by deliberate use 
of a biological agent (Heymann and Rodier, 2001). There are different approaches to 
surveillance systems: Some infectious disease surveillance programs monitor a disease 
over time, like the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (Layne, 2006); 
others attempt to detect and track specific diseases, like the U.S. Department of 
Defence Biological Threat Reduction Program (Levac, 2006). Still others report on 
unusual clinical cases or disease clusters that are judged by experts to be of concern to 
the infectious disease community (Hutwagner et al., 2003). Other systems rely on 
“case definitions and clinical observations; others monitor laboratory test results (e.g., 
serology); some use analysis of samples routinely collected by sentinel clinicians; 
some derive data from routine computer-based searches of patient or public health 
records; and some use media reports about disease outbreaks” (Hitchcock et al., 2007). 
Not only does disease surveillance provide information about novel diseases, spikes in 
routine diseases, and characteristics of pandemics; it also informs about actions, which 
can be further investigated, response plans and strategies (Sell, 2010). Yet surveillance 
data by itself does not suffice to create successful response; the data must be carefully 
analysed by organisations that will utilise it to create situational awareness, develop 
plans and mobilise resources (Arita et al., 2004). Surveillance is a necessary 
prerequisite for successful reporting and response (Hitchcock et al., 2007).  
The importance of surveillance cannot be understated. It can define the behaviour of 
diseases in populations and on this magnitude the public health problem can be 
assessed and an effective strategy developed (Arita et al., 2004). For example, the 
importance of surveillance was vividly illustrated during smallpox eradication in India 
and West Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was found that only 10% of cases 
were reported to health authorities. Hence it was deduced that mass vaccination 
without surveillance was ineffective: it must be guided by surveillance (Fenner and 
Organization, 1988). 
Traditionally, surveillance lay solely in the domain of public health, but as the 
economic, social, and political effects of diseases have been recognised, and due to 
bioterrorism threats, it is now a mission pursued by defence, intelligence, and national 
- 76 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
security-focused agencies as well (Sell, 2010). Surveillance systems try to collect 
information about: 
a. Outbreaks of unusual or novel diseases, such as SARS or Ebola. 
b. Increase in routine diseases, such as measles. 
c. Monitoring the outbreak: information can be collected on the spread and 
severity of disease and on potentially vulnerable populations to manage 
intervention and produce recommendations. 
Surveillance can be passive or active. Passive surveillance relies on reports being sent 
to public health agencies from hospitals, laboratories and outpatient visits. Active 
surveillance involves outreach to actively collect disease information from specific 
groups, such as sentinel medical providers or hospitals. Typically, active surveillance 
is undertaken to look for a specific disease, such as influenza or whooping cough. 
Active surveillance is more labour-intensive and requires more public health resources 
than passive surveillance (Gordis, 2004) . 
One interesting facet of surveillance was set up by the WHO which is using informal 
sources of information to detect suspected outbreaks as well as the usual formal ones 
such as U.S. Centres of Disease and Control (CDC), the U.K. Public Health Laboratory 
Service and the French Institutes Pasteur (Heymann and Rodier, 2001). One of the 
most important informal sources is a semi-automated electronic system called the 
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) that continuously scours world 
communications and crawls websites, social media, newswires, and electronic 
discussion groups for rumours of unusual disease events. Another example of informal 
surveillance collaboration, established in 2003, is Alumni for Global Surveillance 
Network (ASGnet). This group was initiated in Japan and consisted of principal 
government officials who dealt with infectious disease surveillance, forming 60 
sentinels in 29 countries. They reported quarterly, by email, the infectious disease 
cases reported to them (Arita et al., 2004). The importance of such informal systems is 
that they accounted for 65% of the world’s first news of infectious disease events 
between 1997 and 2001 (Heymann and Rodier, 2001). 
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3- Diagnostics: Diagnostics is the process of attempting to determine a possible infection. 
The diagnostic procedure attempts to classify an individual’s condition so to allow 
medical decisions about treatment and prognosis to be made. A number of tests can 
help in the diagnosis of influenza and its clinical management, but the preferred test is 
collecting respiratory samples for influenza testing include nasopharyngeal or nasal 
swab and then using lab-developed reagents to test for viral presence and type. This 
test obtains results usually within 1 to 4 hours (CDC, 2011). 
4- Clinical management of patients: This is the management of patients with influenza-
like illness (ILI). It might include sending some patients home since they do not have 
complicated influenza infection and would be expected to recover within one week. 
Other patients who might have complications will need to be admitted to hospitals, and 
others who might have developed influenza-related pneumonia are at high risk of death 
and should be managed as having severe pneumonia. Such patients will need to be 
admitted to an intensive care unit and need to be managed by specialists with 
appropriate training in intensive care, respiratory medicine and/or infectious diseases 
(This, 2007). It is also well known that during a pandemic, the demand for acute 
clinical care will be high. Hence hospitals and clinical care facilities need to adjust 
their services to maximise the benefit of scarce resources and to plan their surge 
capacities to accommodate the expected influx of patients. The facilities can be 
expected to begin a phased deferral of non-influenza services or to scale back some 
elective services.  
5- Reporting: Reporting pandemics is a multi-tiered complex process. It can start bottom-
up, such as with a surveillance team (be it an emergency department, a GP or a 
laboratory test result) instigating the investigation about a possible outbreak. Or it can 
be top-down, such as the WHO releasing a regional or global declaration or warning 
for a certain pandemic. Between these two simply conceived reporting extremes, a 
complex multi-agency reporting process gathers and follows up information and 
combines it in intelligence reports for decision makers. Besides their reporting lines or 
directions, these reports also differ in content. For instance, WHO issues case 
definition reports which define who is included as a case in an outbreak investigation. 
Other reports aggregate reported case data based on demographics, age, etc. 
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6- Infection control: There are methods and strategies by which the transmission of 
influenza agents can be reduced. These can be as simple as performing hand hygiene. 
Other methods such as social distancing, home isolation or quarantine aim to 
proactively protect susceptible population. Some more drastic measures can be taken if 
need be, such as school closures. Hospitals can apply more sophisticated infection 
control methods to protect non-infected patients and the hospital workforce.  
7- Public communication: influenza pandemic generates immediate, sustained and intense 
demand for information from the public, healthcare providers, policymakers, and news 
media. People need information about what is known and unknown, as well as interim 
guidance to formulate decisions to help protect their health and the health of others. 
Coordination of message development and release of information among federal, state 
and local health officials is critical to help avoid confusion which can undermine 
public trust, raise fear and anxiety, and impede response measures (Reynolds and 
Quinn, 2008). The messages should be timely and transparent to build public 
confidence on one hand and to induce the public to act and maybe change some 
behavioural patterns on the other hand, such as adapting the “etiquette sneeze” 
(Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009). Tools available for communicating with the public 
include traditional media such as television, radio, newspapers or websites, and new 
media such as social networking sites. The messages should cater for linguistically and 
culturally diverse segments of the population in multicultural countries.  
8- Response: A pandemic response involves the collective action of every part of the of 
the health sector. After the response is initiated, continuation of the measures is 
required to address the evolving situation. Response includes some of the tasks 
discussed previously (such as clinical management, public communication). It is 
usually a multi-jurisdictional process by which reports, surveillance information and 
intelligence are used to mobilise resources, based on predetermined operating plans. It 
is important for these plans to be flexible enough to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. 
Governments usually have national response plans, yet international collaboration is 
becoming the standard where WHO plays a leading role in such collaboration.  
9- Intervention: Intervention entails using medical resources to treat and follow up the 
treatment of infected cases, Mainly antiviral agents for influenza can be used to 
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prophylactically prevent infection given exposure, to reduce the probability of clinical 
illness given infection, and to reduce the probability of transmission to others given 
infection (Longini et al., 2004). Given the limited antiviral stockpile, public health 
officials use preventive or prioritised intervention to vaccinate the high-risk and 
susceptible segments of the population such as the elderly and children or the kin of an 
infected person. Intervention also means using other medical means such as ventilators 
for critical care patients who are admitted to intensive care units. 
10- Inter-organisational communication: Communication plays a key role in the ability of 
different agencies to attain and maintain superior coordination. The two concepts are 
linked because communication can be regarded as a necessary and sufficient precedent 
associated with coordination (Miller and Moser, 2004). The wide range of tasks and 
activities performed during an outbreak mandates a great deal of communication 
between relevant agencies. These communications need robust, stable, effective and 
compatible informatics systems (Bdeir et al., 2011). Highlighting the importance of 
communication, a study has shown that the real problem in Hurricane Katrina was lack 
of information and information management. Not enough information was shared 
between those at different levels: field, local Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs), 
hospitals, and the state (Pou, 2008). Many types of information are communicated 
during a pandemic, including: 
a. Case definitions: This is the set of diagnostic criteria standardised for the 
purpose of identifying a particular disease. It can be based on clinical, 
laboratory, epidemiological, or combined clinical and laboratory criteria 
(WHO, 2012). It is usually set by WHO and then disseminated to countries 
concerned. However, each country might customise the case definition 
according to its own standards. It is important for the case definition to be 
accurate, since it dictates which patients with influenza-like illness are to be 
treated as cases. Also case definition changes and updates must be rapidly 
communicated to Emergency Departments, GPs, hospitals, and public health 
officials to ensure accurate reporting of new cases.  
b. Diagnostic results: Like laboratory results; these need to be communicated to 
patients, the test requestor (might be the GP) and public health officials. 
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Compatibility of laboratory systems with other health systems is an important 
factor in getting results to relevant parties quickly, without putting further strain 
on the laboratories to deliver these results.  
c. Situation reports: These reports are used to provide the most recent and 
accurate available information about the pandemic status within a defined 
jurisdiction or geographical boundary. These reports are aggregated from 
hospitals, laboratories, and public health unit data to the state and federal level. 
They are meant to provide decision makers with a clear view of the current 
situation, such as confirmed and suspected cases, hospitalisations, number of 
people tested and treatment given, along with statistical comparisons with 
previous or historical data. Some situation reports also contain resource 
utilisation ratios.  
d. Directives and decisions: These are instructions and/or guidelines that are 
issued from higher levels of the pandemic management committee(s) to those 
who are in executive positions in middle and lower management roles. They 
are then translated to tasks and duties for front line staff in emergency 
departments and other facilities.  
One last note about communication is that it can either pull or push information. In the 
former case, a second party has to be queried in order to gain access to information; in 
the latter case information is provided proactively.  
11- Continual monitoring and assessment: It is necessary to monitor circulating influenza 
strains in order to contribute to ongoing pandemic risk assessment. This also includes 
detecting new cases of new subtype influenza infections.  
12- Resources management: Managing pandemics requires a range of resources, apart 
from human ones, some of these being: PPE (personal protective equipment), 
antibacterial gel, vaccines and swabs. Public health authorities usually stockpile these 
supplies so to avoid any shortages during the pandemic period. Authorities distribute 
these to parties that need them; those parties include GPs and facilities such as 
hospitals, community health centres, schools, etc. By using infection control measures, 
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authorities can effectively reduce the strain on the antiviral stockpile by decreasing the 
expected number of infections. 
13- Antiviral and vaccine preparation: It is not logistically or practically possible to 
prepare reagents and vaccine against all strains of influenza, therefore virus subtypes 
must be prioritised for pandemic vaccine and reagent preparation. This is due to the 
different virus subtypes and antigenic drift that some subtypes such as H1 and H3 
experience (Webby and Webster, 2003). The general stocks of antiviral drugs are too 
low to cope with an epidemic and would be quickly depleted (Smolinski et al., 2003). 
One main method of vaccine preparation is through growing influenza genome in 
embryonic chicken eggs to produce the desired antigenicity. Although this method 
creates safe and effective influenza vaccines, it is too time consuming and too 
dependent on a steady supply of eggs to be reliable in case of pandemic emergency. 
During inter-pandemic periods, 6 months is required to organise sufficient fertile 
chicken eggs for annual vaccine manufacture (Catherine, 2003). Hence scientists and 
virologists are working on other methods such as reverse genetics, that can produce 
vaccines more quickly in pandemic situations (Webby and Webster, 2003) .  
14- Learning: Extreme situations impose a steep learning curve on intervention participants 
from different disciplines. Certainly exercises and training sessions are conducted 
before a pandemic, yet each situation brings unique challenges. Continual sharing of 
new techniques, best practices and personal experiences through continual 
communication and interaction will reduce errors and sub-optimal processes and help 
teams to be adaptable, flexible and receptive to new input (Marshall et al., 2008).  
2.6. Hypothesis 
There is an increasing interest in utilising network theory techniques in research and 
subsequently applying them to increasingly sophisticated coordination scenarios (Zakour, 
1997, Chwe, 2000). The discussion has also demonstrated how these have been applied in 
disaster research. One of the gaps in that research is the application of such techniques to 
studying inter-organisational coordination for a specific form of disaster, disease outbreak. To 
study such a case I explore the H1N1 2009 outbreak within the state of NSW in Australia. 
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In such a coordination framework, different attributes of the node are used, the node being the 
agency or organisation engaged in the coordination. And network measures define its 
positional characteristics. These attributes are those of the social network such as centrality, 
betweenness, and tie strength. The assessment criteria are than compared against a measured 
outcome.  
This modelling technique is based on the concept of independent variables influencing the 
outcomes of the process, which in turn are called the dependent variables. The independent 
variables are the network measures determined by the network structure. They in turn 
influence the dependent variables (Creswell, 2009), which represent some type of performance 
or measure for the coordination process. The dependent variable should be a measurable and 
quantified value that can provide an outcome correlated with the independent ones. 
Figure 2-17 is a high-level view of such a model.  
Network attributes Coordination measures
Independent variables Dependent variables
General model
 
Figure 2-17: Social networks-based model for coordination 
 
Working further to populate this model, it is necessary to decide the appropriate variables to 
be used on each side of the diagram. These should be measurable, selected in accordance with 
the literature, and be collectable, i.e. data that can be quantified from the field. 
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2.6.1. Dependent and independent variables 
Most of the important network measures were discussed in section 2.3.3. Here I briefly 
describe those that have been found indicative for coordination facilitation.  
Degree centrality might be the first measure that shows up as a powerful candidate. In 
coordination related research, degree centrality was found to be an index of a position’s 
potential for activity in the network (Freeman, 1978). (Hossain et al., 2006) showed that out-
degree centrality had a stronger correlation to coordination than in-degree centrality. Hence 
centrality has been chosen as a network based measure, to further determine its effect on 
coordination.  
Another network measure is tie strength, an important attribute for defining the quality of 
relationship between nodes. Several studies have focused on the strength of network ties as a 
source of different kinds of information exchange (Granovetter, 1983). This relationship 
quality is specifically important during disasters and is directly linked to the frequency of 
information sharing and exchange (Uddin and Hossain, 2009). An egocentric analysis of tie 
strength against coordination has found that an increase in the quality of relationships can 
improve coordination attributes such as quality and accessibility of information and overall 
readiness for an emergency situation. That correlation may be due to the context of the data 
itself more than an overarching statement of tie strength (Hossain and Kuti, 2010). 
The last network measure to be used is tier connectedness. Tier level refers to the layer in 
which an organisation exists, such as federal, state, local, private or other types. Tier 
connectedness can be used as a measure to assess the current state of actor involvement. It has 
been suggested that by increasing the efficiency of an actor’s tier connectedness within the 
network, an increase in the potential for the network to coordinate effectively may be found. 
Tier connectedness, henceforth called connectedness, works as an enabler of coordination 
efficiency rather than an inhibitor, by limiting the network involvement to the needs of a given 
tier, thus preventing the circulation of redundant or unnecessary information through the 
network as a product of excessive ties (Hossain and Kuti, 2010).  
These three measures are the independent variables. They are all indicators of how well an 
organisation can coordinate and how efficient the coordination structure itself is. Some of 
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these measures have previously been used as independent variables to measure coordination in 
soft target organisations- being the common access places such as schools, parks and sports 
facilities - and disasters (Hossain and Kuti, 2010, Uddin and Hossain, 2009). 
The dependent variable for disease outbreak should be a clear indicator of performance results 
that can be correlated or not, so as to prove or disprove the null hypothesis. In this research I 
have decided to use the speed with which the coordination began after the outbreak was 
announced, as well as respondents’ perception about how long it took for the coordination to 
become optimal. More detail is presented in Chapter 3. 
Although in this research the main focus was on the state of NSW, during the course of 
interviews it became necessary to classify the organisations that dealt with the outbreak into 
two main broad categories: State and local organisations. State organisations are those that 
work on the state jurisdictional level, with their authority, influence and interest covering the 
whole of NSW. Local organisations are those that act at the area health service jurisdictional 
level. NSW is divided into eight area health services (formerly called local health districts). 
Differences between organisations at each jurisdictional level are expected to reflect on their 
networking characteristics and variables. These elaborations allow a more detailed depiction 
of the model as presented in Figure 2-18. 
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Figure 2-18: Coordination model 
The same measures and concepts can also be applied to the network of informal coordination 
where the same network measures apply, since the ego will be initiating communications. The 
dependent variable is still communication robustness, but this robustness is defined in relation 
to the main reason for initiating informal coordination from the very beginning: bridging 
coordination gaps. Hence as the dependent variable, coordination robustness is considered to 
be the perception of respondents as to the importance of informal coordination to bridge any 
gaps left by formal coordination. How effective was this form of coordination in bridging 
structural holes? (Burt, 1992). Structural holes give the node that is bridging them competitive 
advantage, because nodes at the edges of the chasm do not communicate directly with each 
other, as explained by Burt. In the context of coordination, and especially disaster 
coordination, it is important to cover those holes as effectively as possible during the 
emergence of the network structure. Hence the informal coordination model will use the 
ability of informal coordination to close these gaps, as elaborated in Figure 2-19. 
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Figure 2-19: The informal coordination model. 
2.6.2. Coordination phases 
Coordination structures no longer rigid, as explained previously. They are dynamic and 
change in accordance with the crisis on hand. Hence it was necessary to study the pandemic 
coordination during two main phases, before and during the outbreak. 
Usually pandemic management agencies participate in constant exchanges of information such 
as details of new cases, confirmed lab results as part of surveillance, or horizon scanning 
activities. These are normally constant bureaucratic activities that most public health related 
agencies routinely engage in as part of their standard practices. This information gathering and 
exchange process is an integral and important part of pre-pandemic administration that will 
also lead to a proactive management model. This communication should all lead, theoretically 
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at least, to better management and coordination efforts during the outbreak itself, as the 
agencies are familiar with each other’s roles and communication protocols.  
Hence this research was designed in a way to capture the pre-pandemic communication lines 
and then also capture those lines during the pandemic itself. This could facilitate 
understanding of the coordination lines and how they change with phase change. 
Moreover, it was desirable to investigate coordination more comprehensively during the 
outbreak. Thus I planned to capture both formal and the informal coordination during the 
outbreak management. This represented a unique opportunity to examine the process from 
both facets, which has not previously been undertaken, as elaborated in previous sections.  
Researching informal communication before the outbreak will be done qualitatively. The main 
reason is that before the outbreak, coordination is neither intensive nor demanding. The model 
will be as illustrated in Figure 2-20. 
Before outbreak During outbreak
Formal coordination
Informal coordination
I.V. D.V.
M.V.
I.V. D.V.
M.V.
I.V. D.V.
M.V.
Types of coordination vs outbreak phases that will 
be investigated
Qualitative
 
 Figure 2-20: The three phases of coordination considered in the research 
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2.6.3. Research Hypothesis  
In this section hypotheses are proposed that will be either validated or disproved in analyses. 
2.6.3.1. Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
There is significant relationship between the network positions of the agency (node) in the 
formal structure of the disease outbreak coordination network that exists before the outbreak 
coordination officially starts and the perceived level of performance regarding how long it 
took for the coordination to be optimal. To assess this hypothesis, three sub-hypotheses are 
used to evaluate the principal theory. They are:  
Hypothesis 1a. Degree centrality in formal structure is positively correlated with the 
perceived coordination robustness before and during the outbreak. 
In an organisational environment, an actor with high degree centrality would be ‘in the thick 
of things’ (Freeman, 1978). Hence it is expected that when a node is well connected to other 
nodes it will be better equipped and prepared to start the coordination process or join an 
emerging coordination process due to its high number of links that are expected to expedite 
the transfer of information from that node to others. 
Hypothesis 1b. Tie strength in formal coordination is positively correlated with coordination 
robustness.  
It has been shown in coordination preparedness that the greater the strength of the relation of 
an actor in the network, the more frequently it can share information with others (Uddin and 
Hossain, 2009). Tie strength defines the quality of a relationship and is a source of different 
kinds of information required for information exchange. Weak ties represent relationships that 
might be less efficient and might not be well maintained, whereas strong ties depict frequent 
and stable relationships. It is expected; therefore, that if a network has already forged strong 
ties between its nodes then it will better prepared to initiate the coordination process when 
needed, and is better equipped to meet coordination challenges that might arise later.  
Hypothesis 1c. Tier connectedness in formal coordination is positively correlated with 
coordination robustness.  
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Tier connectedness is considered a measure of the variance of the nodes to which an agency is 
connected during the event (before and during the outbreak). Hence it is used as a measure of 
a node’s multi-tiered relationships. For example, if an organisation operating at the local level 
can establish and maintain relationships with agencies at different jurisdictional levels 
(international, federal, state, etc.), that organisation will then have access to diverse sources of 
information and resources. It is originally anticipated that the collaboration network will 
operate at different jurisdictional levels, creating an interconnecting mesh that crosses tiers, as 
well as the cliques that usually exist within the network greater structure (Hossain and Kuti, 
2010). By moving away from standard centrality definitions, how can such interconnectedness 
be interpreted? Does it correlate with an increase in coordination capability due to this multi-
jurisdictional outreach? Will these diversified links locate the ego-nodes in a preferred 
position in relation to others that produce a more effective coordination performance? These 
are some of the questions to which the inter-connectedness analysis is expected to provide 
answers. 
2.6.3.2.  Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 investigates the informal structure of the coordination during the outbreak. As 
described previously, informal networks are formed when nodes (agencies or individuals) find 
it mutually beneficial to outreach each other to build shared understandings about issues that 
are important to the group. These networks grow spontaneously to satisfy personal needs. 
(Atkinson et al., 2005). In particular, these networks grow when there is need for information 
to deal with the task at hand; they are fast and surprisingly accurate and efficient vehicles for 
news and information (Waldstrøm, 2001, Mintzberg, 1979). Such information needs grow 
when there is insufficient or inaccurate information at times of uncertainty or crisis 
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988), and thus such networks try to arbitrate information to cover 
these structural holes (Burt, 1992). Hence the coordination robustness or performance 
indicator for the informal network in this research is the perceived ability of these informal 
links to bridge the gap and cover those holes. 
Hypothesis 2a. The degree centrality of informal coordination is positively correlated with its 
ability to bridge coordination gaps. 
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 It is very likely that the more informal links that a node creates, the more it will be able to 
obtain novel information otherwise unavailable via formal links. Firstly there must be a 
premeditated intention to create these links and secondly there must be awareness of the 
number of these needed links. In other words, the person occupying a particular organisational 
position reaches out to satisfy his or her information needs so as to facilitate coordination 
capability, hence limiting or extending the number of those links and thus controlling 
outbound centrality. 
Hypothesis 2b. The tie strength of informal coordination is positively correlated with its ability 
to bridge coordination gaps.  
Tie strength is related to the frequency of communication between two parties. Since the main 
reason for initiating an informal link is to obtain some required information, therefore, it is 
anticipated that the more the two parties communicate, the more they will share needed 
information and the more they will be able to coordinate common tasks, especially those that 
need extensive information sharing.  
Hypothesis 2c. Tier connectedness in informal coordination is positively correlated to 
information sharing and bridging coordination gaps. 
Novel information needs to be obtained from diverse resources that exist in different 
repositories, which are not necessarily defined in the standard operating procedures or able to 
be obtained via established links. Therefore, informal links need to extend beyond the pre-
established cliques and spread to cross-jurisdictional and hierarchical levels to satisfy the need 
for novel information. The more a node is connected across tiers, the more it will be able to 
acquire varied information to coordinate complex and demanding tasks.  
2.6.4. Moderating variable 
A moderating variable can be defined as one that affects the direction or strength or both of 
the relation between dependent and independent variables. In the proposed model, the 
moderating variable is considered as a third variable that affects the correlation between both 
variables. Moderating variables usually stem from the socio-demographic characteristics of 
actors such as their age, gender, locality or position. It is of interest to discover if a moderating 
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variable might exercise an influence on the dependent variable. Since this research deals with 
organisational nodes, it was decided to use the organisational tier level of the respondent as the 
moderating variable. This would further enable checking the influence of the organisation’s 
tier on coordination performance. Introduction of the moderating variable gives rise to 
Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3. The relations between H1 and H2 are mediated by the moderating variable 
being the tier level of the organisation that originates the link. 
2.7. Introduction to next chapter 
Having reviewed the literature that leads to the above-mentioned hypotheses, in the next 
chapter I present the social network measure that were selected to test those hypotheses. The 
chapter then details the data collection methodology, how it was constructed, its rationale, how 
it was carried out, and which constructs defined the hypotheses variables.  
 
- 92 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Chapter 3 
3. Data Collection and Analysis 
In Chapter Two, I discussed the theoretical background of the research. This chapter discusses 
social network methods, data collection and analysis techniques and how to employ them in 
the present research. This chapter moves from general to specific in presenting the material. It 
first briefly introduces network analysis, which took its name from social network analysis, 
and how and why it can be used to analyse inter-organisational coordination. This leads into 
the detail of the measures that can be used to gauge this coordination and the type of data that 
need to be collected to satisfy the measures. Since this is new research, it was decided to 
approach it quantitatively and qualitatively; hence both methods are overviewed. After this 
general overview the chapter moves into the specifics of data collection, zooming in to the 
research data collection techniques. This begins by introducing the geographical area and the 
particular pandemic that was sampled, and then presenting the designing of the qualitative and 
quantitative data collection instruments along with how they were administered. The chapter 
concludes with exploring data analysis procedures and data set exploration and description.  
3.1. General Introduction to Social Network Analysis Methods 
The origins of social network analysis (SNA) can be traced back to the 1930s when Jacob 
Moreno published his book “Who Shall Survive?” which is depicted by many scholars as the 
origin of SNA (Hummon and Carley, 1993, Leinhardt, 1977, Degenne and Forsé, 2004, 
Wasserman and Faust, 1995). Another important transition in the history of the SNA field 
began in early 1970 when Harrison White at Harvard started training graduate students in that 
field, producing an “amazing number of important contributions to social network theory and 
research such as ‘ the block models theory for social structure’” (Mullins and Mullins, 1973, 
Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1984, Scott, 2007).  
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Beyond the historical timeline, SNA progressed theoretically in the field of social sciences 
with the interest in studying interactions among individuals. This went beyond the sample 
survey that used to dominate empirical social-research-based random sampling of individuals 
that were “tearing the individual from his social context and guaranteeing that nobody in the 
study interacts with anyone else”, as Allen Barton (1968) described mainstream research in 
social sciences. He also described that type of research as, “like a biologist putting his 
experimental animals through a hamburger machine and looking at every hundredth cell 
through a microscope; anatomy and physiology get lost, structure and function disappear, and 
one is left with cell biology… if our aim is to understand people’s behaviour… we want to 
know about primary groups, neighbours, organisations, social circles, and communities; about 
interaction, communication, role expectations and social control” (Barton, 1969). This 
statement marked the development of social sciences, the aim of which has been always to 
investigate the behaviour of individuals, to incorporate the interaction of social actors as major 
part of any ongoing research (Freeman, 2004).  
Moreno collaborated with Helen H Jennings to support the social network theory with what 
they called “sociometry“, which Moreno defined as an “experimental technique… obtained by 
application of quantitative methods… which inquire into the evolution and organization of 
groups and the position of individuals within them” (Moreno, 1953). Social network theory, 
modelling and analysis soon began to penetrate different scientific disciplines and its methods 
were adopted in anthropology, communication studies, economics, biology, geography, 
information sciences, organisational studies, social psychology and sociolinguistics (Hummon 
and Carley, 1993, Leinhardt, 1977).  
SNA can be defined as the relational data between actors, rather than the attribute data from a 
sample of individuals as in a general social survey (Chung et al., 2005). Those actors are 
called nodes and their relationships are called ties. The combination of nodes and ties can be 
presented in an array as the first step in visual representation.  
Table 3-1 is a simple array of “like” relationships that might exist between four individuals. 
Such data might be obtainable by asking the respondents – nodes – to answer a simple 
question such as: “Identify the ones you like from this set of individuals.” 
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Table 3-1: A simple matrix of “like” relationship between four individuals  
     
Chooser John Jim Mel Susan 
John -- 1 0 1 
Jim 1 -- 0 0 
Mel 1 0 -- 1 
Susan 1 0 1 -- 
 
Visualisation is a powerful tool in SNA, which can provide investigators with new insights 
about network structures and help them to communicate those insights to others (Freeman, 
2000). For example, visualising  
Table 3-1 will result in Figure 3-1 below. This figure will easily suggest many assumptions 
about the network, such as that Jim is not popular within the group and the three other 
members maintain a close relationship among each other.  
 
Figure 3-1: A visual illustration of Table 3.1 
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Yet SNA is not limited to social behavioural research; as mentioned previously, SNA has 
extended to other domains and established itself as an interdisciplinary field. One domain that 
uses SNA methodologies is inter-organisational relationships. Borgatti and Foster (2003) 
previewed some of the major research streams in organisational network theory. Their 
investigation began by looking at the use of network analysis in studying social capital, which 
is about the value of connections (Seibert et al., 2001, Adler and Kwon, 2002, Hansen, 1999b). 
Another branch was the study of embeddedness, which entails the notion that all economic 
behaviour is necessarily embedded in a larger social context, hence looking at economics as a 
branch of sociology (Ingram and Roberts, 2000, DiMaggio and Louch, 1998). In 1980s and 
1990s, the use of organisational network terms was a fashionable way to describe 
organisational forms characterised by repetitive exchanges among semi-autonomous 
organisations that rely on trust and embedded social relationships to protect transactions and 
reduce their costs. It was argued in network organisation research that as commerce became 
more global, hypercompetitive and turbulent, both markets and hierarchies displayed 
inefficiencies as modes of organising production. In their place, a network organisational form 
emerged that balanced the flexibility of markets with the predictability of traditional 
hierarchies (Bradach and Eccles, 1989, Miles and Snow, 1986, Achrol, 1996, Borgatti and 
Foster, 2003, Van Alstyne, 2009). The study of board interlocks, which are ties among 
organisations that exist through a member of one organisation sitting on the board of another, 
also had its share of network analysis field and methods (Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). Network analysis has been used in public health studies, and some of that literature was 
reviewed in the paper titled “Network Analysis in Public Health: History, Methods, and 
Applications” (Luke and Harris, 2007). Network theory has been extensively used in 
epidemiological research such as tuberculosis (Klovdahl et al., 2001) and sexually transmitted 
diseases (Chen et al., 2003) 
The SNA Data requirements are different from those of traditional social research in that SNA 
is capable of featuring rich information that analysts can use to understand social effects and 
trends. 
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3.2. Network Data Collection 
Since it is relational data that is needed, social network analysts rarely use samples in their 
work. They usually identify some population and conduct a census by including all elements 
of the population – or as many as needed – as units of observation (Hanneman and Riddle, 
2005). The two main approaches to collect relational social network data being the 
sociocentric and egocentric approaches are discussed next. 
3.2.1. Sociocentric approach 
The sociocentric approach is based on “whole network” or “whole population” method, 
assuming the availability of complete network information. In other words, it is based on a 
census approach for a certain predefined population with set boundaries. First, the researcher 
should define the network in question such as a classroom, school, board of directors for a 
certain company or mental care health providers in a certain city. Then a data collection 
method is used such as a network survey to investigate the ties between each node of this 
network to others, thus facilitating a complete understanding of the relationship matrix of the 
entire population investigated. 
This approach is an ideal and desired situation for any researcher, since the information 
collected represents the saturation sample of interest and the results can be generalised for the 
population (Chung and Hossain, 2009) ; however, full network data can be very expensive and 
difficult to collect. Asking each and every member of a population to rank and rate every other 
member can be a very challenging task in all but small groups. This task can be made more 
manageable by asking respondents to identify a limited number of specific individuals with 
whom they have ties, based on the context of the study. Yet this problem might not be as 
severe as one expects, because many organisations, persons and groups tend of have a limited 
number of ties. This is probably because social actors can utilise only limited resources like 
energy, time, and cognitive capacity to maintain their ties, especially the strong ones 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This also contributes to the fact that social structures tend to 
self-balance and self-organise with relatively managable connections. 
Sociocentric approaches have been used in some inter-organisational coordination 
investigations that considered a particular type of health system in a bounded geographic area 
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such as a city (Provan and Milward, 1995, Tausig, 1987). This works well because there is a 
predefined and well-known set of organisations that deal, say, with mental care in a certain 
city, since they are usually institutionalised based on jurisdictions. In this environment it is 
rare to have new nodes joining or exiting the network dynamically. Actually, more often than 
not, such changes negatively affect the performance of the network, as Provan and Milward 
(1995) have demonstrated. 
There are many challenges for using this approach in the context of pandemic coordination. 
To conduct a sociocentric study for pandemic coordination requires the collection of data from 
all the health workers, private and public, clinical and managerial, logistic and 
microbiological, within the geographic boundary of the state of NSW. This would literally 
create a list that includes tens of thousands of names, resulting in huge workload and data 
warehouse. Earlier research proposes that scrutinising through extensive lists of names and 
identifying the numerous kinds of links with each individual on the list leads to exhaustion and 
recall difficulties (Bernard et al., 1982). To overcome these problems, an alternative approach 
for social network data collection, which trades off respondent numbers with information 
richness and practicality, is the egocentric approach.  
3.2.2. Egocentric approach 
The egocentric data collection approach is another well-known method for collecting network 
data. Basically, this approach begins with the selection of focal nodes, “egos”, and identifies 
the nodes, “alters”, to which they are connected. Ego in the network parlance means the 
person being investigated, and alters are the people who are the ego’s affiliates or the “others 
“whom the ego is linked. In other words, it is the network of me (the ego). The researcher then 
decides which of those alters is interesting for the research and interviews those people. This 
progressively unveils the perspective network as we proceed to identify more alters in one step 
and change them to egos in the following one. The egocentric method is used when studying 
novel types of networks where nodes, affiliations and extent or boundaries cannot be 
predefined and which have not been previously investigated. Data collection will proceed by 
snowballing from one ego to another until no more actors are identified or the researchers 
decide to stop for other reasons like time and resource constraints or when practicality 
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suggests (Goodman, 1961). This method can be used to determine business contact networks 
or community elites and is used as name generator for further investigations and data 
collection. 
When combined with an attribute-based approach, the egocentric method is effective for 
collecting relational data (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The egocentric network of a firm 
consists of its set of direct, dyadic ties and the relationships between these ties, with the firm at 
the centre of the network as the focal actor (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). When it comes to 
analysis, however, the egocentric network implies a dual level of network analysis that 
requires simultaneous focus on network dyads and the aggregation of dyads into the larger 
network. This simultaneous focus is necessary because changes in an organisation’s egocentric 
network result from the aggregation of changes at the dyadic level. Thus, the evolution of a 
network necessarily includes and builds from the simultaneous evolution of the dyadic ties 
(Hite and Hesterly, 2001).  
Knoke (1993) suggested four generic techniques to locate players within networks, these are: 
1- Positional methods: persons occupying the key roles in the system, such as the ones 
with executive roles.  
2- Decisional methods: actors that participate or influence the collectively binding 
decisions for the system. 
3- Reputational methods: actors who have actual or potential power to “move and shake” 
the system. 
4- Relational methods: actors who maintain important political relationships with other 
system members.  
Knoke (1993) then states that it is hard to keep these methods separated as there will be 
always mix between incumbent and past invlovments. In the inter-organisational disease 
outbreak data collection protocol, one noticeable condition was the different schemas of the 
parties involved, representing a wide spectrum of expertise, domains and bureaucracies. Hence 
data collection needs to be conducted through a diverse community of health professionals 
with various positions and skillsets to provide their linkage data. These positions could range 
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from emergency care provider to clinicians and epidemiologists. Table 3-2 shows some of 
those positions that could participate in the survey: 
Table 3-2: Some of the positions that participated in pandemic coordination 
Working Field Position Examples  
Clinical care Doctors, nurses  
Policy decision-makers Senior public health officials  
Emergency management Emergency care professionals, intensive care unit 
professionals 
Logistics Ambulance services 
Public health Public health unit, epidemiologists 
Detection and surveillance Laboratories, GPs, infectious disease centres.  
 
Interviews with such professionals were used to construct the network of the participating 
organisations in pandemic intervention and coordination. Interviews snowballed from one 
participant (ego) to that participant’s interesting alters who were considered that have 
knowledge that could further extend the scope of information. 
3.3. Social network measures 
In any research, data collection is followed by data analysis and choosing the investigation 
approach. Network-based research is no exception. This section provides background of the 
calculation, interpretation, and some uses of various empirical formulas in the network 
analysis domain. For example, some of these measures define nodes that occupy an important 
role, like being in the central position of a network. The section also discusses some of the 
structural properties of the whole network. These empirical measures are a mean to quantify 
the position of nodes (being either individuals or organisations) within the structure as part of 
the sense making and enumeration of the coordination performance. There are numerous 
quantifying network measures that are usable by researchers, yet those used in each study 
depend on the structure of the network in hand and its associated level of data availability. For 
instance, in a star or wheel network where there is a central node connected to all other nodes, 
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using betweenness centrality is not applicable since it would not provide any significant or 
interesting information.  
3.3.1. Degree centrality measure 
When looking at network diagrams, viewers innately focus their attention on the nodes located 
in the centre. Typically, being at the centre of the network is viewed as a positive trait. These 
nodes enjoy positions of prestige and visibility, and may be influential in the spread of ideas, 
behaviour and information (Valente, 2010). Centrality measures for social networks were first 
developed in the 1950s by Bavelas, Sabidussi and many other scholars from many disciplines 
(Everett and Borgatti, 1999, Freeman, 1978). Freeman introduced the modern topology of 
network centrality measures by specifying that a centrality measure can have three properties 
(Valente, 2010):  
• It can be calculated on individuals, referred to as point or node centrality. 
• This point centrality measure can and often should be normalised by the size of 
the network so that calculations from different networks can be compared. 
• A network-level centralisation score can be calculated indicating the degree of 
centralisation derived from a specific measure.  
3.3.1.1. Degree centrality measure 
The most frequently used, intuitive and easy to understand centrality measure is the degree 
centrality, being the number of links to and from a node. Degree centrality is a local centrality 
measure because it can be calculated without reference to the overall structure of the network. 
In an asymmetric (directed) network, in-degree is defined as the number of ties received and 
out-degree is the number of ties sent or initiated by the node outwardly. The following 
formulas define these types of vectored centrality:  
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 …………………….. (1.1) 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ……………………….. (1.2) 
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𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Indicates the existence or non-existence of a link between nodes i and j. If there is 
any link between node i and node j then 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1. If there is no link then 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 
In-degree counts the number of times a node (organisation) is needed or nominated by the 
others in the network. This node might be a resource distribution network, such as the 
authority that distributes vaccine or PPE (personal protective equipment) during the pandemic, 
and other agencies would be contacting it for such resources. It might also be a data collection 
agency such that all front line agencies and departments (pathology laboratories, emergency 
departments, etc…) are required to provide it with their daily statistics so that it can produce 
data for decision making and provide outbreak trends analysis.  
To make the degree centrality comparable between networks of different sizes, the count is 
divided by (N-1) being the maximum possible number of connections a particular node can 
have, hence a representation of the network size. This results in normalised centrality 
measurement that varies from 0 to 1 (Freeman, 1978): 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁−1 ………………………….(1.3) 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) = ∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁−1 …………….…………….. (1.4) 
Where N represents the number of nodes.  
3.3.1.2. Closeness and betweenness centrality measures 
Complementing degree centrality, which is a local centrality measure; other centrality 
measures have been developed to take into consideration the information pattern of the links in 
the entire network. Two of those are closeness and betweenness. Closeness measures the 
average distance of a node from all other nodes in the network. Totalling these distances and 
then inverting resulting the value changes the measure from a distance measure to closeness 
measure. Point closeness is then the inverted sum of all the distances, and normalised 
closeness is N-1 divided by the sum of distances, making it an average closeness measure. 
Normalised closeness is calculated as (Freeman, 1978, Valente, 2010) : 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶=  𝑁𝑁−1∑𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖………………………………………….(1.5) 
Closeness has intuitive appeal as a centrality measure, as someone who is closer to everyone 
else, on average, is in a central position. Yet social networks are non-Euclidian, meaning that 
the distance from node A to node B is not necessarily the same as the distance from B to A 
due to the asymmetric nature of the links. A path from one person to another follows a 
direction along the links, with the result that this path cannot be reversed if at least one link is 
asymmetric. Accordingly, closeness is directional. In-closeness refers to the links directed to a 
person and out-closeness to the links initiated from a person. The practical implication is that 
the person with the highest out-closeness is the person who can reach others in the fewest 
number of steps, whereas the person with the highest in-closeness is the person others can 
reach in the fewest number of steps (Valente, 2010). 
The third centrality measure is the betweenness centrality proposed by Freeman (1979). It 
measures the frequency with which a person lies on the shortest path connecting everyone else 
in the network. The concept of betweenness is very appealing, as it measures the degree to 
which a node occupies a strategic position in a network, somewhat akin to bridging and 
centrality combined. Normalised betweenness centrality is calculated as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏 =  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2−3𝑛𝑛+2………………………………(1.6) 
Where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 counts the number of times point k lies on the geodesic –shortest- path 
connecting all other nodes (i and j) and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of geodesics in the network. The 
maximum possible value that the numerator 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  can reach is 𝑖𝑖2 − 3𝑖𝑖 + 2 so this is the 
normalisation factor (Linton, 1979). Since a geodesic path is directional, betweenness 
centrality is directional and hence separate calculations for in and out directions are needed. 
Freeman (1979) explained that betweenness centrality captures a gate-keeping function: if 
members high in betweenness oppose an idea, its diffusion to other segments of the group 
might be blocked. Closeness centrality captures a communication role such that people high in 
closeness can communicate an idea to many others rapidly (Valente, 2010) 
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3.3.2. Network-level measures 
Network-level measures are those calculated on the whole network. These provide indicators 
of the network structure. These usually deal with the network’s density and size and clusters 
within the network.  
3.3.2.1. Network density 
Density is the first measurement to be discussed. It is the number of connections in a network 
reported as a fraction of the total links, and is calculated as:  
 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑙𝑙
𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁−1)......................................(1.7) 
Where l is the number of links in the network and n is the network size. Equation 1.7 is 
applicable to asymmetric networks, but the numerator must be multiplied by 2 for undirected 
(symmetric) networks. There is an inverse relationship between size and density: as size 
increases, density decreases. One of the reasons for this is that there are practical limits to the 
number of other people a person knows or can establish relationships with.  
3.3.2.2. Tie strength 
Tie strength expresses the excellence of connection between two nodes in a network. 
According to Granovetter (1973b), the strength of the relationship between two nodes can be 
expressed as a mixture of the amount of time and the mutual services that distinguish the link 
between them. Extending Granovetter’s theoretical concept of tie strength, Marsden and 
Campbell (1984) established that “emotional closeness” was the most effective indicator of tie 
strength, in preference to the other indicators “frequency of contact”, “reciprocity of services” 
and “intimacy” (mutual confiding). Besides emotional closeness, frequency of contact is 
extensively used as a measure of tie strength (Lin et al., 1978, Granovetter, 1995). 
3.4. Forms of data collection 
Research usually is associated with data collection and analysis. The researcher might newly 
collect some of the data or might use new methods to analyse and synthesise existing data. 
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Generally, these data are of two types, qualitative and quantitative, with a continuing debate 
on which is better to represent what type of research. A long trace of literature exists to 
support each group’s point of view. Each method is briefly discussed here, since both were 
used in our research, and the subsequent section explains how these methods were used in the 
data collection when interviewing subjects.  
3.4.1. Qualitative data 
Qualitative research is used in inductive thinking to explore a new area or to develop 
hypothesis as well as testing whether the predictions of a certain hypothesis are valid or not 
valid. This is especially helpful when there is lack of an established theoretical basis in the 
specific area of research in hand.  
Qualitative data has wrongly been associated exclusively with anecdotes and social sciences. 
This is because (a) it is usually in the form of words rather than numbers and (b) social science 
was the first domain that used it, notably anthropology, history, and political sciences. 
However, more researchers in basic disciplines and applied fields (psychology, sociology, 
linguistics, public administration, organisational studies, business studies, health care, urban 
planning, educational research, family studies, program evaluation, and policy analysis) have 
shifted to a more qualitative paradigm (Miles and Huberman, 1999).  
The importance of qualitative data is that it is a source of rich descriptions and explanations 
that can help researchers to see precisely which events led to which consequences, to get 
beyond initial conceptions, and to use the opportunity to generate or revise conceptual 
frameworks. The objective of qualitative research is to obtain an in-depth understanding 
of human behaviour and the reasons that guide such behaviour. Qualitative research methods 
can also help in the development of a theory. They can lead to new findings and discoveries 
and improvement of existing practices. Qualitative research methods can also provide a closer 
view of the study case’s culture, practices, motivations and emotions. Moreover, qualitative 
research can help test the bases for a science, examine the associated beliefs, and develop 
methods to specify how a theory should change in light of fresh information. Finally, 
qualitative research helps to answer questions such as: Where have we come from? Where are 
we? Who are we now? And where are we going?  
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Qualitative data is collected based on observation, interviews, reviewing available documents 
or audio-visual materials. Researchers collecting such data can use the following options: 
• Observing: by directly observing the subject and recording the data. This can be 
with the observer concealing his or her role or revealing it as being a participant.  
• Having face-to-face or telephone interviews with subjects. Also the observer can 
interview a focus group. These interviews are usually unstructured or semi-
structured with open-ended questions.  
• Collecting public or private documents or audio-visual material to be used for 
analysis. 
Wolcott (1992) described qualitative investigation as “watching, asking or examining”. Such 
data emphasises people’s “lived experience” and is fundamentally well suited for locating the 
meanings people place on events, processes and structures in addition to the reasons and 
outcomes associated with them (Van Manen, 1977). It provides richness and holism, with 
strong potential for revealing complexity and “thick descriptions” nested in real contexts and 
naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings. 
One prerequisite of qualitative data collection is purposefully selecting the sites or individuals 
for the proposed study. This helps the researcher to understand the problem of the research 
question, especially if the field of research is still immature. This will involve selectively 
choosing the sites and subjects to be interviewed rather than using random sampling or 
selecting a large number of participants and sites. 
Qualitative data are not usually immediately accessible for analysis, but require some – or in 
most instances, “lots” of - processing, where raw field notes need to be corrected, edited, 
typed up and tape recordings need to be transcribed and corrected (Miles and Huberman, 
1999). This information is then formed into categories or themes that are then developed into 
broad patterns, theories or generalisations that are then compared with personal experience or 
existing literature – if found – on the topic (Creswell, 2009).  
Figure 3-2 shows how the theory becomes the end point in the qualitative research inductive 
method. The inductive process starts from information gathering and builds up through broad 
themes to a generalised model or theory (Creswell, 2009) 
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Figure 3-2: Inductive logic of Research in Qualitative stud; Adapted from Creswell: Research Design 
In a disease outbreak, qualitative research can help us understand the culture and practices 
within health emergency management organisations and other agencies involved in disease 
outbreak incidents. It can provide an insight about how these organisations coordinate during 
disease outbreak and may answer important research questions, such as, “What are the 
characteristics of the organisations that will play central role during the coordination 
evolution?” Qualitative research methods can also help to identify the initiation point for the 
multi-agent coordination process and when it will be ended. It can also assist us to examine 
closely the flow of information within the large complex network formed by organisations 
responding to disease outbreak.  
In the present study the qualitative approach enabled development of the following 
understandings: 
• An exploration of the type of organisations that work together during infectious 
disease outbreaks 
• Orientation to the types of communication that take place (case definition, case 
transport) etc... 
• Discovery of some of the deficiencies that can manifest during the coordination 
process. 
Researcher poses generalisations or theories from past experiences and 
literature
Researcher looks for broad patterns, generalisations, or theories from themes or 
categories.
Researcher analyses data to form themes or categories.
Researcher asks open-ended questions of participants or records field 
notes
Researcher gathers information (e.g interviews, observations)
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3.4.2. Quantitative Data 
The objective of data collection and analysis is to test and verify the theory rather than 
developing it. Hence the theory becomes the framework for the entire study (Creswell, 2009).  
Quantitative data is predominantly collected by either laboratory experiment or through 
surveys. It provides a numeric description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by 
studying a sample of that population and then generalising to the whole population. The 
quantitative approach uses closed-ended questions and numeric data and employs statistical 
procedures to analyse the data.  
The survey should be constructed around the theory in question. The researcher identifies the 
characteristics of the population to be targeted and then selects the sample to be surveyed. 
Then different statistical techniques are applied to generalise the results, usually with an 
estimated error.  
The aim of quantitative research is to apply and develop mathematical models, theories 
and/or hypotheses referring to phenomena. Whereas qualitative research methods develop 
information only about the particular cases studied, and more general conclusions are only 
hypotheses, quantitative research methods are used to validate which of such hypotheses are 
true. Quantitative methods makes it is possible to give accurate and testable expression to 
qualitative views. Figure 3-3 shows the use of the quantitative method deductively to test and 
verify a theory.  
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Figure 3-3: the deductive approach typically used in quantitative research. Adapted from Creswell: 
Research Design 
Quantitative researchers rely on a positivist approach to social science as they apply 
reconstructed logic using the language of “variables and hypotheses”. They use the variables 
to test the hypotheses that are linked to general causal explanation (Neuman and Kreuger, 
2003).  
The form of quantitative data is usually numerical, and the data is analysed statistically to 
show significance, patterns and frequencies. It does not go as far as providing the meaning of 
the experience. This data is collected through surveys, which use closed-ended questions. The 
answers might be in the form of “yes” and “no” or “0” and “1”, as some call them. Hence, it is 
easy to use modern software systems to sort the data and analyse it to search for relationships. 
Statistical analysis is an important phase of analysing data to correlate any statistically 
significant results.  
In researching disease outbreak, quantitative methods can help verify and validate theories 
developed about the inherent relationship between coordination structure and performance in a 
dynamic environment. Quantitative research methods can also help us develop performance 
Researcher tests or verifies a theory
Researcher tests hypotheses or research questions from the theory
Researcher defines and operationalizes variables derived from the theory 
Researcher measures or observes variables using an instrument to obtain 
scores
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indicators to measure the efficiency of the disease outbreak coordination process. From the 
data collected, it is possible to perform statistical analysis for hypothesis testing as defined in 
the disease outbreak coordination model. For example, correlation and regression analysis can 
help to determine which network measures are used to predict disease outbreak coordination 
preparedness. 
In longitudinal studies of disease outbreak, quantitative research methods can help to monitor 
certain variables over time and to examine the percentage of change of these variables, to 
understand the cause of these changes and whether the changes have an effect on other 
variables. For example, it is possible to monitor the time of response to a certain disease 
outbreak case over time and see whether different coordination structures have an effect on the 
response time. 
By beginning this type of data collection in the present study, it will be possible to develop 
some insights about the following: 
• Resource needs during the outbreaks. 
• Types of inter-organisational links and how or why they are established – 
activation criteria. 
• Measurement of node location and network performance during different outbreak 
phases.  
3.4.3. Linking qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Mixing both quantitative and qualitative methods is referred to as triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
Triangulation has been broadly defined by Denzin (2000, Denzin, 1978) as “the combination 
of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”. Hence, organisational researchers 
can improve the accuracy of their judgement by collecting different kinds of data bearing on 
the same phenomenon. (Jick, 1979).  The use of triangulation can be traced back to Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) who developed the idea of “multiple opertionism “. They argued, “more than 
one method should be used in the validation process to ensure that the variance reflected that 
of trait and not of the method”. (Jick, 1979). Hence, mixed method is a tool of cross validation 
to examine the same dimension of research. Both numbers and words are needed to provide 
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better understanding of the world, hence, "Quantities are of qualities, and a measured quality 
has just the magnitude expressed in its measure" (Kaplan, 1998). Howe's analyses (HOWE, 
1985, Howe, 1988) shows that quantitative and qualitative methods are "inextricably 
intertwined", not only with regard to specific data sets but also on the level of study design 
and analysis. In deeper reflection, Salomon (1991) points out that the issue is not a 
qualitative–quantitative one; rather it is the approach that the specific research is taking: 
Whether is an analytical approach to understand a few controlled variables, or a systematic 
approach to understand the interaction of variables in complex environment (Miles and Snow, 
1986). 
“The question, then, is not whether the two sorts of data and associated methods can be linked 
during study design and analysis but whether it should be done, how it will be done and for 
what purposes” (Miles and Huberman, 1999). But what is the benefit of linking qualitative and 
quantitative data? 
 Rossman and Wilson (1985) suggest three reasons: 
• To enable confirmation and validation of each other by triangulation. 
• To elaborate or develop analysis by providing richer detail. 
• To initiate new lines of thinking, tuning ideas around or providing fresh insight.  
 Similarly, Firestone (1987) suggests that quantitative studies lead to more precise and 
generalizable results to convince the reader by disregarding individual judgment and by the 
use of formal standardised procedures. On the other hand, qualitative research overcomes the 
abstraction "inherent in quantitative studies" and persuades through rich depiction and 
strategic comparison.  
Relating both to data collection and theory building, qualitative approaches can aid the 
quantitative side during design by helping with conceptual development. They can also help 
during data collection by making access and data collection easier. During analysis, qualitative 
approaches can help validating, interpreting, clarifying, and illustrating quantitative findings, 
as well as strengthening and revising theory.  
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Combining both the above methods is a challenge. In mixed methods research the researcher 
collects diverse type of data to present better understanding of the research problem. The 
results from qualitative and quantitative methods can be used side by side to reinforce each 
other. The mixed method neutralises or cancels any biases of either method. With mixed 
methods, the results from one method can help identify participants to study or questions to 
ask for the other method.  
 However, how can we link both methods together?  
 Miles and Huberman (1999) suggest four methods to provide such linkage, as illustrated in 
Figure 3-4. 
 
Figure 3-4: Illustrative designs linking qualitative and quantitative data. Adapted from Qualitative Data 
Analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1999) 
In design one; the two methods are integrated throughout the whole track to understand the 
case in hand.  
QUAL
QUANT
(Continuous, integrated collection
Of both
Kinds of data)
1
2
QUAL
QUANT
Wave 1
Continuous fieldwork
Wave 2 Wave 3
3 QUAL
(Exploration)
QUANT
(questionnaire)
QUAL
(deepen, test findings)
4
QUANT
(survey)
QUAL
(fieldwork)
QUAL
(experiment)
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 Design two is a multi-wave survey method. The first survey wave may draw attention to 
things the field worker should look for, and the fieldwork carried out after that might lead to 
revisions in wave 2, and so on. 
 Design three alternates the two kinds of data collection, beginning with exploratory fieldwork 
leading to the development of a quantitative instrument by means of which findings can be 
deepened and tested systematically in the next round of data collection. 
 Design four shows another alternating style: An initial survey helps to point the researcher to 
phenomena of importance. Then the researcher moves to develop a close-up, strong 
conceptual understanding of how things work; and then a qualitative experiment is designed to 
test the results.  
3.4.4. On purposeful sampling and mixed methods 
Determining the number of samples in any research is often a question with many answers. 
This applies for both quantitative and qualitative researches as well as in the mixed methods 
one. Especially in the qualitative research, “determining adequate sample size …Is ultimately 
a matter of judgment and experience” (Sandelowski, 1995). Hence, Margarete (1995) 
continues “…students with whom I have worked that beginning qualitative researchers often 
require more sampling units than more experienced researchers” since the experienced ones 
can recognise “what is there and what can be made of the data already collected”.  
One of the main differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches is the “purposeful 
sampling” (Kuzel, 1992, Patton, 1990) to the extent that Patton (1990) described 14 types of 
purposeful sampling involving the in-depth study of typical, atypical or exemplary information 
rich cases” (p169). Researchers in both domains have to resort in many studies to samples they 
know is less than ideal for their purposes (Sandelowski, 1995).  
Beyond the misconception that sample size is not important in qualitative research, yet sample 
size has to be adequate to support informational redundancy or theoretical saturation. This will 
permits deep “ case oriented analysis that is a hallmark of all qualitative inquiry, and results in 
– by the virtue of not being too small- a new and richly textured understanding of experience” 
(Sandelowski, 1995). Data saturation is reached when “further data collection of evidence 
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provides little in terms of further themes, insights, perspectives or information.” (Suri, 2011). 
This saturation are factors of the nature of data source and the synthesis questions. Usually 
closed ended and focused questions result in faster data saturation while open-ended ones 
result in additional insights and extended data saturation point (Suri, 2011). 
Patton (1999) discusses the misunderstanding about triangulation in that the researcher should 
expect and accept that different data sources or methods of enquiry would yield different 
results. However, this ought not to be viewed that it is weakening the “credibility of results, 
but rather as offering opportunities for deeper insight into the relationship between inquiry 
approach and the phenomenon under study”. 
In order to enhance the quality and readability of data, Patton discusses one triangulation 
characteristic that is of interest to this research, which is “checking out the consistency of 
findings generated by different data collection methods”. (Patton, 1999). This involves 
comparing data collected through different methods such as qualitative and quantitative ones. 
It is often the case, as Patton argues, that one method is usually used a secondary role. Thus, 
observational data are used to generate hypothesis while quantitative data verify it, which 
combines them in a form of comparative analysis. That “often involves different operational 
measures of the same concept….This does not defeat comparison, but can strengthen its 
reliability.” (Fielding and Fielding, 1986).  
Combining both qualitative and quantitative methods is also beneficial for new studies where 
researchers need to learn the domain literature from subject matter experts. In the present 
study it was decided to use mixed methods in data collection, where both qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected. This was first established by the questionnaire and survey 
design. Data gathering started with a qualitative questionnaire which was used to acquire 
domain knowledge from subject matter experts. This was followed by a survey designed to 
conduct wide-scale interviews. By combining the two methods it was possible to capture 
relationships and the reasons for those relationships, as well as the links beyond what the 
quantitative questionnaire could have provided. The method used to combine the two data-
gathering techniques was continuous and integrated collection. This is further discussed in the 
next sections. 
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3.5. Disease Outbreak Network Data Collection 
Data for this research was collected using qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative 
part was designed to enhance and enrich understanding of the coordination process itself and 
to enable the researcher to have a “look behind the scenes”. The quantitative part facilitated 
reconstructing the networked coordination structure, and hence it was possible to apply critical 
validation and testing of it. Since the H1N1 outbreak had occurred in 2009, the first practical 
step was to track the professionals who had a role in that outbreak. Then the qualitative 
questionnaire was administered to them for validation. After some interviews it was possible 
to design the quantitative questionnaire, and hence to conduct follow-up interviews with those 
professionals. With both data sets on hand, the opportunity was presented to compare the 
results and cross-validate them.  
3.5.1. Qualitative data collection method 
This section introduces the qualitative questionnaire, which was primarily motivated by the 
review of literature related to pandemic coordination.  
3.5.1.1. Qualitative questionnaire content and design 
As discussed, it was necessary first to qualitatively understand the outbreak criterion and 
activities. After a detailed examination of the research that has been conducted in disease 
outbreak coordination, a 'gap' in the research was identified there were some interesting 
questions yet to be answered: 
1. How to identify the initiation point for this multi-agent coordination process 
and when it will be over? 
2. What are the characteristics of the organisations that will play a central role 
during the evolution of coordination? 
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3. What are the effects of formal and informal structures on the total inter-
organisational coordination process? 
4. What are the performance indicators to measure efficiency of the disease 
outbreak coordination process and how should they be developed? 
These initial questions were the foundation for developing the qualitative questionnaire, which 
in turn evolved to the final survey. The focal points that needed to be addressed were divided 
into four main ones:  
1. Situational information 
2. Actors 
3. Processes 
4. Determinants and resource management. 
 The next step was to dissect the research questions into tangible ones, which then were in turn 
allotted to the focal points. These questions are elaborated in Table 3-3: 
Table 3-3: Summary of the main focal points and their relevant questions 
Section: Example Questions  
• Situational information • How is an outbreak detected? 
• How is information routed? 
• What are the outbreak criteria? 
• What are the containment criteria? 
• Actors • Which organisations are involved? 
• What are the organisations’ 
characteristics? 
(Jurisdiction/domain/location…) 
• How and when do organisations 
become involved in the outbreak? 
• What is their communication plan and 
protocols? 
• What types of information are 
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exchanged? 
• Determinants • How can coordination gaps be 
measured? 
• What are the criteria to determine 
whether coordination is successful? 
• Resource management • How are resources deployed? 
• Are resource storage and distribution 
centralised or distributed? 
 
Expanding these mid-level questions resulted in the qualitative questionnaire as presented in 
Appendix A, which was intended to be administered in the first wave of interviews.  
3.5.1.2. Administering the questionnaire 
The interview questions were designed and planned carefully so that when they were 
executed, a systematic flow to the data collection process was achieved (Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1982, Miles and Huberman, 1999). The questions were constructed in a way to 
avoid resistance, suspicion, prejudice and any sort of negative forces within the interview 
environment. The qualitative questionnaire was designed to target decision-makers, 
coordinators and middle level managers within the public health system. These people usually 
act as gatekeepers for incoming and outgoing communication within their organisations. They 
also act as policymakers and determinants for any policy changes. Table shows the proposed 
matrix for each section of the questions, along with the proposed interviewees – the titles have 
been generalised to suit different health authorities’ structures and names that might differ 
from one state or country to another.  
Table 3-4: Matrix of proposed interviewees for the qualitative questionnaire 
Section  Proposed Interviewee  
A. Situational information Policy and decision-makers/ 
biosecurity authorities/ emergency 
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management authorities 
B. Actors Coordination units/ clinical 
managers/ logistics/ public health 
units/ emergency management 
authorities 
C. Determinants Policy and decision-makers/ 
coordination units  
D. Resource management Resource provision and 
distribution management  
 
The responses to the qualitative questionnaire mainly established the following repositories:  
1. Domain schema: A basic overview of the terminologies/ processes/ workspace 
environment and sphere of the outbreak management  
2. Organisational matrix: A basic matrix of organisations/ units that were used as 
a pool from which to select interviewees during the following quantitative 
phase 
3. An overview of the main determinants of the process, such as when and how an 
outbreak is announced. 
This questionnaire was used in the first wave of interviews conducted between October and 
December 2010. Firstly I identified a group of experts, including academics and subject matter 
experts, with whom I engaged to capture information and obtain feedback about the survey. 
The positions of the persons interviewed were: 
1. Senior public health management professional 
2. Senior epidemiologist 
3. Midlevel disaster management professionals working in health services 
functional area coordinator (HSFAC) teams 
4. Senior laboratory professional 
5. Executive manager in GP division  
6. Senior clinical pathology and medical research professor 
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7. Midlevel health media communication unit manager. 
Interviewees were chosen who had participated in the H1N1 2009 outbreak. All the interviews 
were face-to-face; four of them were conducted in the Hunter New England Area Health 
Service (HNEAHS) and the rest were within the greater Sydney region. The time of each 
interview was intended to be one hour only, but three of the interviews extended to be about 
two hours each, due to the wealth of information from some of the respondents and their 
willingness to share this information. The interviews were semi-structured using the Appendix 
“A” questionnaire. The advantage of the semi-structured interview is that it uses the planned 
questionnaire template uses open-ended questions that allow the spontaneous flow of 
information. Semi-structured interviews have the benefit of flexibly adapting to suit the 
interviewee; they promote rich understanding of the data collected, which is a necessary 
prerequisite for building later surveys in less known research contexts (Miles and Huberman, 
1999).  
Some of the main findings of these questionnaire-based interviews were the understanding of 
coordination dynamics such as initiation and closure. The interviews provided valuable 
insights such as the different phases during which public health systems change their 
intervention procedures (delay, contain and protect). They also provided information about the 
different levels of intervention in Australia, at federal or commonwealth, state, and local 
levels. Understanding was built up of the types of communication that take place during 
outbreaks, such as case definitions which are the set of criteria used to classify patients as 
having a defined illness. As well I became aware of the use of the informal communication 
and its needs during outbreaks, and hence began to consider types of formal and informal 
communication, the context of these types of communication and their targeted audience and 
objectives. Finally, these interviewees provided the first seeds of contact details of further 
candidates and respondents in variety of organisations. 
On the basis of the interview results, a quantitative survey was designed – discussed in the 
next section – and then most of those professionals were approached again to fill in the survey 
and provide some feedback.  
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3.5.2. Quantitative data collection method 
In conjunction with qualitative interviews conducted with subject matter experts, the data 
collection framework was used to further develop and refine a valid and reliable survey 
instrument. The quantitative method included a non-traditional “networks” method of data 
collection and analysis to serve as a fine complement to traditional research methods in 
behavioural studies. Surveys are most useful when the actors are people and the relations that 
are being studied are ones are those that the respondent is reporting on.  
The survey for this study was essentially designed to cover three broad constructs: (i) social 
networks, (ii) coordination, and (iii) performance. Importantly, the quantitative research 
method added further empirical weight to the disease outbreak coordination model by 
explaining with quantitative evidence how network properties were associated with 
coordination.  
3.5.2.1. Survey design 
Designing a quantitative survey based on the relational quality of network methods requires a 
shift in thinking when it comes to research methodology. The network approach focuses on 
relations between nodes (organisations in this case) rather than between subjects’ attributes. 
Hence study design, data collection, and data analysis incorporated this relational perspective, 
requiring unique approaches to each (Luke and Harris, 2007). Data collection focused on data 
about nodes and their relations with each other. The survey, “A national assessment of State 
and Local law enforcement preparedness” prepared by RAND Corporation was adopted as the 
basic structure for the survey developed for this research (Riley, 1995). Interestingly RAND’s 
survey and the dataset it generated has been used in much other researches and several papers 
(Davis et al., 2004, Hossain and Kuti, 2010, Fricker et al., 2002, Hossain et al., 2011). The 
RAND survey contained questions developed to investigate the relationships between 
organisations at different jurisdictional levels and how they communicated with each other 
during preparation for terrorism response planning. In the present research, it was customised 
to suit outbreak coordination in a multi-networked environment. The rationale of the design 
took into consideration many aspects, some of which were: 
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1. Coordination is not a process that evolves overnight. Yes, it intensifies during the 
crisis, but its seeds are well planted before that. It starts from policy development, 
followed by training and then standard coordination before the outbreak followed 
by evolving coordination during the outbreak. Figure 3-5 shows the stages through 
what is called the coordination train. 
 
Figure 3-5: the coordination train: Coordination phases from policy development to outbreak 
coordination 
Naturally it is not anticipated that the relationship will be as linear as in the figure, 
but the view represents a holistic approach to the coordination sequence and 
facilitates following up the network during its growth. Also the actual coordination 
during the outbreak is divided into two main sections:  
• Before the outbreak: This usually covers the horizon scanning and surveillance 
phases discussed in Chapter Two, where a group of agencies exchange 
information and update each other on new or expected outbreaks. 
• During the outbreak: This is when the evolving dynamic coordination 
structures are activated. Agencies refer to their plans or standard operating 
procedures and emergency manuals to work together. The coordination will 
materialise in different forms such as the provision of information or the 
exchange of resources. 
Formal Coordination during disease outbreak.
Informal coordination during disease outbreak. 
Training
Planning 
and 
Developing 
policies
Standard 
Coordination 
before disease 
outbreak
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2. The “during the outbreak coordination” part was further divided into three further 
phases: delay, contain and protect, in accordance with how the NSW health 
authorities divided the pandemic intervention phases.  
• Delay involved delaying admission of the pandemic to Australia by taking 
specific measures at airports, seaports, and any other borders.  
• Contain is when the authorities activate their plans to manage patients, limit 
contagion, and create awareness. This is the phase usually characterised by 
considerable tension, information collection and analysis, resources 
mobilisation, etc. It is the phase during which most of the fatalities occur.  
• Protect occurred is when the authorities activate their vaccination plans. 
Acquiring the needed resources, primarily the vaccine, usually precedes this. 
Then the authorities interpret the information collected in the contain phase to 
determine the most vulnerable communities and age groups. They then begin 
targeted or mass vaccination programs.  
Moving from one phase to another is a decision made by the health authorities 
based on correlated information. Due to the different tasks in each phase, different 
organisations are needed. Capturing such micro-information would enhance 
understanding of the dynamics of each phase within the macro-structure and 
compare the main changes that occurred in the network when moving from one 
phase to another.  
3. Formal and informal coordination. As part of capturing the whole coordination 
process, it was decided to use different questions for formal and informal 
coordination, each in its separate section. Both sets of questions were designed to 
obtain the details of the three main coordination phases (delay, contain, protect), 
and both contained separate questions about the organisations that respondents 
“[did not] normally coordinate with but needed to create (formal/informal) 
communication channel during the outbreak.” It was of interest to know how the 
informal coordination helped the respondents during the outbreak. Hence, the 
survey contained in its last section a question about the “most three important 
factors that informal coordination facilitated [in their] work”. Respondent were 
asked to list these from the most to the least important, to add perceptual weight the 
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answers. The last section also contained perceptual questions about the 
effectiveness of the informal coordination in “getting things done” and its 
importance in bridging coordination gaps.  
4. Communication methods: It was presumed that health professionals in different 
locations of the network would use different communication methods to 
communicate with others. Hence, they were asked to rate communication methods 
from most to least important. These were landline phone, mobile phone, fax, 
mobile text messaging, email, and web portal.  
5. Resources: Different types of resources are used during an outbreak. Some 
questions were included to capture the types of resources that were needed and 
how these were usually transferred. 
6. Who sends the notification out: To identify initiation point, questions were 
included about who notified different parties that an outbreak was declared or 
finished, and which methods of communication were used in both cases.  
7. Errors or mistakes: To identify the perceptions of respondents about errors or 
mistakes that could have happened to them, and at the same time trying to identify 
some performance measures, a question was added, asking what were the three 
main errors or mistakes that could happen during the outbreak. Respondents were 
asked to list those errors or mistakes from the most to least important to identify 
the perceptual weight of each response. 
3.5.2.2. Survey structure 
Any survey design is necessarily an iterative process. In most cases the first version of the 
survey is large and ambitious one, but it needs to go through a weight loss program after some 
iterations. This survey was no exception. The first version of the survey was a considerable 62 
questions within 30 pages, a time-consuming booklet to manage by all means. This iteration 
was first used to interview eight respondents, the average interview lasting one hour and 45 
minutes, nearly double the time that was originally agreed to by the respondents. Indeed, most 
of the eight respondents tended to rush through the remaining questions after the first hour, 
something they could not be blamed for. Hence the survey was reviewed to make it leaner and 
more attractive cosmetically. The number of questions was cut to 37 and the number of pages 
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to a mere 14. During the course of interviews, question 30 was found unnecessary and deleted, 
as discussed below. The questionnaire was then a manageable 36 questions. Then it went into 
second iteration by obtaining valuable feedback from highly experienced subject matter 
experts, such as professors in the Centre of Infectious Diseases and Microbiology. After this 
the survey was ready to be rolled out.  
The survey was composed of eight sections, reduced to seven after dropping question 30. The 
survey itself is presented in Appendix B. Here I present the main questions and some 
discussion of them.  
1. Section 1: “About your organisation”, 10 questions: This section sought necessary 
information about the organisation, the respondent’s position within it, and the 
activities that it handled during the outbreak. The pandemic management and 
coordination tasks explained in section 2.5.2 were summarised under the following tick 
boxes: 
• Leadership and guidance 
• Collecting information  
• Information analysis and dissemination 
• Training other organisations 
• Epidemiology 
• Detection (including surveillance) 
• Community education 
• Emergency care (emergency department and intensive care unit)  
• Providing resources to others (more information was required about the 
types of resources and to whom they was provided) 
• Using logistics to transport disease outbreak related equipment. 
The aim of questions 7 to 10 was to capture how and who notified the respondent’s 
department when an outbreak was announced, and how and who notified them when it 
was over. Hence the attempt to determine the initiation and closure points for the 
coordination process in accordance with the design questions in section 3.3.3.1 above. 
2-  Section 2: Planning and developing polices: In this section perceptual questions were 
asked about the importance of developing policies, rated on a six-point scale ranging 
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from not important to very important. Networking questions were included, asking 
respondents about collaboration with other agencies during policy development and 
how often it occurred (weekly, monthly, semi-annually or annually), so as to measure 
tie strength during policy development.  
3- Section 3: Internal training: this small section was used to gauge preparedness within 
the organisation to use as an outcome construct if need be. 
4- Section 4: Trans-unit training: This was a networking section, the main focus of which 
was to capture the ego’s training and exercises relationships before outbreaks and how 
often they occurred. A four-point scale question measured the perception of 
preparedness after the training compared to before it. 
5- Section 5: Formal coordination: three questions all focused on networking. The first 
question asked with whom the respondent exchanged information about outbreaks 
before they occurred. Here is where networking information of the respondent was 
captured. More meta-information questions were included about each link, so as to 
capture: 
• Tie strength as the frequency of communication (daily, weekly, monthly, semi-
annually, and annually). 
• Tier connectedness by asking about the jurisdictional level of the organisation 
with which the respondent communicated (international, federal, state, local, 
private, and other). The federal, state and local categories were used for public 
agencies (education department, health departments, etc.) and private was for 
non-public corporations. 
• Type of communication: The aim was to capture the context of the 
communication itself, whether it was exchanging information, exchanging 
resources, or conducting fieldwork together.  
The above three points were repeated in all the subsequent questions about 
coordination. This section then proceeded into coordination during the outbreak itself, 
and the last question-concerned organisations that the respondent had not anticipated 
needing to coordinate with during the outbreak and hence were not part of the 
coordination plan, yet needed to be involved. Here missed parts of the structure could 
be captured, which do not usually show up until needed. 
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6- Section 6: Informal coordination: This section captured nearly the same information as 
the previous one, but applied to informal coordination during the outbreak and to the 
agencies that respondents did not anticipate needing, yet found they needed to extend 
organisational reach to them and create informal links with those agencies. Informal 
coordination was not captured before the outbreak because we assumed such 
interaction would be minimal in that phase, consisting just of passing and receiving 
surveillance and protocol information. Those contexts do not usually stimulate the 
creation of informal coordination links since there is no need for them. This section 
contained a further three questions. One asked about the stage at which the respondent 
realised the need for informal coordination. The second was a scaled question about 
the efficiency of the informal coordination in getting things done compared to the 
formal coordination, rated from not efficient at all to very efficient. The last question in 
this section was also a scaled one, asking about the importance of informal 
coordination in bridging coordination gaps, rated from not needed at all to it is 
essential. This question could be used as a dependent variable for the informal 
coordination model.  
7- Section 7: Intra-organisational informal coordination. Many departments were small, 
containing five to ten workers and making it infeasible and uninformative to collect 
such information because in such small environments everyone talks to everyone. 
Therefore any information would be insignificant and not representative. Thus this 
question was discarded. 
8- Section 8: Coordination measure: Besides capturing coordination measures, i.e. 
dependent variables, this section also contained some miscellaneous questions. One 
question asked how up-to-date the coordination plan was (relating it to the policy 
development section). Respondents were also asked to rate the most effective 
communication methods on a scale from 1 to 6, ranging from landline phone to web 
portal such as wiki sites or intranets. An important question asked how long it took for 
coordination to begin after the outbreak was announced, hence an important indication 
of coordination robustness; and how long it took for the coordination to reach the 
optimal point. The section ended by asking about additional resources that the 
respondent had needed during the outbreak, and the three main errors or mistakes that 
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occurred during the outbreak as well as the most important ways in which informal 
coordination facilitated the respondent’s work. These questions could be used as 
further indicators for the success or robustness of coordination, besides the questions 
already detailed.  
Figure 3-6 presents a cumulative graphical view of the relationship between different 
components of the survey. The survey itself is presented in Appendix B. 
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Section 1: About your organisation.
1- Name of the organisation.
2- Which department do you work in?
3- What is your position within the department?
4- What are the activities that describe your duties during the 
outbreak
5- Does your department provide resources to other, please 
specify.
6- Do you use external agencies during the transport of 
outbreak related material? please specify.
7- How does your department get notified when an outbreak is 
announced?
8- Who notify your department when disease outbreak (DO ) is 
announced?
9- How does your department get notified that an outbreak is 
finished?
10-Who notify you then?
`
Section 2: Planning and developing policies.
1- How important to have prepared 
coordination plan to deal with DO?
2- Please list the organisations that you 
worked with so to develop DO policies?
3- How often did you meet to exchange 
information with the organisations?
4- Which legislative level did you provide 
policy input to?
Section 3: Internal training.
1- Does your department conduct periodical 
internal training to manage DO?
2- How often these training exercises are 
conducted?
3- How many employees participate in that 
training?
Section 4: Trans unit training.
1- Have your department participated in 
joint training exercises with others?
2- List those and the period in which the 
training was carried.
3- Which organisation was leading the 
training?
4- How do you measure your preparedness 
after the training compared to what it was 
before? 
Section 5: Formal coordination.
1- Before DO, whom do you communicate with about emerging 
or expected outbreaks?
2- Which organisations do you coordinate with during any of 
the three phases of DO?
3- Which organisations you don’t normally coordinate with, but 
needed to do so during DO? 
Section 6: Informal coordination.
1- What are the organisations that you informally coordinate 
with during DO?
2- What are the organisations that you don’t normally 
coordinate with but needed to create informal channel during 
DO?
3- How efficient was the informal coordination in getting things 
done compared to the formal one? 
4- At which stage you realised the for informal coordination?
5- How do you rate the importance of informal coordination in 
bridging coordination gaps? 
Section 8: Coordination measures
1- How updated was your coordination plan?
2- Rate which communication methods were most effective.
3- How long did it take the coordination to start after the DO is 
announced?  
4- How long did it take for the coordination to be optimal after 
it started?
5- What are the additional recourses did you use during the 
outbreak?
6- List three main errors that happen during DO.
7- List the most three important factors that informal 
coordination facilitated your work.    
`
`
``
`
`
 
Figure 3-6: Flow chart of the survey flow and components 
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3.6. Ethics approval 
For this research, that dealt with health issues and needed to collect information from health 
professionals, it was necessary to apply for health ethics approval before releasing the survey 
to health officials. Ethics approval had to be obtained from the NSW Ministry of Health (NSW 
Health) via a newly established online system www.ethicsform.org/au. The process started in 
October 2010, where the survey and many other forms were submitted. Fortunately, the survey 
was deemed a low and negligible risk survey, and NSW Health at that time had a new 
expedited process for reviewing research that involved low and negligible risks. Approval was 
sought from the Hunter New England (HNE) ethics committee, and luckily again, the HNE 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HERC) was a lead HERC under the NSW Health 
systems for single Ethical and Scientific Review of Multicentre research. Thus, all other NSW 
HERCs would accept ethics approval granted from this committee and for any multisite (i.e. 
involving more than one Area Health Service). The approval, once obtained, could be used 
throughout NSW rather than needing to file a separate application for each AHS. This was 
beneficial since the research involved many AHSs within the state and overall approval saved 
the hassle, time and effort to seek new approval for each one. 
The approval letter was received on March 10, 2011, with the lifetime of three years on 
condition that progress report was filed each year (HNEHREC number 11/03/16/5.13). Any 
changes in the survey would need to be notified to the committee and re-evaluated. Hence 
with the latest version of the survey was supplied, with no intention for subsequent change. 
Email correspondence and copy of the approval letter are in Appendix C. 
3.7. Administering the survey: 
Conducting a sociocentric network study would have been relatively new for research of this 
scope (Dantas and Dalziell, 2005) because it involves the entire population in disease outbreak 
(Bharosa et al., 2010). The researcher would have to form a roster of all disease outbreak 
personnel and colleagues (alters) and then present it to the ego who would be asked to identify 
known alters, so as to determine the relationships between different alters. This would be a 
massive, practically impossible exercise since tens of thousands of personnel were involved in 
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the H1N1 2009 outbreak. For this reason, the egocentric network approach was more practical, 
less expensive, and hence adopted for the study. Furthermore, it also allowed the ego to freely 
recall alters and could include alters not conceived of by the researcher. This would not have 
been possible with the sociocentric approach. So the first step was to utilise the information 
that had been acquired through the first round of qualitative data collection to build an 
understanding of what tasks were performed during the outbreak, and then target officials 
working within these tasks. The second step was to discuss with them introducing their alters 
to the research so that they might participate in the survey, based on the criteria that they 
participated in the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. The matrix of expertise targeted is shown in Table 
3-5. 
Table 3-5: Overview of the positions surveyed 
Working Field Positions Example  
Clinical care Doctors, nurses  
Policy decision-makers Senior public health officials  
Emergency management Emergency care 
professionals, intensive care 
unit professionals, clinicians 
Logistics Ambulance services 
Public health Public health unit, 
epidemiologists 
Detection and surveillance Laboratories, GPs, infectious 
disease centres, intensive care 
units 
 
This was also accompanied by constructing an abstraction of the tasks and high-level 
communication scheme between organisations involved in outbreaks. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3-7. It is divided into four quadrants to emphasise the leading agencies within each 
quadrant. These tasks start from surveillance and detection, to communication and 
management and logistics. These groups do not reflect any sequential division of the tasks; 
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rather they reflect general categories. The scope of this research was limited to NSW state 
within Australia; hence the focus was on the tasks that were performed within this scope.  
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Figure 3-7: Abstraction of the tasks that are performed during the outbreak 
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The next step was to superimpose Table 3-5 and Figure 3-7 to define the targeted audience and 
hence approach individuals working within these organisations or performing such tasks to 
complete the survey and provide a list of their contacts. This will be used to further build up 
the data corpus. Those targeted are shown in bold in Figure 3-7 
The plan was to approach most of the health professionals who had been interviewed for the 
qualitative questionnaire to obtain their comments on the survey. This resulted in fixing some 
cosmetic and grammatical errors, but most importantly, it was reduced from a voluminous 30 
pages with 64 questions to 14 pages and 37 questions, focusing on the main streams discussed 
above. Since this was considered health-related research, the next step was to apply for ethics 
approval before rolling the survey out to health professionals.  
Approval was received with HNEHREC reference No: 11/03/16/5.13, NSW HREC reference 
No: HREC/11/HNE/78 and NSW SSA Reference No: SSA/11/HNE/79. This meant that data 
collection in NSW could begin. Thus the main data collection phase started. 
3.7.1. Sample population targeted. 
An online version of the survey was created using smart-survey.com. A test link is still 
available and can be accessed via: 
https://www.smart-
survey.co.uk/v.asp?i=40603sjrvk&preview=THIS_IS_A_PREVIEW_LINK_DO_NOT_SEN
D 
Data collection for this phase began by utilising contacts and establishing new ones with 
support from the Sydney Infectious Diseases and Biosecurity Institute (SEIB) to generate 
names that could participate in the survey. The initial intention was to send sending 
introductory emails with the supporting documentation attached to potential respondents, 
asking them to use the link to fill out the survey online. Follow-up emails would then be used 
as per the survey’s standard procedures. It soon became apparent, however, that since health 
workers were extremely busy, they paid little heed to the survey and this method generated 
zero results. Hence, the technique needed to be changed if any results were to be obtained. 
Potential respondents were then telephoned, and I went through a brief introduction about the 
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research then asked for a one-hour appointment. This personal approach created trust and 
interest, and many agreed to meet and go through the survey. Most of the health professionals 
were so busy that some meetings were scheduled one month after the initial contact. Others 
had to reschedule the interviews due to unexpected circumstances. Some respondents were far 
from Sydney, and I had to travel more than three hours to do an interview. Meeting the 
respondents face-to-face provided a unique opportunity to extend the information captured by 
obtaining in-depth details with the respondents, and hearing their personal insights, reflections, 
perceptions, criticisms, and anecdotes. These proved to be valuable information during the 
data analysis phase, especially as these interviews were tape-recorded, allowing transcription 
for further analysis. Moreover, many personnel volunteered valuable documentation such as 
situational reports, policies, influenza plans and the like. These proved to be invaluable to 
build a structural layer of familiarity and understanding of the formal methods for operating 
procedures. 
In seeking to widen the base of the interviewed people, the snowballing method was followed 
to elicit contacts details for others to be interviewed. Some interviewees were helpful by 
initiating the communication with the contacts that were deemed interesting. This was 
capitalised on the trust and working relationships between contacts and proved exceptionally 
helpful to gain access to other health workers with busy schedules. I found that even in 
initiating the first contact with potential interviewees, the phone was much more efficient than 
email. People chose to ignore or shelve non-urgent third party and non-work-related emails, 
whereas phones and voice created trust and a sense of importance.  
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Figure 3-8: flowchart of the interview process. 
Figure 3-8 above shows a flow chart of the interview process that I followed during the data 
collection phase. 
This phase lasted about four months. By the end of this period, about 70 professionals, health 
workers and bureaucrats from a broad spectrum of the health industry had been interviewed.  
During the interview process, the respondents were asked on behalf of their department during 
the formal communication part in accordance of the standard formal procedures especially if 
these respondents worked in small departments or they were managing their departments. 
However when the interview turned to the informal part, the respondents talked about 
themselves as individuals who have waived these informal relationships.  
Appendix E lists the general positions interviewed, along with general task descriptions. These 
have been intentionally generalised to reduce the possibility of identifying the personnel 
interviewed. Appendix E reflects the diversity of the interviewees, which stems from the 
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diversity of tasks that were undertaken in outbreak management and coordination. This further 
elaborates the discussion in Chapter Two of the wide expertise needed for such a complex 
system of coordination and communication. 
Appendix E also shows the different AHSs that were targeted, suggesting the wide 
geographical area covered. It extended from Wagga Wagga and Albury in southern NSW to 
Lismore in the northern part of the state.  
Only one respondent completed the survey online, but even then I had a face-to-face interview 
with her later. There were also three purely qualitative interviews, which are not reflected in 
Appendix E, one of them with very senior public health official. 
Only one person declined to be recorded. One other respondent could not be recorded since 
the interview was conducted over that respondent’s mobile phone. All the other interviews 
were either face-to-face or by phone (only if they worked in remote places that required more 
than six hours travel each way) but even those interviews were recorded. Finally 66 surveys 
were completed, and more than 80 hours of recordings had to be transcribed.  
During the interviews, responses were written on paper rather than recorded online since 
internet access was not guaranteed at all locations and to allow the researcher to stay focused 
on the interviewee discussions. In more than 90% of the interviews, the researcher filled in the 
survey while the respondent dictated the answers. This created an interactive session, as the 
researcher was able to reflect on the answers and guide the discussion if more details were 
thought to be of importance. Also it facilitated taking field notes as an elaboration to some 
answers.  
While the interviews were still occurring, transcribing began as well as copying the details 
from the paper surveys to the online system, as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1999). 
This was important for following up some of the information in further interviews or even for 
contacting recently interviewed respondents to clarify some topics. 
Transcribing was an interesting task because the researcher began to draw conclusions and 
discover similarities and deficiencies within the information. It was also an extremely time-
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consuming task. Finally, the survey data was all standardised by moving the paper data to the 
online system and standardising the entries, making it ready for synthesis and analysis. 
3.8. Data analysis procedure  
Data analysis technique is dependent on number of factors ranging from the research questions 
to data distribution. In most cases it is not a one-step process, as the raw data collected from 
the field must be standardised, synthesised and then organised to suit the selected software and 
testing methodology. Statistical analysis provides a plethora of algorithms to apply to datasets, 
depending on the aim of each test and the type of the data on hand.  
3.8.1. Dataset description 
For the dataset that was used, the first step was to export it from the online system. 
Unfortunately the online survey provider had only few options for filtering the data before 
exporting it. Also there were very limited options for structuring the exported data to make it 
most suitable for further analysis. Therefore data was exported as a raw .csv file that was best 
opened by the MSEXCEL program. Figure 3-9 shows a screenshot of how part of the raw data 
looked when imported to Excel. 
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Figure 3-9: Data screenshot in Excel 
One of the first tasks was to extract the questions and answers that would be used as constructs 
for the independent, moderating and dependent variables, in a structure that could be used for 
further analysis. At the same time, this structure should elicit the ego network of each 
participant, enabling further calculation of the variables discussed previously. Figure 3-10 
shows a screenshot of the structure from question 25. 
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Figure 3-10: Screenshot of how the ego network data was structured after extracting it from the raw file 
At this stage, each question had its own entity and represented one of the stages and phases of 
the outbreak coordination (formal: before and during; and informal: during the outbreak). 
3.8.2. Survey questions and variables 
Referring to the model in section 2.6.1 and Figure 2-18, the questions and constructs of the 
survey could be linked to the model as follows: 
Formal coordination before the outbreak was addressed through question 22: Prior to disease 
outbreak, did your department communicate with other organisations/departments about 
outbreaks?  
This question designated the phase of coordination before the outbreak, which included daily 
routine communication according to the standard operating procedures as well as during 
horizon scanning in anticipation of outbreaks.  
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As well as giving the name of the organisation that he or she communicated with, the 
respondent indicated the jurisdictional level of that organisation using an ordered series of 
categories: 
I: International, F: Federal, S: State, L: Local (operating at Area Health Service Level), P: 
Private, O: Other. 
These constructs were used to calculate the tier connectedness for the respondent’s 
organisation in that phase.  
Also the respondent was asked to state the frequency of communication based on these codes: 
W: Weekly, M: Monthly, S: Semi-annually, A: Annually, AN: As needed. 
The “as needed” category indicated a domain context in which organisations decide to initiate 
many communications based on need that they perceive at specific times. Such 
communications usually occur between monthly and the semi-annual frequencies.  
Another construct that was collected was the communication type: whether it was information 
providing, information receiving, resource request, and resource supply. Those results are not 
included in this research. 
Formal coordination during the outbreak was addressed through question 23: Which 
organisations/departments/units did you coordinate during the outbreak? 
Informal coordination during the outbreak was addressed in question 25: Which organisations/ 
departments/units did you informally coordinate with during the outbreak?  
The same construct information was collected as for question 22. 
The dependent variable for the formal coordination, as discussed in Chapter Two, was how 
quickly coordination began after the outbreak was announced. This topic was addressed in 
question 33 of the survey. 
The moderating variable, being the actual tier of the respondent’s organisation, was deduced 
from questions 1 and 2, asking for the name of the respondent’s organisation and the 
department or unit he or she worked in. By combining those responses with the organisational 
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chart information from the NSW Ministry of Health, it was possible to deduce the 
organisational tier of the respondent’s organisation, whether it was federal, State, local, or 
other (which includes organisations that are not part of the public health system). 
Still remaining was the task of changing these variables to numerals that could be used as in 
subsequent calculations. 
3.8.3. Changing letters to numerals, Ridit analysis 
Ridit analysis was first suggested by Bross in 1958 as a missing link in data analysis in 
biological and behavioural sciences, specifically when response variables fall in the 
“borderland” between dichotomous classifications (e.g. “lived”-“died”, “yes”-“no”) and 
redefined measurement systems (i.e. measurements that are highly reproducible at different 
times or at different places). Bross explained that sometimes the response variable is a 
subjective scale (e.g. a well ordered series of categories such as “minor”, “moderate”, 
“severe”). These borderland response variables may not be adequately analysed by the chi-
square family of statistical methods, but at the same time the t-test family of techniques may 
not be appropriate. In such cases the “Ridit analysis” may provide the missing link between 
the two traditional families of statistical methods. Ridit procedure is also safe to use because it 
is “distribution free“ (Bross, 1958).  
The name "Ridit" was chosen because of the analogy with "Probits" and "Logits". Like other 
members of the "it" family, Ridit represent a type of transformation. However, whereas 
Probits are relative to a theoretical distribution (the normal distribution), Ridit is relative to an 
empirical distribution. The first three letters stand for Relative to an Identified Distribution. In 
other words, Ridit is based on the observed distribution of a response variable for a specified 
set of individuals. Ridit represent a new application of a very old idea ("the probability 
transformation") and are closely related to distribution-free methods based on ranks 
(especially the Wilcoxon Test). The technique grew out of efforts to apply the rank t-test to 
Cornell Automative Crash Injury Reaesrch Program (ACIR) data (where the number of 
subseries was large) (Bross, 1958) 
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The calculation method for Ridit values begins by giving ascending scores to the answers or 
values. Once this is done, the calculation of Ridit is a simple routine process, the mechanics of 
which are shown in Table 3-6 which uses the ACIR data to exemplify the calculations (Bross, 
1954). Column 1 of Table 3-6 gives the distribution (with respect to a subjective injury scale) 
of the individuals in the "identified distribution" of the ACIR study. Thus of 179 persons, 17 
were reported as not injured and 14 were fatally injured. The Ridits are calculated from the 
numbers in column 1 according to the instructions listed below the table. The Ridit for a given 
category is simply the proportion of individuals injured to a lesser degree plus one-half the 
proportion of individuals in the category itself. 
Table 3-6: Using ACIR data to exemplify Ridit calculations  
  A B C D E 
  Frequency 
of 
occurrence 
1/2 
Column 
A 
Cumulative 
frequency 
Column 
B+C 
Ridit Value 
(D/Sum) 
None 17 8.5 0 8.5 0.047 
Minor 54 27 17 44 0.246 
Moderate 60 30 71 101 0.564 
Severe 19 9.5 131 140.5 0.785 
Serious 9 4.5 150 154.5 0.863 
Critical 6 3 159 162 0.905 
Fatal 14 7 165 172 0.961 
Total 179         
 
The calculations of the columns are done as follows: 
Column A: The frequency distribution in the identified distribution (reference class). 
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Column B: One-half of the corresponding entry in column A. 
Column C: The cumulative of column A (displaced one category downward). 
Column D: Column B + column C. 
Column E: The entries in column D divided by the grand total (179). The numbers are the 
Ridits.  
The operation in Table 3-6 can be viewed as a method of assigning a number (or weight) to 
the graded categories of the data. For example, a person whose degree of injury was 
previously described by a name or category (i.e. “severe”) now has a degree of injury 
described by a number (i.e. 0.785) (Bross, 1958). Also Ridits are by design close to 
distribution-free methods. (Jansen, 1984) 
Ridits have been used in the network analysis context for classification of fraudulent car 
accident injury claims (Brockett et al., 2002). In another study Ridits were used along with 
SNA to create an expert system for detecting automobile insurance fraud (Šubelj et al., 2011). 
Ridit and network analysis have been used in studying emerging coordination during a disaster 
by focusing on the structural positions of the organisations within the network structure. In the 
present research, Ridit was used to calculate tie strength, degree centrality, and ego 
betweenness as continuous numerical score values by converting the respondents’ answers 
from ordinal ones such as for the frequency of coordination meetings held (Hossain et al., 
2011). The exact question being; how often does your department meet or exchange 
information on terrorism with other STATE AGENCIES? 
Responses could use these values: 
1) Once a week or more 
2) Two or three times a month 
3) Once every month or two 
4) A few times a year 
5) Annually 
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6) Never 
These responses were given values representing the weight of each answer, depending on its 
frequency among the total responses. Such score values looked like those in Table 3-7 
Table 3-7: Ridit values for balanced scores of preparedness survey response (Adopted in part from 
(Hossain et al., 2011).  
Ridit value  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tie 
strength 
0.194 0.402 0.491 0.712 0.92 0.991 
 
Hence Ridit is a viable and feasible analysis to calculate the score tie strength, centrality and 
tier connectedness when changing responses to scores and values, to allow use of these values 
in further calculations. The details of these calculations are discussed in Chapter Four. 
3.9. Statistical tests used 
The choice of data analysis techniques to be used on any dataset is dependent on a variety of 
factors ranging from the research questions to data distribution and dataset structure. The 
hypotheses proposed (H1 – H3) and their sub hypotheses examined the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables of the proposed coordination models. The first phase of 
preparing the data after exporting the survey responses from the online survey system was to 
use Microsoft Excel and begin filtering responses for the required rows and columns. Then 
Ridit analysis was applied to change the ordinal values to numeral-weighted ones. In the last 
phase, all the variables were placed into the SPSS statistics program to implement certain 
statistical tests so as to test correlation between the relevant variables. 
3.9.1. Correlation: Partial correlation and zero-order correlation 
Correlation is a statistical measurement of the relationship between two variables (Field, 
2009). It has the value range from +1 to –1 for the relationship between two variables where a 
zero value indicates that there is no relation between those two variables. A “-1” value implies 
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a perfect negative relation between them, which means that when one variable increases, the 
other variable decreases. On the other side, a “+1” value reflects a perfect positive relation 
between the variables, indicating that both variables move in the same direction together. 
Partial correlation is defined as the measure of the association between two variables after 
removing the common effects of one or more control variables (Hinton, 2004, Levin, 2006). 
When there is no control variable in the measurement of correlation between two variables, it 
is called a zero-order correlation. If there is one control variable then it is called a first-order 
correlation. This means that a zero-order correlation is the correlation between two variables 
which does not include any control variable (Hinton, 2004, Field, 2009).  
For example, in Figure 3-11a, the third variable (i.e. third) is correlated with both the first and 
second variables. In this case, we must choose partial correlation to determine the correlation 
between the first and second variables. However, in Figure 3-11b, there is no need to use 
partial correlation in measuring the correlation between the first and second variables – a zero-
order correlation can calculate the correlation between those variables appropriately. 
Third 
variable
First
 variable
Second 
variable
Third 
variable
First
 variable
Second 
variable
(a) Partial Correlation (b) Zero-order Correlation
 
Figure 3-11 Illustration of (a) partial and (b) zero-order correlation. 
To measure zero-order correlation between any pair of independent and dependent variables of 
the proposed hypotheses, both parametric and non-parametric tests are applied. 
3.9.2. The Moderating Variables 
Moderating variables are those that conspire with the independent variables to affect the 
dependent ones. These variables take into consideration some of the characteristics of the 
nodes (gender, ages, organisational level…) in order to measure the influence of these on 
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performance. In this research, the organisational tier level was discussed to be the moderating 
variable. This section presents the calculation methodology that was used for the moderating 
variables, and the results are presented in Chapter Four.  
To test the effects of the moderating variable over the independent and dependent variables, 
the moderating variable (tier level of the originating organisation) had to be changed to 
numerical values using Ridit analysis following the same procedure as for tier connectedness 
when calculating the independent variable in section 3.8.3. This time, however, it was done for 
the originating organisation – the one that the respondent represented – rather than the one that 
the link was directed to. Then a linear regression model was used to determine whether this 
moderating variable had an effect on performance. Regression is a way of predicting the 
outcome variable from one or more predictive variable(s) (Healey, 2011). In simple 
regression, a predictive variable is used to quantify the outcome variable, whereas in multiple 
regressions more than one predictive variable is used. In regression analysis the following 
mathematical equation is used to predict the value of the dependent variable (denoted by Y) on 
the basis of the independent variable (denoted by X):  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋2 + 𝑐𝑐(𝑋𝑋1 ∗  𝑋𝑋2) + 𝑑𝑑  
where a denotes a baseline amount given to all dependent variables, b denotes the coefficient 
of the moderating variable, and c is the interaction term which defines the role of the 
moderating variable. This is the term usually calculated to estimate whether the role of the 
moderating variable is significant or not. Also e is called error terms or disturbance terms.  
Hence the mathematical method combines the effect of the independent and moderating 
variables in calculating the regression significance of this effect on the dependent variable. If 
the result proves to be significant then the coefficient of the moderating variable exists in the 
linear equation. Table 3-8 provides an overview of how this is done: 
Table 3-8: Methodology and interpretation of effect of moderating variable  
Number Independent 
variable 
Moderating 
variable 
Interaction Result interpretation 
(linear regression) 
1 Connectedness Tier level  Connectedness*Tier If significance <0.05 
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Level then the moderating 
variable affects the 
dependent variable; 
otherwise it does not. 
2 Degree centrality Tier level Degree 
Centrality*Tier level 
3 Tie strength Tier level Tie strength*Tier 
level 
3.10. Data Limitations 
The first data limitation in this study, as in most quantitative studies, is that the sample might 
not be generalizable to the complete population of staff involved in health. Second, it should 
be appreciated that participants were asked to remember incidents that in some cases might 
have occurred a year or more earlier. It is consequently conceivable that there are inaccuracies 
in the data basically because individuals’ memory of what occurred was incomplete. The 
responses might be prejudiced through the recollection and the motivations of the individuals 
who took the time to complete the survey. Third, the survey on which the analysis is based 
was not set up to undertake research into social networks. For this purpose, it was 
demonstrated that the processes undertaken did extract what were believed to be useful 
proxies of network relations. From this perspective, it is vital to review the results carefully 
and to reflect on directions they might show for additional research validation. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Findings from the network enabled coordination for disease 
outbreak 
This chapter presents the results for the data collected, without interpretation or discussion, 
which will be provided in Chapter 5. The chapter initially presents descriptive statistics about 
the personnel interviewed, without revealing their identity. This is followed by the storyline of 
how the data was synthesised for analysis, and finally the correlation results for each of the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics of the data gathered from the respondents during 
the 4-month interview period. This section focuses on the demographics and functional 
descriptions, leaving the network-based statistics to the second section. 
4.1.1. Functional areas of the participants 
The interviews were conducted with widely diversified group of actors whose diversity of 
positions and functions demonstrates the complexity of coordinating disease outbreaks. The 
information from Table 3-5, positions and tasks of the respondents, was further condensed into 
19 generalised functional categories, with the number of respondents identified in each 
category. Table 4.1 shows those categories and the number of respondents in each. 
Table 4-1: Number of respondents in each functional category 
Respondents’ functional 
categories Occurrences 
Microbiology 5 
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Area Health management 6 
Laboratory management 2 
Epidemiology 13 
Coordination 3 
Surveillance 2 
Emergency management 9 
Clinical management 5 
Policy development 2 
Pharmacies 1 
Logistics 1 
Immunisation 3 
Nursing 4 
General management 2 
Community Health 1 
Health management 2 
Informaation Technology (ICT) 1 
Bio-preparedness 3 
Public communication 1 
Total 66 
 
Also Figure 4-1 below provides a visual representation of these numbers. 
- 149 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
Figure 4-1: Number of respondents in functional areas 
4.1.2. Task matrix of the respondents 
Question 4 in the questionnaire asked respondents to mark the types of tasks in which they had 
been involved. The standard tasks listed were the following: 
• Leadership and guidance. 
• Collecting information. 
• Information analysis and dissemination. 
• Training other organisations. 
• Epidemiology. 
• Detection (including surveillance). 
• Community education. 
• Emergency care (Emergency Department and Intensive care unit). 
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• Others: please specify. 
This question was designed to define an inter-organisational-tasks relationship matrix, giving 
weight to the tasks most performed during the outbreaks. Figure 4-2 shows the percentage 
distribution of these tasks.  
 
Figure 4-2: Tasks performed during the outbreak (N=66) 
For the “others” category (the last column in the chart), the individual results were: 
Response to individual cases and contact management 
1. Communication to public (NSW health site) / fact sheets 
2. Public Health Alerts (Community, GPS, Hospital) 
3. Liaison between Labs and Public Health epidemiologists 
4. Data entry NCIMS (state-based system for notifiable diseases) 
5. Implementation of NSW Dept. of Health Communicable Disease protocol 
6. Emergency management coordination, provide information to other government 
agencies on how to protect their staff 
7. Supply of medications 
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8. Logistics – distribution of quarantine packs 
9. Emergency management 
10. Liaising personal protective equipment ( PPE) and patients’ isolation management 
11. Deploying National and State stockpile of equipment and drugs 
12. Support the GP network and Aboriginal Medical Services (AMS's) 
13. Surveillance at Sydney airport 
14. Planning/coordination 
15. Testing samples and reporting back 
16. Support and advice to Public Health Units (PHUs) 
17. Hospital staff education 
18. Assistance to Department of Health 
19. GP-level care facility 
20. Liaison with State Emergency Management services (SEMC) 
21. Liaison with other organisations 
22. Policy, resource allocation, protocol development, strategic planning for critical care 
23. Source of communication for people 
24. Taking care of phone call/courier/isolation packs 
25. Logistics / internal communication 
26. Resource development, public and internal communication 
27. Policy development, management and external liaison services 
28. Coordinate home isolation and provision of services for isolated people 
29. Offer vaccine 
30. Helped in rolling information to schools 
It should be noted that for about only 21% of the health workers responded that they work in 
emergency care since these are the ones that work in the intensive care or clinical care in 
hospitals while other epidemiologists and health workers considers themselves working in 
pandemic management rather than emergency management. 
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4.1.3. Geographical distribution of respondents 
In trying to cover coordination patterns across different response groups, the intention was to 
interview respondents from different geographical and demographic spectrums, whether they 
were suburban, urban or rural. This required selective targeting of both respondents’ tasks and 
geographical locations. Some interviews were also conducted with health workers who 
worked on jurisdictional boundaries between NSW and two other states, Victoria and 
Queensland. For this cross-jurisdictional experience, the public health centres in Albury and 
Lismore were targeted. The NSW Ministry of Health was located in North Sydney. All the 
statewide management services were located there, representing the hub for most of the health 
communication within the state. The complexity and intensity of tasks decreased as one 
moved from suburban to rural areas due to the simplicity of social structures in the rural 
context. The red drop pins on the map below represent the offices of the interviewed 
participants. Their offices manage large areas within their local area health service 
geographical location.  
Figure 4-3 provides a mapped projection of the interview locations. 
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Figure 4-3: Base work locations of interviewed respondents (N=66) 
 
4.2. Network descriptive statistics 
This section briefly highlights some of the network-based information, such as the percentages 
of links. 
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4.2.1. Comparison of number of formal links before and during the outbreak 
It is to be expected that organisations tend to initiate more links during a time of crisis as part 
of their effort to acquire more information or resources from others. Table 4-2 compares the 
number of links of each respondent before the Swine flu (H1N1) outbreak to the number 
during the outbreak. It also shows the percentage increase of these links for each respondent. 
Table 4-2: Number of links before and during the outbreak, along with percentage of increase 
Respondent 
ID 4313734 4288732 4029068 4284390 4821701 4236514 
Links before 
outbreak 3 3 2 2 4 1 
Links during 
outbreak 4 9 3 13 10 2 
% Increase 33.3 200.0 50.0 550.0 150.0 100.0 
Identifier 3593163 3343240 4045418 4366750 3686788 3583350 
Links before 
outbreak 1 6 3 1 1 4 
Links during 
outbreak 4 14 4 12 8 4 
% Increase 300.0 133.3 33.3 1100.0 700.0 0.0 
Identifier 3285663 5038035 3910135 3496016 3304691 4000864 
Links before 
outbreak 4 5 9 3 3 6 
Links during 
outbreak 4 7 12 21 10 14 
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% Increase 0.0 40.0 33.3 600.0 233.3 133.3 
Identifier 4821260 3532293 5047656 4016687 4245128 4001052 
Links before 
outbreak 4 3 2 2 2 3 
Links during 
outbreak 6 8 3 4 6 15 
% Increase 50.0 166.7 50.0 100.0 200.0 400.0 
Identifier 4301022 3313606 3687181 3338107 3701510 3567155 
Links before 
outbreak 1 8 1 1 5 1 
Links during 
outbreak 1 21 6 21 14 5 
% Increase 0.0 162.5 500.0 2000.0 180.0 400.0 
Identifier 4016687 4245128 3480594 3268758 5024149 3333690 
Links before 
outbreak 2 2 7 4 3 8 
Links during 
outbreak 4 6 9 12 12 13 
% Increase 100.0 200.0 28.6 200.0 300.0 62.5 
Identifier 3285663 5038035 3910135 3496016 3304691 4000864 
Links before 
outbreak 4 5 9 3 3 6 
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Links during 
outbreak 4 7 12 21 10 14 
% Increase 0.0 40.0 33.3 600.0 233.3 133.3 
Identifier 4420907 3701781 3797036 3764761 3255980 3486586 
Links before 
outbreak 1 3 3 2 5 3 
Links during 
outbreak 4 6 5 4 6 10 
% Increase 300.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 20.0 233.3 
Identifier 3977276 3850879 3701613 3653416 4573390 3683064 
Links before 
outbreak 4 2 3 4 7 2 
Links during 
outbreak 11 3 3 6 15 6 
% Increase 175.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 114.3 200.0 
Identifier 
3662303 4259129 5047656 3296106 5011784 4380610 
Links before 
outbreak 6 3 2 8 4 1 
Links during 
outbreak 15 5 3 17 6 10 
% Increase 150.0 66.7 50.0 112.5 50.0 900.0 
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Identifier 5011784 4380610 3259726 3553658 4181107 4250528 
Links before 
outbreak 4 1 1 0 0 0 
Links during 
outbreak 6 10 4 8 4 2 
% Increase 50.0 900.0 300.0 NA NA NA 
Identifier 4324305 5038216 4292861 3259726 3644246 3157803 
Links before 
outbreak 0 8 0 1 2 3 
Links during 
outbreak 1 13 6 4 11 4 
% Increase NA 62.5 NA 300.0 450.0 33.3 
Identifier 5024264 4285907 4856713 4821704 4948099 5024264 
Links before 
outbreak 6 3 3 9 2 6 
Links during 
outbreak 9 13 11 19 6 9 
% Increase 50.0 333.3 266.7 111.1 200.0 50.0 
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Figure 4-4: Graphical view of the percent increase of communication aggregated per number of 
respondents from before to during the outbreak. 
The average link increase for all respondents was 232%, demonstrating a major shift towards 
increasing new communication during the outbreak. Figure 4-4 shows the percent increase in 
communication against number of respondents compared before to during the outbreak.  It is 
noticed that most of the respondents reported between 50% (10 respondents) and 300% (4 
respondents) fold increase in the communication. 
4.2.2. Comparison of informal and formal links during the outbreak 
Table 4-3 presents the comparative statistics between the formal and informal links during the 
outbreak.  
Table 4-3: Comparative descriptive analysis between numbers of formal and informal links during the 
outbreak 
Respondent 
ID 
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links 
Informal 
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during during of links  of links 
3157803 4 3 1 7 57% 43% 
3255980 6 6 0 12 50% 50% 
3259726 4 2 2 6 67% 33% 
3268758 12 7 5 19 63% 37% 
3285663 4 4 0 8 50% 50% 
3296106 17 4 13 21 81% 19% 
3304691 10  8 10 10 56% 44% 
3313606 21  20 21 21 51% 49% 
3333690 13 3 10 16 81% 19% 
3338107 21 13 8 34 62% 38% 
3343240 14 3 11 17 82% 18% 
3480594 9 9 0 18 50% 50% 
3486586 10 10 0 20 50% 50% 
3496016 21 10  21 21 68% 32% 
3532293 8  0 8 8 100% 0% 
3553658 8 1 7 9 89% 11% 
3567155 5 4 1 9 56% 44% 
3583350 4 5 -1 9 44% 56% 
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3593163 4 1 3 5 80% 20% 
3644246 11 2 9 13 85% 15% 
3653416 6 8 -2 14 43% 57% 
3662303 15  8 15 15 65% 35% 
3683064 6 4 2 10 60% 40% 
3686788 8  5 8 8 62% 38% 
3687181 6 1 5 7 86% 14% 
3701510 14 11 3 25 56% 44% 
3701613 3 3 0 6 50% 50% 
3701781 6 3 3 9 67% 33% 
3764761 4 3 1 7 57% 43% 
3797036 5 4 1 9 56% 44% 
3850879 3 1 2 4 75% 25% 
3910135 12 12 0 24 50% 50% 
3977276 11 4 7 15 73% 27% 
4000864 14 4 10 18 78% 22% 
4001052 15 11 4 26 58% 42% 
4016687 4 6 -2 10 40% 60% 
4029068 3 1 2 4 75% 25% 
4045418 4 7 -3 11 36% 64% 
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4181107 4 1 3 5 80% 20% 
4236514 2 1 1 3 67% 33% 
4245128 6 2 4 8 75% 25% 
4250528 2 3 -1 5 40% 60% 
4259129 5 5 0 10 50% 50% 
4284390 13 3 10 16 81% 19% 
4285907 13  4 13 13 76% 24% 
4288732 9 8 1 17 53% 47% 
4292861 6  0 6 6 100% 0% 
4301022 1 1 0 2 50% 50% 
4313734 4 1 4 4 80% 20% 
4324305 1  0 1 1 100% 0% 
4366750 12 4 8 16 75% 25% 
4380610 10 3 7 13 77% 23% 
4420907 4  0 4 4 100% 0% 
4573390 15  4 15 15 79% 21% 
4821260 6 2 4 8 75% 25% 
4821701 10 2 8 12 83% 17% 
4821704 19 4 15 23 83% 17% 
4856713 11 12 -1 23 48% 52% 
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4948099 6 1 5 7 86% 14% 
5011784 6 2 4 8 75% 25% 
5024149 12 10 2 22 55% 45% 
5024264 9  0 9 9 100% 0% 
5038035 7 3 4 10 70% 30% 
5038216 13 5 8 18 72% 28% 
5047656 3 9 -6 12 25% 75% 
3147843  3 1 2 4 75% 25% 
 
It is noticed that 92.54% of the respondents, that is, the overwhelming majority, used both 
formal and informal forms of coordination during the outbreak. Only 7.46% of them remained 
faithful to formal coordination only, showing strict adherence to the hierarchical structure. 
Two of those respondents, 5024264 and 4420907, expressed their commitment to the standard 
operating procedures and directly indicated that they did not branch to any other 
communication channels. Respondent 5024264 worked in the NSW ministry of health, 
whereas all the other respondents stated openly that they used informal communication. 
Respondent 4420907 worked in the NSW state disaster emergency management centre, health 
section. This centre, which hosted the ambulance and other disaster management facilities, 
was structured on a hierarchical basis and hence informal coordination was not part of the 
organisational culture. Nevertheless, informal coordination was widely used across 
environments during the disease outbreak, alongside the formal coordination.  
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Figure 4-5: Formal and informal links during the outbreak. 
Figure 4-5 shows both formal and informal links counts plotted from table 4-3. An important 
reading from this graph is that formal and informal links are not inversely proportional. It is 
not the case that if the formal links increase, then informal ones will decrease. Rather this 
graph shows that in many cases that even when the number of formal links is high, so is the 
number of informal and vice versa. Hence, one form of communication does not substitute the 
other. 
4.2.3. Additional descriptive statistics 
This section contains some additional descriptive statistical graphs of data obtained from 
several questions that were not used for model analysis, but nevertheless shed light on the 
mechanics of the coordination process. 
Q7: “How does your department get notified when a disease outbreak is announced?”  
The results are charted in Figure 2-9. 
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Figure 4-6: How does your department get notified when a disease outbreak is announced? 
Q9: “How does your department get notified when a disease outbreak is finished?” The 
responses are charted in Figure 4-7. 
-  
Figure 4-7: Notification methods when a disease outbreak is finished 
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Q11: “In your opinion, how important is it to have a prepared coordination plan?” Figure 
Figure 4-8 depicts the results.  
 
Figure 4-8: Importance of having a prepared coordination plan. 
Q14: “In case you provide input to policy development for other 
departments/units/organisations, which levels do you provide that input to?” 
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Figure 4-9: Policy input to other jurisdictional levels 
Question 21 asked about participation in training with other organisations; and Question 24 
followed this: “How do you measure your preparedness after the training comparing to what it 
was before?”  
The results are charted in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11 respectively. 
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Figure 4-10: Percentage of organisations that participated in joint training with others. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Preparedness after training 
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4.3. Normalising the data 
This section details how the data was normalised from text responses to numeric values using 
the Ridit method described in Chapter 3.  
4.3.1. Organising data 
The data was downloaded in raw csv files, hence it was first necessary to re-organise it along 
each respondents’ contacts to create an ego star network for each respondent. In other words, 
each respondent had to be isolated along with her contacts. An example is shown in Figure 
4-12. This figure warrants some discussion, as much later information is built on top of such 
networks. The number in the middle, 3296106 represents the respondent or ego. All the links 
branching out are the communications that respondent had with targeted organisations during 
the outbreak.  
  
 
Figure 4-12: Ego network of respondent 3296106. 
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From such a star network, network measures such as centrality can be easily deduced. To 
provide a broader perspective of the network, Figure 4-12 shows how the respondent’s 
network above was linked to those of other respondents.  
 
 
Figure 4-13: The extended network of three respondents 
It also important to realise that each of these links has a metric associated with it. This metric 
is how often the communication happened (daily, weekly, monthly…). Those metrics are 
discussed in the Ridit analysis section.  
4.3.2. Normalising organisations  
In the interviews, most of the data was raw and not normalised. Many respondents used 
acronyms and often referred to organisations broadly, without using the formal name. A 
simple example is “The Ministry of Health”, which is the main health body in NSW. 
Sometimes the respondents called it by its official name, but at other times, they used “NSW 
Health” or referred to it as the “Health Department”.  
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If these names were left as is, then three separate nodes would have been created in the 
network structure referring to one entity. This would create not only confusion and 
inconsistency but also inaccuracies when calculating the measures. Therefore the researcher 
had to refer back to the industry literature, manuals and organisational charts in order to 
normalise all organisations and codify them, deciding on a single code for each entity. This 
normalisation had to take into consideration several factors: 
1. The codes should be distinctive so as not to be confused with each other. 
2. The codes should give a brief idea of each entity that facilitates the process of reading 
tables and diagrams and reduces the need to refer back to the key table.  
3. The codes should take into consideration different organisational levels and services of 
each entity and embed those in the code. It was particularly important here to 
differentiate between organisations that operated at federal, state, and/or local level 
longitudinally, and to try to understand which of these levels a respondent interacted 
with, so as to refer to it accurately in the name code. 
Each entity name was thus manually revised and codified, which produced the code names 
shown in Figure 4-13 above. 
Table 4-4 below presents some of these codes and their original meanings. 
Table 4-4: Some code interpretations from the respondents’ network in Figure 4-13 
Code Organisation 
NSW_H New South Wales Ministry of Health 
Schools_WS Schools in the Western Sydney Area 
Health Service (WSAHS) 
Eds_WS Emergency departments in WSAHS 
hospitals 
Inf_Cntrl_WS Infection control unit in WSAHS 
hospitals 
GPs_WS General practitioners in the WSAHS 
geographic region  
DEPT_EDU Department of Education 
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Labs_WS Medical laboratories (public and private) 
in the WSAHS geographic region 
Cath_EDU Catholic Education Office (private 
educational organisation) in the WSAHS 
geographic region 
Councils_WS Local councils (local government areas) 
in the WSAHS geographic region  
ICPMR The Institute for Clinical Pathology and 
Medical Research at Westmead Hospital 
CDU_WS Counter Disaster Unit in the WSAHS 
geographical area 
ED_Westm_H Emergency Department in Westmead 
Hospital 
 
4.3.3. Using Ridit to calculate tie strength 
Tie strength was the first independent variable to be calculated using the Ridit method. This 
section details how a value was calculated for each link of the respondent, as a prerequisite for 
calculating the tie strength value for the whole respondent as a normalised value. 
The survey asked respondents to list the frequency of their communication with other 
agencies, a measure that represents tie strength as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The answers 
were coded as annually, semi-annually, quarterly, monthly, as needed, weekly, and daily. 
Table 4-5 shows some of these responses taken from Question 25 of the survey about the 
coordination before outbreak. These forms of response were repeated for Questions 26 and 28 
(formal and informal coordination during the outbreak respectively).  
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Table 4-5: A sample of the responses indicating the frequency of communication 
Table 4-5 above also illustrates the communication frequencies in action. These were divided 
into “as needed”, meaning that the respondents would communicate when they need to, then 
daily, weekly and monthly, up to quarterly. The frequency of the communication reflects the 
importance and urgency of the collaboration task as well the strength of the relationship 
between both nodes. 
Ridit analysis was used to convert these frequencies (A, S, M, As Needed, W, D) to numbers 
following; the procedure discussed in section 3.8.3 above. First, the number of occurrences of 
each of the responses was counted. Then the Ridit values were calculated using the standard 
calculation method for this procedure. The tie strength Ridit calculation and values for 
Question 25 are shown in Table 4-6 
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Table 4-6: Tie strength calculations using Ridit analysis 
Tie strength-
Q25 
A B C D E 
Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences:  
1/2 column A 
Cumulative 
B 
Add 
C+B 
Ridit 
value: 
D/Total 
Annually: A 14 7 0 7 0.032 
Semi-annually: 
S 
5 2.5 14 16.5 0.076 
Quarterly: Q 22 11 19 30 0.139 
Monthly: M 40 20 41 61 0.282 
As needed 81 40.5 81 121.5 0.563 
Weekly: W 28 14 162 176 0.815 
Daily: D 26 13 190 203 0.940 
  
     
Sum: 216 
    
 
Table 4-6 shows that the network had 216 total links. The last column, E, is the final Ridit 
value for tie strength. The tie strength value was low when the connection was made only 
annually (0.032), and increased as the connection grew stronger for organisations that 
communicated weekly (0.815) and daily (0.94). 
These values were then introduced to the Question 25 table to replace the frequency-coded 
answers. Table 4-7 shows these values in place in the Ridit value column.  
- 174 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Table 4-7: Sample of tie strength values 
 
Table 4-7 is sorted by tie strength in ascending order. The values indicate that before the 
outbreak was detected, low-tier organisations like Public Health Units (PHU_SW, PHU_SWS) 
had lower than average communication frequency specifically with clinical units like 
Pathology laboratories (ICPMR, Labs_pub) and with emergency departments (RPAH_ED). 
On the hand, communication occurred daily between bureaucracies and emergency 
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management organisations, such as between the Health Emergency Management Unit 
(HEMU) and the Ministry of Health in NSW (NSW_H) and the State Emergency 
Management Coordination Centre (SEMC). The reason for this frequent communication was 
that, even in a situation where no outbreaks are detected, there were daily situational updates 
between the State Emergency Management centres. 
The same calculation is performed for Questions 26 and 28. The tie strength results for 
Question 26 are in Table 4-8and for Question 27 in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-8: Tie strength calculations for Q26 (Formal coordination during the outbreak) 
Tie Strength-Q26 A B C D E 
Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences 
1/2 
column A 
Cumulative 
B Add C+B 
Ridit 
value: 
E/Sum 
Annually: A 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Semi-annually: S 2 1 0 1 0.002 
Quarterly: Q 1 0.5 2 2.5 0.005 
Monthly: M 8 4 3 7 0.013 
As needed 152 76 11 87 0.157 
Weekly: W 117 58.5 163 221.5 0.399 
Daily: D 275 137.5 280 417.5 0.752 
Sum 555 
     
Table 4-8 shows tie strength during the disease outbreak. Interestingly, there is no annual 
communication, as everyone now is engaged in actively communicating with others, rather 
than passively waiting for communication to occur. Note that there are 555 links in this 
network compared to only 216 links before the outbreak; that is, there was more than 100% 
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increase in the number of links after the intervention plans were activated and new agencies 
became part of the evolving network. 
Table 4-9: Tie strength calculations for Q28 (Informal coordination during outbreak) 
Tie Strength-
Q28 A B C D E 
 Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences 
1/2 column 
A Cumulative B Add C+B 
Ridit 
value: 
N/Sum 
Annually: A 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Semi-annually: S 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Quarterly: Q 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Monthly: M 18 9 0 9 0.037 
As needed 66 33 18 51 0.211 
Weekly: W 54 27 84 111 0.459 
Daily: D 104 52 138 190 0.785 
Sum 242         
 
There are 242 links in this network. Note that the number of informal links is nearly half that 
of the formal links (242 compared to 555). This shows that nearly one third of the 
communication during the outbreak was informal, representing a significant amount and at the 
same time revealing the real necessity and importance of informal communication. Another 
observation is that informal communication occurs at intervals between monthly and daily, 
since it was motivated by the direct need to coordinate quickly and to attend to urgent and 
pressing situations, rather than to long-term matters.  
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4.3.4. Using Ridit to calculate tier connectedness 
Tier connectedness is the second independent variable. In this section a value is calculated for 
each tie as a prerequisite to calculating the normalised tier connectedness value for the 
respondent as a whole. Tier connectedness represents the value of the link and how the ego is 
connected across different tiers and jurisdictions. These values were expressed as follows in 
the survey: 
International: I 
Federal: F 
State: S 
Local: L (at the Area Health Service level) 
P: Private (such as private health care)  
O: Other  
The numbers of these tiers were also calculated using Ridit. However, when adding the 
numbers, it was noted that the contributions of international, private and “others” were each 
negligible (numbers were 2, 4, and 1 respectively). Hence, the three categories were merged 
into one, called “Others”.  
The calculations for Question 25 (formal coordination before the outbreak) are shown in Table 
4-10.  
Table 4-10: Tier connectedness calculations for Question 25 
Connectedness
-Q25 A B C D E 
Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences 1/2 column A 
Cumulative 
B 
Add 
C+B 
Ridit value: 
D/Sum 
Other: O 7 3.5 0 3.5 0.016 
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Federal: F 18 9 7 16 0.074 
State: S 82 41 25 66 0.306 
Local: L 109 54.5 107 161.5 0.748 
Sum 216         
 
The calculations for Question 26 (formal coordination during the outbreak) are shown in Table 
4-11. 
Table 4-11: Tier connectedness calculations for Question 26 
Connectedness-
Q26 A B C D E 
Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences 
1/2 
column A 
Cumulative 
B 
Add 
C+B 
Ridit value: 
D/Sum 
Other: O 54 27 0 27 0.049 
Federal: F 34 17 54 71 0.128 
State: S 179 89.5 88 177.5 0.320 
Local: L 288 144 267 411 0.741 
Sum 555         
 
The calculations for Question 28 (informal coordination during the outbreak) are shown in  
 
Table 4-12. 
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Table 4-12: Tier connectedness calculations for Question 28 
Connectedness-
Q28 A B C D E 
Ridit analysis 
No. of 
occurrences 1/2 column A 
Cumulative 
B Add C+B 
Ridit value: 
D/Sum 
Other: O 39 19.5 0 19.5 0.064 
Federal: F 22 11 39 50 0.165 
State: S 96 48 61 109 0.360 
Local: L 146 73 157 230 0.759 
Sum 303         
 
Table 4-13 below shows a sample of these values when they are substituted back into the 
original tables of the survey to quantify the tiered connectedness in question 28.  
The three tables above (Table 4-10, Table 4-11, and Table 4-12) in combination provide an 
important result, which is that the lower the specific organisational tier level, the higher the 
tier connectedness. Hence, there is an inversely proportional relationship between the tier level 
of the origination and its tier connectedness. One reason for this is that local organisations 
seek links with upper-level organisations (e.g. state and federal) since such links are usually 
needed by virtue of hierarchical considerations. Another reason is that local organisations seek 
to connect to upper-level ones since they have to feed them with information and elicit 
resources from them. 
 
Table 4-13: The Ridit values for tier connectedness populated for part of the data in Question 28 
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Table 4-13 further emphasises the results and discussion for Table 4-10, Table 4-11, and Table 
4-12 showing that organisations on the lower tier levels had higher connectedness. For 
example, compare the connectedness value of 0.75 for South West Sydney Public Health Unit 
(PHU_SW) with the value of only 0.07 for the Australian General Practitioners Network 
(AGPN). These results indicate that the lower the tier level of the organisation, the more it 
would try to connect to other tiers of organisations. 
4.3.5. Calculating centrality  
Centrality is the third independent variable used in the model. It is also one of the easiest 
measures in the ego networks since it is merely the number of ties that the ego has with alters. 
Hence, the procedure was to produce a count of each respondent’ reported links for each of the 
three questions. Table 4-14 shows some of these measures for Question 26. 
Table 4-14: Some of the centrality values for Question 26 
 
The sample of centrality in Table 4-14 shows that high centrality was not constrained to 
certain types of organisation. High centrality existed for state organisations such as the NSW 
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Ministry of Health bio-preparedness Unit (NSW_H_Bio) with centrality of 21, South West 
Public Health Unit (PHU_SW) Unit with centrality of 14, and Ambulance AMB_SOU with 
centrality of 15. This generally means that centrality is diversified based on the unit’s need 
rather than its position in the hierarchy.  
4.3.6. Calculating the independent variables 
After the numerical calculations for each link and node were completed, it was necessary to 
normalise these values by calculating the value of each per respondent rather than per link, as 
was done in the previous sections. 
Hence each of the tie strength and connectedness values for all the links of an ego were 
totalled, and the total was divided by the number of links of the ego. The formulae were: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜ℎ =  ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1
𝑁𝑁
  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1
𝑁𝑁
  
Where N is the number of links for each ego. 
A sample result after the calculations were performed for the three questions 25, 26 and 28 is 
shown in Table 4-15. 
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Table 4-15: A sample of the final calculations for Q28 showing the three independent variables sorted by 
ascending centrality 
  
A quick deduction from  
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Table 4-15 shows that the three independent variables, centrality, tie strength and 
connectedness, were independent and not correlated with each other. This means that high 
centrality, for example, did not correlate with high tie strength or connectedness, and vice 
versa. As an example, compare respondents 3296106 and 3338107: the first had 4, 0.681 and 
0.557 for centrality, tie strength and connectedness respectively, whereas the latter had 13, 
0.562 and 0.650 for the same three values. This variability provides a good basis for using 
such variables and obtaining interesting outcomes. 
After calculating the values for the independent variables, the next step was to do the same for 
the dependent variables. 
4.3.7. Calculating the dependent variables for formal coordination (H1) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the dependent variable used as an outcome measure for Hypothesis 
H1 was Question 33 in the survey, which asked, “How long did it take the coordination to start 
after the outbreak was declared?” This was considered as an indication of the speed and 
robustness of the initiation of the coordination process.  
Respondents were asked to respond in the framework of time, with options like “same day” 
(some chose “immediately”), “within one week”, “between one and two weeks” or “more than 
two weeks”. A small sample of the raw responses is given in Table 4-16. 
Table 4-16: A sample of the answers to Q33 about the time before the coordination started. 
Respondent Answer to q33 
3296106 1-2 days 
3304691 Anzac day - same day 
3313606 Same day we heard the news 
3333690 Same day 
3338107 Two days  
3343240 About a week 
- 185 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
3480594 A while 
 
It was also necessary to change those responses to numerals and then use the Ridit analysis to 
define their final values. 
The first step was to assign a numerical value to each time period, as shown in  
 
Table 4-17 below: 
 
 
Table 4-17: The numerical values assigned to time-period answers for Question 33. 
Q33: Answers Values 
Same day 1 
Immediately 1 
Straight away 1 
Within 24 hours 1 
More than 1 day but less than week  2 
1–2 weeks 3 
More than 2 weeks  4 
 
These numerical values were then used to calculate the Ridit value for each category of the 
responses (each time period).  
Table 4-18: Ridit values for Question 33 
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Q33 A B C D E 
Ridit Frequency 
1/2 column 
A 
Cumulative 
frequency 
Column 
B+C 
Ridit: 
D/Sum 
4 3 1.5 0 1.5 0.024 
3 3 1.5 3 4.5 0.073 
2 8 4 6 10 0.161 
1 48 24 14 38 0.613 
            
Sum 62         
Therefore, these values were assigned to each ego as per their answer. A sample is shown in 
Table 4-19. 
Table 4-19: Ridit values for Question 33 
Respondent Ridit Q33 
3296106 0.615 
3304691 0.615 
3313606 0.615 
3333690 0.615 
3338107 0.164 
3343240 0.074 
3480594 0.025 
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4.3.8. Calculating the dependent variable for informal coordination (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 used Question 32 as the dependent variable to measure the effectiveness of the 
informal coordination. The question used a five-scale answer. The response categories are 
presented along with the number of answers in Table 4-20. 
Table 4-20: The number of responses in categories for Question 32 in the survey 
Q32 
No of 
occurrences 
Not needed at all 0 
Can be used sometimes 2 
Useful 9 
Needed most of the time 13 
It is essential! 32 
 
Numerical values were assigned to these answers, as shown in Table 4-21. 
Table 4-21: Numerical values for Question 32. 
Q32: Rate imp of informal in bridging coordination 
gaps q_32 
Not needed at all 1 
Can be used sometimes 2 
Useful 3 
Needed most of the time 4 
It is essential! 5 
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The Ridit values for Question 32 are shown in Table 4-22. 
Table 4-22: Ridit values for Question 32, the dependent variable for H2 
Q32 A B C D E 
Ridit 
No of 
occurrences 1/2 column A 
Cumulative 
B 
Add 
C+B 
Ridit 
value: 
N/Sum 
Not needed at all 0 0 0 0 0.000 
Can be used sometimes 2 1 0 1 0.018 
Useful 9 4.5 2 6.5 0.116 
Needed most of the 
time 13 6.5 11 17.5 0.313 
It is essential! 32 16 24 40 0.714 
Sum 56         
 
The results presented in Table 4-22 show that more than half of the respondents consider 
informal coordination to be essential (32 out of 56), hence resulting in the high Ridit score for 
this answer. These results are another indication of the ubiquitousness of the informal 
coordination.  
4.3.9. Normality and statistics of data distribution 
Table 4-23 lists some of the descriptive statistics for the social network variables, including 
means and standard deviations. 
Table 4-23: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
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Before 
outbreak 
      
Degree 
centrality 
8 1 9 3.57 2.235 4.995 
Tie strength .907 .032 .940 .49376 .246068 .061 
Connectivity .674 .074 .748 .49631 .204253 .042 
Formal 
during 
outbreak 
      
Degree 
centrality 
20.000 1.000 21.000 8.52308 5.108534 26.097 
Tie strength .669 .083 .752 .51535 .201005 .040 
Connectivity .591 0.0150 .0.741 .0.5078 .0.19081 .036 
Informal 
during 
outbreak 
      
Degree 
centrality 
12 1 13 4.57 3.357 11.268 
Tie strength .79 .03 .82 .43408 .2635 .038 
Connectivity .60 .16 .76 .5158 .16347 .027 
 
As part of the statistical analysis, it is important to investigate the distribution of data by 
visualising the graphs (e.g. histograms) and conducting statistical tests. This can also 
determine whether the distribution of variables of interest is normal or not. Besides inspecting 
the data via the histogram visual inspection, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality was 
conducted, and the results are shown in Table 4-24. 
Table 4-24: Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
 Measure Statistic df Significance 
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Formal 
before 
Degree centrality .217 60 .000 
Tie strength .143 60 .004 
Connectivity .157 60 .001 
Formal 
during 
Degree centrality .182 65 .000 
Tie strength .119 65 .022 
Connectivity .118 65 .025 
Informal 
during 
Degree centrality .216 54 .000 
Tie strength .178 54 .000 
Connectivity .097 54 .200 
 
Since the significance was less than 0.05, it seems that, in the tests where the distribution of 
the variable of interest was not normal, non-parametric tests should be applied. However, such 
results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are quite common (where n > 60). Also the 
histograms for the independent variables “degree centrality” (mean=3.57, std. dev. =2.235), 
“tie strength” (mean=0.49376, std. dev. =0.246), “connectivity” (mean=0.496, std. dev. 
=0.2402), as well as those for formal and informal coordination during the outbreak as per 
Table 4-23 are fairly normally distributed. Given these results, parametric tests such as t-tests, 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations and regression analysis may still be run, as there are 
no obvious outliers or extreme irregularities in the data distribution for these variables. 
Moreover, these parametric tests are robust enough to handle the variations in normality 
observed in the histograms in Appendix D. 
4.4. Formal coordination hypotheses 
This section reports the results relating to the hypotheses about formal coordination before and 
during the outbreak. Pearson’s correlation is a measure of how the variables are related and it 
shows the linear relationship and the direction of the relationship between the two variables. 
This was discussed in Section 3.9 
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4.4.1. Hypothesis 1a – Degree centrality and coordination 
Hypothesis 1a. Degree centrality in formal structure is positively correlated to the perceived 
robustness of coordination before and during the outbreak. 
4.4.1.1. Before the outbreak 
To test Hypothesis 1a, a partial correlation test was applied to explore the relationship between 
the independent variable (degree centrality) and the dependent variable (coordination 
robustness). In addition, a t-test was applied to test for the significance between these 
variables. The results for coordination before and during the outbreak are presented separately. 
As discussed, Pearson’s test was used in the correlation analysis. The calculated Ridit values 
for both degree centrality and coordination start-off were used for the analysis. Table 4-25 
shows the correlation results for before the outbreak. 
Table 4-25: Correlation between degree centrality and coordination, for formal coordination before the 
outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Degree 
centrality 
before 
outbreak 
  
Correlation -0.147 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.262 
    
 
The results from Table 4-25 show a negative but non-significant correlation (𝜌𝜌=-0.0147, t-test 
significance two tailed =0.262 >0.05 – the significance level). Hence, initially it can be said 
that there was no direct relationship between the centrality of an actor and its coordination 
robustness before the outbreak, as per H1a. 
4.4.1.2. During the outbreak 
The second correlation to be tested against H1a was for the period during the outbreak. The 
same tests were applied for the set of data derived from Question 26. The results are provided 
in Table 4-26. 
- 192 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Table 4-26: Correlation between degree centrality and coordination for formal coordination during 
outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Degree 
centrality 
during 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.019 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.891 
    
The results again show that no correlation existed (Pearson’s coefficient 𝜌𝜌 = 0.019, t-test 
=0.0891 for 2 tailed). Hence, the centrality measure of the respondents either before or during 
the outbreak did not result directly in their initiating the response when the outbreak was 
announced. Therefore, H0 is still valid for both scenarios. 
4.4.2. Hypotheses 1b – Tie strength and coordination 
Hypothesis 1b. Tie strength in formal coordination is positively correlated with robustness of 
coordination  
4.4.2.1. Before the outbreak: 
Tie strength was calculated based on the frequency of communication between different 
nodes. The same Pearson’s correlation and t-test as above were applied to test whether there 
was any correlation between the independent and dependent variables. Ridit derived values 
were again used. Table 4-27 shows the results of those tests for the phase before the outbreak. 
Table 4-27: Correlation and t-test between tie strength and coordination before the outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Tie strength 
before 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.065 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.621 
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The results from Table 4-27(𝜌𝜌 = 0.065 and t-test =0.621) again show no correlation between 
coordination and tie strength before the outbreak. This means that the null hypothesis is still 
valid, and tie strength with others before the outbreak did not indicate that coordination would 
be more effective during the outbreak. 
4.4.2.2. During the outbreak: 
Hypothesis 1b also predicted a relationship between tie strength and coordination during the 
outbreak. Pearson’s correlation and t-test results are shown in Table 4-28.  
Table 4-28: Correlation and t-test between tie strength and coordination during the outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Tie strength 
during 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.288* 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.036 
    
 
The tie strength correlation value (𝜌𝜌 =2.88 and t-test 0.036<0.05) indicates the significance 
and association between tie strength and robustness of coordination during the outbreak, and 
hypothesis H0 is invalid. In other words, the more frequent communication was with other 
organisations, the faster coordination was achieved.  
4.4.3. Hypotheses 1c – Tier connectedness and coordination 
Hypothesis 1c. Tier connectedness in formal coordination is positively correlated with 
robustness of coordination.  
Tier connectedness measures the variance of a node’s links between different jurisdictional 
and tier levels. The results are given here for the hypothesis before and during the outbreak. 
4.4.3.1. Before the outbreak: 
Correlation and t-test analysis were performed for tier connectedness before the outbreak and 
the results are shown in Table 4-29. 
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Table 4-29: Correlation and t-test between tier connectedness and coordination before the outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Tier 
connectedness 
before  
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.117 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.372 
    
 
The results (𝜌𝜌 =0.117 and t-test 0.372 >0.05) do not indicate any correlation between 
connectedness and coordination performance for formal coordination before the outbreak. 
The same tests were performed for tier connectedness during the outbreak. The results are 
shown in Table 4-30. 
Table 4-30: Correlation and t-test between tier connectedness and coordination during the outbreak 
Control Variables Coordination 
Tier 
connectedness 
during 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.387* 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.01 
    
 
The correlation result (𝜌𝜌 = 0.387 and t-test =0.01) shows that there was a significant and 
positive correlation between tier connectedness and coordination performance. This 
invalidates the null hypothesis and consequently validates Hypothesis 1c; meaning that during 
the disease outbreak tiers connectedness positively affected coordination performance.  
4.4.4. Informal coordination hypotheses 
This section discusses the second hypothesis H2 and its sub-hypotheses, concerning informal 
coordination during the outbreak. 
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Hypothesis 2a. Degree centrality of informal coordination is positively correlated with the 
ability to bridge coordination gaps. 
This hypothesis predicts that the higher the number of informal connections of the actor, the more robust 
that actor’s coordination will be, since these links will enable the actor to bridge coordination gaps or 
structural holes. Pearson’s correlation analysis and the t-test results are shown in  
Table 4-31. 
 
Table 4-31: Correlation and t-test results between degree centrality and informal coordination during the 
outbreak 
Control Variables – informal Coordination 
Degree 
centrality 
during 
Outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.422* 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.006 
    
 
The correlation and t-test results (𝜌𝜌 =0.422 and t-test = 0.006) indicate that there was a direct 
correlation between the number of links and the ability to bridge across structural holes, as in 
trying to acquire more information and resources.  
Hypothesis 2b. Tie strength of informal coordination is positively correlated with the ability to 
bridge coordination gaps.  
This is where tie strength, as in the frequency of communication, was tested for any 
correlation. Table 4-32 presents the results. 
Table 4-32: Correlation and t-test between tie strength and informal coordination during the outbreak 
Control Variables – informal Coordination 
Tie strength 
during 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.319* 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.019 
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The result shows that a correlation (𝜌𝜌 =0.319 and t-test = 0.019) between tie strength and 
coordination performance in informal coordination. This means that the null hypothesis is 
invalid.  
Hypothesis 2c. Tier connectedness in informal coordination is positively correlated to 
information sharing and bridging coordination gaps. 
Would the existence of informal links to diverse organisations at different jurisdictional levels 
help to bridge the gaps? This is what this hypothesis addressed. Again, correlation was 
checked between the independent and dependent variables. The results are presented in Table 
4-33 
Table 4-33: Correlation and t-test between tier connectedness and informal coordination during the 
outbreak 
 
 
 
 
 
The result indicates a direct correlation (𝜌𝜌 = 0.417 and t-test 0.07), which means that the null 
hypothesis is invalid. Hence, there is an association between the ego initiating links with nodes 
at different jurisdictional levels and the use of these links to overcome gaps that might occur 
during formal coordination.  
    
Control Variables – informal Coordination 
Tier 
connectedness 
during 
outbreak 
  
Correlation 0.417* 
Significance 
(2-tailed) 
0.07 
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4.5. Effect of moderating variables on coordination 
The organisational tier level was used as the moderating variable, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The calculations were performed according to the methodology elaborated in Section 3.6 after 
using the Ridit calculation technique to change the values from the original tier level as 
follows: 
S=State 
L=Local 
O=Other (private/NGO/…) 
After these calculations were completed, the moderating variable regression results were 
calculated only for those hypotheses, which had indicated a correlation between dependent 
and independent variables. All the results are presented in Table 4-34 
Table 4-34: Moderating variable significance calculations 
 Hypothesis against which 
moderating variable 
(MV) is tested 
Standardised 
coefficient 
T-test Significance 
1 Formal tie strength during 
outbreak (H1b) *MV 
-0.357 -2.499 0.015 
2 Formal connectedness 
during outbreak (H1c) 
*MV 
-0.325 -2.025 0.047 
3 Informal degree centrality 
during outbreak (H2a) 
*MV 
0.432 2.089 0042 
4 Informal tie strength 
during outbreak (H2b) 
*MV 
1.146 16.236 0.000 
5 Informal connectedness 
during outbreak (H2c) 
0.239 1.821 0.074 
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*MV 
 
The results show that for the following hypotheses the moderating variables were significant 
(significance <0.05) and affected coordination as the dependent variable:  
H1b (𝝆𝝆 =0.015), H1c (𝝆𝝆 =0.047), H2a (𝝆𝝆 =0.042), and H2b (𝝆𝝆 =0.000). On the other hand, the result for H1c 
(𝝆𝝆 =0.074) showed that the impact or effect of the moderating variable was insignificant.  
Table 4-35 summarises the results for the moderating variables. These results are discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 4-35: Hypotheses affected by the moderating variable 
Theory Details Significance 
H1b Formal coordination, tie 
strength, during outbreak 
0.015 
H1c Formal coordination, 
connectedness, during 
outbreak 
0.047 
H2a Informal coordination, 
degree centrality, during 
outbreak 
0.042 
H2b Informal coordination, tie 
strength, during outbreak 
0.000 
 
Table 4-35 indicates that the organisational tier level, such as whether a state or local 
organisation is concerned, when combined with tie strength and connectedness influenced 
formal coordination. With regard to informal coordination, tier level influenced coordination 
performance when combined with degree centrality and tie strength.  
4.6. Forward to next chapter 
Table 4-36 below summarizes the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
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Hypotheses Independent 
variable 
Formal/Infor
mal 
Before 
/During 
Coloration 
coefficient 
Correlated 
Hypothesis 1a Degree 
centrality 
Formal Before 0.262 No 
Hypothesis 1a Degree 
centrality 
Formal During 0.0891 No 
Hypothesis 1b Tie Strength Formal Before 0.621 No 
Hypothesis 1b Tie Strength Formal During 0.036 Yes 
Hypothesis 1c Tier 
connectedness 
Formal Before 0.372 No 
Hypothesis 1c Tier 
connectedness 
Formal During 0.01 Yes 
Hypothesis 2a Degree 
centrality 
Informal During 0.006 Yes 
Hypothesis 2b Tie Strength Informal During 0.019 Yes 
Hypothesis 2c Tier 
connectedness 
Informal During 0.07 Yes 
Table 4-36: Summary of Hypotheses statistical results in chapter 4 
This chapter has shown the empirical results and calculations related to the hypotheses and has 
shown systematically that Hypothesis 1 is invalid for all the discussed network measures 
before the outbreak. Interestingly informal coordination has shown positive correlation for the 
three measures. Discussion and conclusions concerning these results will be discussed in the 
following chapter along with qualitative explanation that was communicated by the 
respondents. 
 
 
 
 
- 200 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
 
- 201 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Chapter 5 
5. Synthesis and discussion 
This chapter discusses and explores the results of the data analysis based on the theoretical 
perspectives that were introduced in Chapter 2. Hence, this chapter investigates the results of 
each hypothesis critically and explains the meaning of the empirical results by relating them to 
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. 
This chapter uses the existing theory of coordination in the context of disease outbreak rather 
than the general and abstract context. First, the initiation and cessation points of the outbreak 
coordination are discussed using qualitative – and statistical – feedback. The effects of 
different social network characteristics before the outbreak, namely tie strength, centrality and 
connectedness, on the formal outbreak coordination are considered, attempting also to deduce 
conclusions from the statistical results. Then the chapter follows the same discussion 
framework but this time during the outbreak. Since this is an emerging coordination, the 
network characteristics of each phase are briefly stated. Lastly, the discussion moves to the 
other facet of coordination, informal coordination during the outbreak, using the same 
methodology. To ensure consistency with the hypothesis and framework, tie strength, 
centrality and connectedness are also used in the informal coordination network, to investigate 
the influence of each on coordination. 
5.1. Pandemic coordination process 
Emerging coordination is not expected to have a set starting or finishing point. This might be 
due to the fact that each organisation is semi-autonomous, with different objectives and goals, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, the priorities of one organisation might not be the same as 
those of another. These different priorities will be reflected in the organisation’s timeline and 
resource commitment. To capture such information in the context of a disease outbreak four 
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questions were embedded in the survey, namely questions 7 to 10 as described in section 
3.5.2.3. 
Organisations use different communication methods during a pandemic. Figure 5-1: Method 
of outbreak notification to initiate coordination shows the percentage of these methods at the 
particular time “when the outbreak is announced”. Electronic communication (email) followed 
by phone calls had the highest representation among those communication methods. 
 
  Figure 5-1: Method of outbreak notification to initiate coordination 
 
Fax and face-to-face meetings were the least used methods. Even in the “others” category, 17 
respondents defined it as teleconferencing (25.75%). This reveals the importance of modern 
electronic media and communication in signalling the initiation of the process. But what about 
when an outbreak has finished? Figure 5-2 shows the notification methods and their 
percentage when the outbreak is finished. 
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Figure 5-2: Method of outbreak notification to finish the coordination 
 
Here also electronic communication takes precedence with emails being the most frequently 
used, followed by phone calls. Teleconferencing (part of the “others” category) was a 
communication method used to notify that the outbreak was over 21% of the time. This again 
reveals the importance of electronic and technological communication in such an environment.  
Some respondents; however, stated, “The outbreak doesn’t need notification to stop working 
on it. It just tails off”. This means that case thresholds just continue to decrease until that 
number falls “under the radar” of the health monitoring system. 
Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 shows consecutively the organisations that take the lead role in the 
notification process as to “when outbreak is declared and finished”.  
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Figure 5-3: Notifying organisations when outbreak is declared 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Notifying organisations when outbreak is finished.  
Table Table 5-1below lists the organisations in Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 along with their 
abbreviations  
Table 5-1: List of organisations in Figure 5-3 and 5-4 
Abbreviation Organisation name 
NSW_H New South Wales ministry of health 
PHU Public Health Unit 
H Protection Health Protection  
HSFAC Health Services Functional Area Coordinator 
DoHA Department of Health and Aging (Federal) 
0
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AHS Area Health Service 
GPNSW General Practitioners of NSW 
AHPC Australian Health Protection Committee 
 
From the two figures 5-3 and 5-4, it is clear that NSW Health (now the Ministry of health) is 
the main notifier for initiation and termination of outbreak management. Yet on further 
examination, it seems that the closure phase is more decentralised than the initiation, with 11 
notifiers compared to 8. In addition, it is evident that some organisations actually were never 
notified and others made the decision by themselves, including those that considered the 
outbreak to have just tailed off. One can conclude that even if emerging or open system 
coordination – as detailed in Chapter 2 – might be more controlled in its initiation, it tends to 
become more decentralised as the time passes and each agency needs to make its own 
decisions. This also might be linked to resource acquisition and need. That is, when the 
outbreak starts, the agencies involved will need resources, which are provided by the central 
agency. As the need for these resources decreases due to decline in the number of cases, then 
decisions tend to be more localised within the agency, hence enabling decentralisation.  
5.2. Formal coordination before and during the outbreak and network 
theory 
This section discusses and analyses the results presented in Chapter 4 regarding the formal 
coordination through which agencies interact and exchange information during the phases of 
before and during the pandemic. These two phases encompass most of the outbreak tasks, 
which were in turn discussed in section 2.6.2. These tasks usually start with horizon scanning, 
surveillance and detection, followed by diagnostic services as part of routine checks or in 
anticipation of detected cases. The following sections discuss the three network measures, 
centrality, tier connectedness and tie strength, and their influence on coordination 
performance.  
- 206 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
5.2.1. Degree centrality and coordination 
Prior to any disaster or incident, coordination usually occurs in accordance to the standard 
operating procedures or their organisational “alignment “as putting it in ambidexterity terms. 
Organisations rely on their strong ties to provide needed resources (Lin, 2002). This statement 
has proven to be true for disease outbreak coordination, as becomes evident in this and the 
next sections. 
Previous research has claimed that the ego-network measure – centrality – is associated with 
performance (Burt, 1976, Rosenthal, 1997). Centrality depicts the degree to which an 
individual obtains information and controls benefits from non-redundant ties, and it is 
theorised to positively influence performance. Such assertions also were supported by the 
controlled experiment conducted by Bavelas (1950) in which individuals were given certain 
information to assemble in order to reach a decision, with the purpose of issuing orders to 
solve a puzzle. Bavelas found that centralised structures (e.g. star) performed better than 
decentralised ones (e.g. circle). It was suggested that the reason was that decentralised 
information floats better than centralised information. Numerous follow-ups were conducted 
to the Bavelas experiment to study the impact of different structures on communication and 
problem-solving performance. Unfortunately, the empirical studies did not produce consistent 
and cumulative results. In fact, some results were contradictory with each other and with the 
original Bavelas findings. For example, several researchers confirmed that the star structure 
performed better than the all-channel one (Leavitt, 1951, Mulder, 1959, Mohanna and Argyle, 
1960, Cohen, 1962). On the other hand, other empirical research also determined that the all-
channel structure was better than the star for simple task design (Guetzkow and Dill, 1957), 
while still others found no significant differences between the star and all-channel structures 
with regard to their performance (Shaw, 1954, Mulder, 1960). 
 Similar inconsistent evidence can also be found for “complex” task design. Heise and Miller 
(1951) found that the star structure showed better performance than the all-channel one in 
“complex” task design. However, other controlled experimental research showed that the all-
channel structure was more conducive to performance than the star or wheel structure for 
“complex” task design (Shaw 1956; Shaw and Rothschild 1956; Shaw, Rothschild et al. 1957; 
Shaw 1958). Later, Mulder (1960), in another experimental set up for “complex‟ task design, 
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found no significant difference between the star and all-channel communication structures 
with regard to their perceived level of task-completion. In conclusion, there are empirical and 
experimental results that suggest that centrality can have positive, negative, or no effect at all 
on performance.  
The results in the present study indicate that degree centrality did not influence performance. 
The correlation coefficients presented in Table 4-25 confirm that there was no significant 
correlation between degree centrality and performance.  
5.2.1.1.  Before the outbreak 
The lack of correlation can be attributed to the fact that communication guidelines and 
procedures are adhered to before the outbreak actually starts. Organisations tend to 
communicate mostly with people and organisations that they usually communicate with, 
according to what are in the books. For example, respondent 5038216 reported: 
“Well, we’re coordinating all of the time with ambulance and we’re coordinating all of the 
time with GPs. We’re coordinating all of the time certainly internally with specialists 
departments such as Respiratory and obviously Public Health.” 
The same respondent then said: 
“So before disease outbreak happens, we’re certainly communicating constantly with all of 
those departments which is ongoing – an ongoing sort of management. We would be with all 
of our own facilities.” 
 It also seems that before the outbreak, health workers tend to focus on increasing their 
communication frequency rather than widening the spectrum of their communication. 
Referring back to section 2.4.4.1, network efficiency, it is not the number of direct links from 
one node that increase efficiency, it is rather the number of total links as compared to the 
number of alters. For example, if four links connect to four alters who in turn connect to 
another four each, this will be more efficient than having a total of 16 links to 16 alters, as per 
Figure 2-7.  
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Thus, if the links were well established and operated according to the standard operating 
procedures or organisational alignment, then it would be sufficient. Creating more links does 
not tend to increase the coordination performance in the disease outbreak context. For 
example, respondent 4821701 reported: 
“We were communicating with – probably more through the HASFAC that communication 
was coordinated and then the HASFAC would be responsible for disseminating that 
information to the other agencies and the same for the other agencies with getting that 
information.” 
Also respondent 4181107:  
“Talk to your own administration firstly, and I hope the Department of Health. Usually you 
coordinate with your institution and administration and by that time you hope that 
someone from the Department of Health would contact you and ask what you need.” 
5.2.1.2. During the outbreak 
During the disease outbreak, nodes definitely tend to increase their centrality by extending and 
initiating new links to new alters. There may be different reasons for this, such as providing or 
seeking information, resources, decisions, or to adapt to the new environment – being the 
second characteristic of ambidexterity. However, will this actually increase the efficiency of 
the coordination as a whole? 
According to the correlation result, increasing centrality does not correlate with better 
performance during this stage either. The reason might be that many of these links are actually 
redundant, as respondent 3593163 reported: 
"Duplication of information happened because PHU were also getting information from 
hospitals and sending it to the state. It was a mess. Infection control people used to give us 
information and we sent it to the bunker. They collated info from ICU – Intensive Care Unit - 
... And sent to us, we aggregated them and sent them to the bunker. We sent copy to 
(PHU)….It wasn’t a disaster so the communication was bad; the chain of command was not 
followed. It wasn’t a disaster as such.” 
Also respondent 3910135: 
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“We get information from multiple channels; I will get the same email six times per day. 
From PUH, NSW Health, etc…There were lots of emails flowing around.” 
This finding contradicts the findings of Bavelas findings in the controlled laboratory 
experiment, but conforms to the findings of Guetzkow and Simon (1955) that decentralised 
structures work better than centralised structures when tasks become more complex. Unlike 
the laboratory setup of those experiments, this study explores complex dynamic networks that 
evolved within a disease outbreak response. In such extreme and dynamic events, standard 
operating procedures cannot always be followed. These events require a dynamic coordinated 
system that can adapt to unanticipated and evolving conditions. In such situations, an 
individual alone cannot effectively handle tasks that are complex in nature. The same holds 
true when the central actors of any network structure are overwhelmed with many 
communications from the other actors in that structure.  
This result suggests that decentralised structures (in terms of degree centrality) might perform 
better than centralised ones. A decentralised network structure can minimise the problems 
associated with a centralised structure of having a single point of vulnerability by 
modularising a centralised network into smaller stars connected with additional links. A 
decentralised structure provides a better opportunity for organisations to maintain self-reliance 
because emergency management personnel are adapted to working independently. A 
decentralised network can also make decisions more quickly, allowing the structure to react 
quickly to emergencies. An emergency manager can usually make a decision without having 
to wait for it to go up a chain of command, a feature that allows emergency agencies to react 
quickly to situations where fast action can mean saving lives. As well, networks in which a 
few actors have a high degree of centrality may induce increasingly centralised decision 
making, which in turn may have a negative influence on coordination performance. A 
decentralised network relieves some of the load of emergency managers when others are 
allowed to perform some tasks. Emergency managers can then spend more time on big-picture 
items and concentrate on the most important decisions. For example, respondent 4284390 
reported: 
“AHS: daily by email and weekly by teleconference, there was about 80-90 people in the 
teleconference which was awkward but we would manage. It was important because they 
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had direct access and needed someone authoritative like [Senior Health Director name 
omitted] which was valuable and gave recognition of what they were doing.” 
These results suggest that before as well as during the outbreak, plans should not focus on 
increasing the centralisation of the personnel, as this does not necessarily lead to better 
pandemic management. Interestingly, some health workers were practising the same concept; 
respondent 4284390 reported: 
“The communication lines existed but we escalated them when the pandemic was declared. In 
terms to forge new communication with groups, there was normal business communication 
and can’t see new communication being brought in.” 
Also respondent 4045418: 
“The organisations that we coordinated with are basically that I have said at the beginning, I 
didn’t feel any additional that we needed to speak to… but I didn’t find that there was new or 
unusual I didn’t talk to. There were pretty extensive networks across the whole of government 
so there wasn’t anyone new that I can recall. So it was all those that you had on the front 
page.” 
5.2.2. Organisational tier connectedness and coordination 
Zhiang (2002) was one of the few researchers who studied the concept of tiered connectedness 
as discussed in section 2.3.1.3 . He looked at the dynamics of how such connectedness worked 
in crisis and how organisations tried to extend their reach by initiating new links to different 
tiers based on their resource requirements and dependence (Blau, 1986). Such links are 
directional because they originate from one node and extend to another. Zhiang concluded that 
local nodes rely on their strong ties to provide resources to local communities in crisis. 
However, when they realise that their resources are insufficient, they will activate their ties to 
the upper tier level – state level in this case – so they can coordinate and acquire more 
resources. If the need persists, then both state and local governments will activate or 
strengthen their weak ties to the federal level so to coordinate more resources. Kuti and 
Hossain (2010) correlated connectedness with increased coordination, as that will increase the 
quality of information and accessibility to it during emergency. 
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The empirical results presented in section 4.4.3 show that “before the outbreak” tier 
connectedness is not correlated to coordination performance. This is consistent with Zhiang’s 
results, in that the organisations rely on their own resources first and hence do not need to 
coordinate to obtain additional resources. An explanation for this behaviour is that extra 
communication needs resources by itself; hence, at times of less need they tend to commit 
their current resources internally and preserve them to deal with tasks on hand, rather than 
utilising their resources to service communication channels. Also before the outbreak, much 
coordination will be about exchanging potential case information, informing the public, 
surveillance, etc. … These are usually standard communication protocols.  
Yet when “outbreak starts”; tier connectedness is correlated positively with coordination 
performance. In other words, the more organisations connect to “one tier up” nodes, the better 
they will coordinate. This might be obvious due to many reasons; the main one is that usually 
those “one-tier-up” organisations are expected to have more resources. Local level 
organisations need to connect to state level ones that in turn connect to federal level 
organisations to provision these needs.  
There may be some cases in which a local agency is connected to many other local ones; this 
means that if it requires more resources it will need to arrange them from local agencies that in 
turn connect to the state level organisations. 
Tier connectedness can also be designed so as to increase network efficiency, as discussed in 
the previous section. Hence, one authoritative node might step in to aggregate many links in 
order to save communication resources between lower level ones, as in this example from 
respondent 4821701: 
“LABS: That was more done directly through Health Protection. We were really encouraged 
as Public Health units not to have each of the Public Health units ringing and harassing the 
LABS because they were so overwhelmed. So if there was anything specifically that we wanted 
we did it by Health Protection and they just had one person who liaised with laboratory.”  
Due to some previous relationships, different tier connectedness might also help organisations 
solve issues that are outside their jurisdiction, as respondent 3662303 explained: 
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“Our relationship with 3M and other private bodies has helped a lot because org_x [name 
changed] didn’t pay their bills so the private companies wanted to stop their supply.” 
Health professionals were aware of the concept of connectedness and they used it when they 
needed it, as per respondent’s 4284390 comment: 
“The communication channels were there but haven’t been really used. The communication 
lines existed but we escalated them when the pandemic was declared.” 
As expected, connectedness can also be used for cross-jurisdiction coordination, as explained 
by respondent 4821701: 
"...even asking for assistance from their agencies [Food Authority] if it’s something outside 
our jurisdiction like inspections of premises" 
The result is that Hypothesis H1c is not valid before the outbreak but is valid during the 
outbreak. A practical implication would be that during the outbreak, coordination could be 
enhanced by incorporating formal one-tier-up connectedness.  
5.2.3. Tie strength and coordination performance 
Tie strength was defined as the frequency of communication between the nodes during the 
coordination process. Tie strength is indicative of the quality of the relationship between two 
nodes. Several studies have focused on the strength of network ties as a source of different 
kinds of information exchange (Hossain and Kuti, 2010). This was first elaborated by 
Granovetter (1973a), who argued that strong ties connect individuals who have frequent 
encounters with each other and provide greater motivation for assistance . Strong ties 
strengthen trust relationships, which further enable divulging useful knowledge and 
information (Reagans and McEvily, 2003, Levin and Cross, 2004). The issue of the strength of 
ties has two angles, the first advocated by Granovetter (1983)  when he argued that weak ties 
are a source of novel information; Burt (1992) added the second view, that weak ties are a 
source of competitive advantage due to controlling information flow. On the other hand, 
Krackhardt (1992) debated and provided empirical evidence that strong ties have a positive 
influence on performance. 
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In the disease outbreak context, as in any disaster situation, it is expected that high frequency 
of communication is needed and desired as an enabler of better communication and hence 
coordination.  
Consistent with the previous network results, “before the outbreak” shows that tie strength 
does not influence coordination. The practical implication is that in the phase before an 
outbreak is announced, communicating every day or every week does not necessarily lead to 
better performance. This can be attributed to the fact that the communication patterns and 
context are still standardised in that phase. During that phase, messages are expected to be 
routine and informational only, and as such might not entail novel information requiring 
further collaboration.  
However, “during the outbreak”, empirical results indicate that coordination performance is 
correlated with tie strength. Thus, communication frequency becomes an enhancer of 
collaboration. Frequent communication provides an ideal atmosphere for effective 
communication exchange. This also means improved access to information of better quality, 
which in turn enables health staff to perform their role better due to the information sharing 
that needs to be turned into performable actions in this phase. Actions need resources that 
must also be mobilised distributed and utilised as quickly as possible, because of the expected 
impact on human life and welfare if delayed. Hence, the results of this study indicate that more 
frequent communication means that organisations perform their role better, leading to 
improved access to and distribution of resources. It should also be noted that the frequency of 
communication was not rigid all the time. When the impact of the pandemic decreased, health 
workers reduced their communication frequency, as some examples from the respondents’ 
answers show. Respondent 4045418 stated: 
“During the pandemic, to start with we met daily, every business day so we didn’t meet on the 
weekend, every two or three weeks then we dropped to three times per week after two months 
and then we dropped back to once per week. And then probably from September on we 
dropped to once per month to finalise the transitioning back to normal.” 
Respondent 4259129 said: 
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“During the contain phase the information were passed quickly and communication 
intensified.” 
Such communication also helped organisations to build and maintain situational awareness 
and to build a better understanding of the big picture, which is vital when dealing with large 
outbreaks such as H1N1. An important example of the importance of quick and frequent 
communication is the dissemination of case definitions. Case definition is the set of criteria 
under which patients with ILI (influenza like illness) are considered as patients – also called 
cases – and admitted to the case management system. This has consequences for resource 
allocation (hospital or ICU beds, nurses, medication, ventilators, etc.), and also for the 
pandemic reporting and statistics. It is essential, therefore, that case definition be unified 
across the whole geographically dispersed and multi-specialised health management system 
(hospitals, border quarantine, emergency departments, GPs, and any place where patients 
might present themselves). This case definition continued to evolve and change during the 
outbreak, even sometimes on daily basis. This matter was resolved, for example, within the 
HNEAHS (Hunter New England Area Health Service) by increasing the frequency of 
communication from the HSFAC EOC (emergency operation centre) to the front line (being 
EDs, GPs, and medical centres). The case definition ended up being fully disseminated and 
deployed into medical management systems within 30 minutes, down from 2 days in the early 
phases of the outbreak. This was done by increasing the communication frequency and also 
entailed receiving confirmation that the end organisation was using the newly distributed case 
definitions. Respondent 5038216 said: 
“But we are using case definitions as an example because that could change couple of times a 
day at one stage.” 
Also respondent 5047657 stated: 
“Pheromone communication worked well, where we contacted people after sending them the 
case definition which made them familiar with us and built trust relationship. This two-way 
communication was great.” 
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5.3. Informal and formal coordination during the outbreak and social 
network measures 
This section discusses the results of Hypothesis H2 that investigates informal coordination 
during the outbreak through analysing the correlation results presented in Chapter 4. These 
results are linked to the formal coordination results discussed in the previous section. The aim 
is to highlight the dynamics of both types of social network that were formed during the 
outbreak. Informal communication  “can be an invaluable tool for systematically assessing and 
then intervening at critical points within the informal network” (Cross et al., 2002). Formal 
and informal networks are distinct in theory, but heavily intertwined in organisational real-life. 
To understand the organisational culture, it is necessary to understand how both formal and 
informal structures interact. If the formal organisation is the circles and lines in the 
organisation chart, the informal networks are the lines that are not drawn (Uhr, 2009). 
5.3.1. Informal communication before the outbreak 
During the pilot study, we have interviewed some of the executives in the outbreak 
coordination bureaucracy and intervention planning and management. In addition, I was 
invited to participate in train disaster simulation exercise based on the “Emergo Train System 
“. The exercise spanned multiple health systems and providers in the Hunter New England 
AHS such as John Hunter Hospital, Public Health Unit, Emergency Department in John 
Hunter hospital, X-Ray department, and Ambulance service. Hot debriefing for all the 
participants followed this exercise. The pilot study clearly showed that there was a strong web 
of informal communication between that AHS personnel based on many factors, some of 
which are: 
• Personnel working in remote areas remain in their geographical areas for long time, 
hence even formal relationships turn to informal ones after many years of working 
within the same locality albeit different positions.  
• Many of these personnel have grown up in these remote areas and went to schools with 
the same people they are working with. Hence, these informal relationships are 
developed based on long history of trust makes them prevail over even the formal 
ones. 
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• The training exercises that takes place multiple times per year works as an introducer 
platform for any workers that yet doesn’t know each other so that the informal 
relationships gets established them by open colleague introducing the new worker to 
another hence establishing the trust relationship. 
5.3.2. Centrality and coordination performance 
The informal communication network is a mapping of personnel that exchange work-related 
information or services outside the standard formal structures. These are surely expected to 
increase during crises as the need for collaboration surges. It is important to highlight the fact 
that there is no current theory in general that points to an optimal structure of the informal 
relations in an organisation (Krackhardt and Stern, 1988), let alone in a crisis situation and 
especially in the disease outbreak context. 
The correlation results for the degree centrality of the informal network show that it is 
positively correlated with performance, as in section 4.4.4. That means that ego’s performance 
is related to the number of links he or she establishes informally – outside the standard 
operating structure – during the outbreak as trying to adapt the organisational structure to the 
new situations.  
This result is somehow expected, based on the understanding that informal networks are 
purposefully formed ones rather than being dictated by operating manuals and procedures. 
These links are built based on need and mutuality. The ego assess her or his requirements and 
needs, then outreaches intentionally to the alter that is capable of satisfying that need. Hence, 
the more links that egos create, the more it is expected they will be able to coordinate and 
acquire their needs. Using Krackhardt and Hanson’s (1993) analogy “If the formal 
organisation is the skeleton of the company, the informal is the central nervous system driving 
the collective thought process, actions and reactions of the business units”. Hence those nerves 
are activated whenever one part of the body wants to communicate a change (pain, pleasure), 
which again underlines the purposeful awareness of building such links and networks. 
Respondent 3333690 explained some of the needs that invoked informal communication: 
“Informal coordination in pandemic? There is lots of information to process so if you get a 
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knowledgeable person that will save you going through going five different documents. There is time 
cost for informal communication – you can’t talk to everyone. Informal helped the formal 
commination with groups that we already have links to.” 
“The informal network was heads-up that something formal is coming through. So it’s used to get 
things done more quickly. So yes, it was efficient.” 
This explains the main difference between centrality in formal and informal coordination. In 
the formal coordination, centrality is pre-designed and assigned based on the wider 
organisational structure, which in many cases may be sub-optimal, and carries the burden of 
assigning resources to communicate that might not even necessarily affect coordination. On 
the other hand, informal coordination is a pre-mediated and conscious decision by the ego to 
increase the centrality stemming from the awareness of needs. Therefore, the ego will direct 
these links  directly to the target (alter) that can help. Also egos will be willing to commit 
resources to this communication cost since they will assess that the reward is greater than the 
effort or cost.  
Respondent 4288732 elaborated on this, saying: 
“During the contain phase, the number of cases was increasing in isolation, people were not receiving 
their packages within couple of days so we used the informal channels to get this done. Informal used 
local knowledge.” 
“Basically it was when we needed more information or more resources. That’s when we went 
off talking to people.” 
For example, the complaint about repetitive messages received in formal communication was 
discussed. When establishing an informal link, the ego does not build a link to an alter that 
will be source of information already received. If that occurs, then it is expected that the ego 
will later sever that link and move to another one, as there is no organisational commitment 
and obligation to maintain that inefficient and ineffective link.  
5.3.3. Informal tier connectedness and coordination performance 
Tier connectedness in informal coordination has the same role as in formal coordination, 
namely to communicate to other jurisdictional levels and acquire resources from higher-level 
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authorities. Informal tier connections might follow the same pattern as formal ones, as 
discussed by Zhiang (2002), where egos will look for their local resources and then try to 
connect to higher-level tiers as they need resources, information, and decisions. However, the 
difference between the two types of links is that informal ones are consciously built and 
maintained based on the health worker’s prior knowledge of the alter, and that it is  through 
this particular altar, objectives can be achieved. Usually this requires that both nodes know 
each other beforehand and that a mutual trust relationship exists between them.  
The result for informal tier connectedness during the outbreak shows that it was correlated 
with coordination performance, similar to the formal coordination result. This is a logical 
result, especially for informal coordination, as informal networks are quick to grow and 
transmute according to changing circumstances (Groat, 1997). Connecting to other tiers means 
that the health workers are diversifying their links due to their own needs and requirements 
while trying to communicate more quickly at the same time. This is reflected in the words of 
respondent 3333690: 
“We set up email list communication with the ID physicians, respiratory and ICU physicians. It was 
circumventing the hospitals so it was informal communication. We got some feedback that it was 
appreciated.” 
Also respondent 3662303 stated: 
“Cut off 20 people you don’t need to talk to.” 
One important note is that in a hierarchical world, such connectedness is not desired nor 
allowed. Yet in the networked organisational domain, informal tier connectedness is usually 
an accepted and tolerated practice to the extent that some contended that 70% of 
communication occurs at the informal level (De Mare, 1989). One important feature that 
stimulates informal tier connectedness is that informal networks transmit messages faster than 
formal ones (Davis, 1979). This means that information reaches its destination before formal 
communication does. Respondent 4366750 stated: 
“Informal coordination is the way you solve problems quickly, in the formal hierarchy, you 
have to go up the hierarchy then across the hierarchy and then down, the military model. 
Simple things can take ages and mistakes … happen in the communication in that sense, so for 
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example, if you want to know what is the capacity of the laboratory to do certain test, the PHU 
people are the ones that need to make sure that the test was done, so they need to talk to the 
ED on how the swabs need to be taken and if the issue’s in the capacity, the PHU will talk to 
the labs as well. There was formal communication with the labs as they were part of the 
teleconference… Good informal coordination when you have a formal system and people 
know each other. In health systems people work in more networked arrangements, they used to 
work in informal professional hierarchy. The quality of the staff was very good.” 
Some respondents mentioned cross-jurisdictional informal communication. Respondent 
4821701 stated: 
“I think that would be all – or Victorian schools, but we’ve got schools along the border. We 
found that because the Melbourne Health Protection is centralised in Melbourne, they are 
quite often unaware of border issues. Albury is in Victoria, but it’s one community. We did 
have some informal communication with the Victorian local governments or Victorian 
schools.” 
Also respondent 4045418 stated: 
“Use telephone calls, if you get through to people. Also in the federal – Commonwealth- Department 
of Health and Aging DoHA I’ve got some contacts, also my counterparts in other jurisdictions, they 
weren’t the CHOs , Chief Health Officer, – that’s [names omitted] list – they were health emergency 
coordinators who were equivalent to the state HSFACs.” 
Respondent 4284390 stated: 
“Informal: I instigated this process, constant communication with cross-jurisdiction, 
Queensland and Victoria, to compare what we are doing. We were much [more] prepared 
than any other state so we shared the information with them. So we did a weekly meeting and 
daily email of sending the summary of NSW critical care units.” 
Interestingly, informal connectedness worked jurisdictionally from the top- down because 
high-level management would want to obtain realistic information from the lower tiers, as 
respondent 5038216 elaborated: 
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“Usually the managers try to give you a rosy picture about what’s happening there. So in this case, I 
might need an independent, an informal channel that will gather information and report them directly 
about the actual, actual reports.” 
5.3.4. Informal tie strength and coordination performance 
Tie strength has been defined as the frequency of commination between two nodes, be it daily, 
weekly or monthly, as a representation of the quality of relationship between those nodes. 
Informal tie strength is also different in its dynamics from formal tie strength. It is based on 
needs and mutual agreement between both ends of the link. A health worker who initiates a 
link does so only for the sake of coordinating more resources or to communicate information – 
either outward or inward. The other party on the other side of the link is willing and accepting 
of this form of communication, due to mutual trust and benefit. Yet both of them know that 
this channel is activated in need and hence there is no requirement for it to be active on 
frequent basis, weekly or daily. This link will be used only when there is need to communicate 
or coordinate. Hence increasing or decreasing the frequency of commination should be 
directly related to the sense of necessity for coordination, and hence should reflect back to 
enhance coordination performance. 
This explanation is further supported by the correlation result where the empirical values 
showed a direct correlation between tie strength and coordination performance. This result is 
congruent with the formal coordination result during the outbreak, in that the empirical results 
presented earlier show that formal coordination during the outbreak was also correlated to tie 
strength. Hence, both forms of coordination play a complementary rule in achieving higher 
performance. 
The following response provides an overview of how informal tie strength varied in 
accordance with requirements. This is reiterated by respondent 4284390: 
“Informal: I instigated this process, constant communication with cross-jurisdiction, 
Queensland and Victoria to compare what we are doing. We were much [more] prepared than 
any other state so we shared the information with them. So we did a weekly meeting and daily 
email of sending the summary of NSW critical care units. Then I would include the other 
jurisdictions with that. Weekly meetings by teleconference. We rang the intensive care initially 
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once per day to get their status for the first two weeks because we hadn’t the Flu Web setup, 
and made a summary that [was] sent out every day for two weeks including weekends until the 
Flu Web was set up.” 
Another response about intensifying of the informal channels when the outbreak started came 
from respondent 4284390: 
“The communication channels were there but haven’t been really used. The communication 
lines existed but we escalated them when the pandemic was declared.” 
On last note about the intra organisational communication during the outbreak. Meaning the 
communication that takes place within the same department. Most of the workers that I’ve 
interviewed were working in small departments. Therefore, it was expected, and actually they 
explicitly stated many times during the interviews, that all the workers within the same 
department or organisational unit talks with each other informally before, during or after the 
outbreak. 
5.4. Moderating variable effect 
After establishing the correlation relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables, the regression calculations for the moderating variable discusses whether the tier 
level of the organisation had an effect on the coordination performance. The results showed 
that this was the case. For formal coordination, the moderating variable effect was significant 
for both tie strength (rho=0.015), and connectedness (rho=0.047). This further supports 
Zhiang’s finding (2006) that during crisis , communication with tier levels becomes important 
as organisations utilise their resources and try to acquire more from different tiers, hence the 
pre-established ties are strengthened.  
As for the informal coordination, the regression results indicated that tier level conspired with 
tie strength (rho=0042) and degree centrality (rho=0) to influence coordination. This also 
indicates that tier level played a role in strengthening and increasing the number of links that 
an organisation could utilise during the outbreak.  
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5.5. Conclusion and introduction to next chapter  
This chapter looked into different relationships between network measures and coordination 
performance during the pandemic. The results showed that some network measures, namely 
connectedness and tie strength, played an important role both formally and informally to 
enhance coordination. Also degree centrality of the informal network positively affected 
coordination.  
The next chapter concludes this dissertation by providing an overall summary of key findings 
and the implications of these findings for research and practice, future research directions, and 
limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Conclusions, recommendations and future directions 
This chapter summarises the results of the research in terms of theory, method and domain, 
along with the assumptions. Then I reflect on the research process and experience before 
providing some practical recommendations. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future 
directions. 
6.1. Key findings 
This dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature on social network theory and its 
use as a tool for analysing complex coordination relationships. By combining social network 
theory, coordination theory and complex systems theory, this thesis provides an 
interdisciplinary study in the context of a disease outbreak.  
The results of the proposed hypotheses are presented in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: Summary of the results of hypotheses  
Hypothesis Phase Details Result 
H1a: Formal 
coordination 
Before the 
outbreak 
 Degree centrality  No correlation with 
performance 
H1b: Formal 
coordination 
Tie strength No correlation with 
performance 
H1c: Formal 
coordination 
Tier connectedness No correlation with 
performance 
H1a Formal 
coordination 
During the 
outbreak 
Degree centrality No correlation with 
performance 
H1b: Formal 
coordination 
Tie strength Correlation with 
performance 
H1c: Formal 
coordination 
Tier connectedness Correlation with 
performance 
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H2a: Informal 
coordination 
During the 
outbreak 
Degree centrality Correlation with 
performance 
H2b: Informal 
coordination 
Tie strength Correlation with 
performance 
H2c: Informal 
coordination 
Tier connectedness Correlation with 
performance 
 
6.1.1. Theory 
Being multidisciplinary, this research taps into different theories, namely the theory of 
coordination, theory of social networks, and theory of complex adaptive systems. Those 
theories are combined to provide answers to the key motivating questions about inter-
organisational coordination for pandemics.  
Theoretically, the results presented in Table 6-1 clearly indicate that coordination is not only 
multidisciplinary but also dynamic. The first three rows in Table 6-1 demonstrate that network 
measures were not correlated with performance before the pandemic began.  However, once 
the outbreak began, the network measures became relevant and usable to determine 
coordination performance, except for the case of centrality in formal coordination. These 
findings have implications for coordination, some of which are explained below through the 
lenses of this study. 
Firstly, the theory of coordination has been further extended and inspected in different 
perspectives. It is no longer mechanistic but an open system of interacting agents embedded in 
a social system. Studying coordination in its two facets, formal and informal, further supports 
considering coordination to be dynamic. Formal coordination is based mostly on the standard 
operating procedures, and informal coordination grows organically within and between the 
nodes. 
Secondly, the theory of social networks is used to analyse the coordination structure, first by 
mapping the nodes and their respective links, then by analysing the structure to determine its 
performance empirically. Three main measurements have been used: node centrality, tier 
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connectedness and tie strength. Combining coordination and social networks theories creates a 
complex adaptive system, such as that employed by Kapucu (2005) and Comfort (2001) for 
similar scenarios. This research did not try to simulate the coordination system using a 
controlled laboratory experiment so as to determine the relationship between network structure 
and performance, as Bavelas (1950) and Leavitt (1951)  did. Instead, data was gathered from 
personnel who worked in the intervention of disease outbreaks, and the analysis provides an 
important contribution to the literature of both inter-organisational coordination and disease 
outbreak management.  
It should be noted that there was no theoretical performance measure for the study of such 
coordination. Going back to Bavelas (1950) and Leavitt (1951), both of them used predefined 
performance measure such as solving a simple task in controlled environment. Considering 
coordination as interdisciplinary by nature enables the development of a new performance 
measure for each discipline. Hence this research developed a new performance measure for 
pandemic coordination, being the speed of response to the pandemic, represented by the start 
of the networked coordination structure. Then the abovementioned social network measures 
were calculated to determine if they influenced performance.  
The empirical correlation results with the proposed performance measure speed of response to 
the pandemic shows that the results are consistent, providing further validity to the use of 
social networks theory to study coordination within complex inter-organisational scenarios. 
6.1.2. Method 
Since this research uses social network theory as a methodology for understanding and then 
analysing the coordination structure, it utilises relational data that employs node relations to 
explain group outcomes. The social network field is an emerging one, which is gathering 
momentum in different research disciplines, with inter-organisational relationships being just 
one of these. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two methods for gathering network 
relational data, egocentric and sociocentric, with the latter being dominant.  
In this research, the sociocentric method was used, based on a snowballing technique used to 
select the candidates for interview. It was decided to produce the data collection instrument in 
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two phases so as to ensure that it was reliable and valid. An exploratory questionnaire was first 
designed, which was used to further design the main instrument.  This instrument collected 
both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative data was used to provide empirical 
validation or rejection of the proposed hypotheses, and the qualitative data provided in-depth 
views of causes, reasons, and context for the empirical results.  
Surveys were conducted with about 70 respondents representing a wide range of professional 
and bureaucratic backgrounds and positions within the network that managed pandemic 
intervention. This combination of the sociocentric relational network, the qualitative and 
quantitative instruments, and the respondents interviewed, created a wealth of domain-related 
information about coordination related to the pandemic, as well as statistical data for 
validation.  
Reflection on the methodology used to collect the data leads to the conclusion that this 
approach could also be applied in other coordination research that uses network theory as its 
analysis tool. Assuming that the researcher has little specific domain knowledge, he or she will 
need to gain familiarity with the domain by using an introductory questionnaire and 
interviewing a group of domain experts. Then, after these qualitative interviews, the researcher 
will be ready to construct the survey instrument and then to further verify it by some 
preliminary interviews with subject matter experts before beginning the main data collection 
phase. It is also preferable that the interviews be approached from both quantitative and 
qualitative perspectives if possible. This will further strengthen the researcher’s domain 
knowledge and support the empirical results with reasons and causes.  
A key contribution of this dissertation is that the triangulation methodology provided a 
theoretically motivated and practically verified survey, which met validity and reliability 
requirements and would be replicable in other domains in which coordination needs to be 
investigated. The analysis method used in this research also provided a replicable framework 
that can be used to validate data in other domain contexts.  
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6.1.3. Domain 
This study began with a generic review of coordination and then progressed to investigating it 
in the disease outbreak domain. Theoretically, this study looked at how pandemics propagate, 
with the main focus on influenza in the recent H1N1 2009 outbreak. Then the research 
proposed two main theories about how to measure the performance of both facets of 
coordination, formal and informal. The domain of the research highlighted that pandemic 
coordination is an ongoing task that must be addressed both before and during the pandemic 
itself. Hence, the formal coordination was investigated before and during the pandemic. The 
results showed that network measures were not associated with performance before the 
outbreak. During the outbreak, however, network measures (centrality, connectedness and tie 
strength) correlated with pandemic performance. Another network measure, the tier level of 
the organisation, was found to moderate the relation between the independent variables (tie 
strength, connectedness and centrality) and the dependent one being the initiation speed of 
outbreak coordination.  
This whole structure provides a complete framework that can be used in any outbreak context. 
6.2. Implications of this study 
This section discusses the practical implications and contributions of this thesis for identifying 
important properties of the proposed social network based modelling framework and the two 
coordination models (for both formal and informal networks) in the context of coordination 
during a disease outbreak. The implications of the research include building on the 
foundations of the new definitions of network theory and proposing an extension called “open 
systems coordination”. The implications also include the development of a social network 
based modelling framework as an analytical tool for “open system coordination”, thereby 
extending the applicability of current network theories. Contributions also include 
enhancement of the research methodology and demonstration of the modelling of coordination 
in the context of pandemic coordination. Practical contributions include guidelines for 
developing an efficient pandemic management network, acknowledgment of the importance of 
both formal and informal networks, and delineation of the patterns of usage of informal 
networks.  
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6.2.1. Research implications 
The first research implication is that this dissertation has contributed to coordination theory by 
offering a generalised social network based modelling framework with domain-based 
performance measures. Coordination theory has developed to the stage where it is 
acknowledged as being interdisciplinary. However, most of the studies in the literature relating 
to coordination and coordination theory are based on a specific domain or environment, or else 
consider specific and limited types of interdisciplinary coordination, such as product and 
functional hierarchies or centralised and decentralised markets, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Hence, modelling coordination based on a social networks framework that is applicable in 
diverse domains enriches coordination theory itself and provides more examples of 
interdependencies that exist between coordinating units. This in itself is one-step in the path of 
proposing new coordination models for “open system coordination” which reflect the 
complexities and probabilistic nature of present-day tasks.  
Similar to the first contribution above, the second research contribution is the approach 
followed to model coordination. The tradition understanding of coordination has been one of 
“command and control” and “top-to-bottom”, even in the discipline of disaster management, 
which inherited this approach from the military context. By investigating in the context of a 
disease outbreak in a complex environment and a large geographical area, this investigation 
has provided a new perspective for understanding how the structure of a collaborative network 
of actors affects the performance of the overall network. This new approach for modelling 
coordination enriches the present literature of coordination theory.  
Another contribution is extension of the applicability of present structural network theories of 
centrality, tie strength and connectedness (Bavelas, 1950, Granovetter, 1973c) to a new 
research domain, namely disease outbreak management as part of disaster management. This 
dissertation applies the concepts of these three network theories to analysis of the whole 
organisational network. The outcomes for centrality observed in this research are different 
from those reported by Bavelas (1950), who tested his theory in the controlled laboratory 
environment, whereas this research takes the approach of addressing a real-life problem in an 
open, complex environment. The results of this research also confirm that  tie strength theory 
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has an influence on network performance (Granovetter, 1973c). Therefore, this research 
reveals a path for demonstrating the applicability of network theories.  
Another contribution lies in the combination of both formal and informal networks within the 
coordination model. Most coordination studies have investigated one or the other of these 
networks at one time. This may well be the first time that both networks have been studied 
together, hand in hand, in any context, and more specifically in the context of management of 
a disease outbreak. Also this research shown that an important value of the ambidextrous 
organisational behaviour , being adaptability, is actually applied during the course of 
coordination by adopting the informal coordination techniques. 
This study was made more interesting by virtue of its methods of data analysis. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used, in both formal and informal networks 
providing empirical validation and in-depth reasoning. Moreover, deciding on a performance 
measure for informal networks in this research context was an innovation of itself. Again, to 
the author’s knowledge, no such performance measure for informal networks had previously 
been developed; hence, this study used a comparative perception between formal and informal 
performance as a dependent variable. It will certainly be of interest to combine formal and 
informal coordination in further studies in different contexts and domains. 
One more contribution lies in the data collection method. Data collection followed a middle 
path between the social sciences and the postpositive view. Hence, the data collection 
instrument was designed based on the domain context but using the network relational data 
collection methodology. That instrument also collected both formal and informal coordination 
information at the same time from the same respondents, providing a complete view of both 
networks and enabling comparison of the performance results of both networks.  
6.2.2. Practical implications 
 The findings of this research can be practically applied to disease outbreak coordination 
within the following settings. 
First and foremost, informal coordination should be considered as a normal and acceptable 
practice. A small number of respondents focused on following the hierarchical structure, but 
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the great majority used informal coordination as a normal fact of life. Such behaviour cannot 
and must not be challenged; rather it should be accepted and even encouraged within the total 
structure. Informal coordination can provide benefit in the following ways, as reported by 
many respondents: 
1- Informal coordination gets results. It is a direct way to get something done. 
2- It reduces bureaucracy. 
3- It is a way of sharing knowledge.  
4- Since it is a trusted network, it alleviates concerns for non-clinical people. 
5- It produces more accurate information than formal coordination in many instances, 
such as about laboratory capacity. 
6- It helps in following matters up; people know who to go to, to make sure necessary 
follow-up occurs. 
This research also underlines the importance of networks for emergency staff working in 
complex environments. From the data collected and correlated, the importance of social 
networks cannot be discounted when it comes to coordination. It is clear that there was general 
awareness and consensus about social networks in the health system, as elucidated by the 
respondents.  
The results emphasise the importance of quick communication (tie strength). However, the 
result for degree centrality is that it was not correlated with performance. Reading both results 
together, it is recommended that organisations should not increase their links to numerous 
other organisations, rather should increase the frequency of communication with key 
organisations and, in the event of an emergency such as a pandemic, increase communication 
frequency from monthly  to daily or weekly if possible .  
Further, diversifying the formal links between different tiers of organisations would help to 
ensure the communication of novel data between different tiers of organisations (local, state, 
federal, others). 
Before any outbreak has occurred, when organisational plans are being designed for 
communication during outbreaks, these plans need not focus on increasing the number, 
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frequency or diversity of links. Nowadays, all information is shared online, and most of it does 
not require special communication channels. 
On the informal side, all the social network measures (centrality, tie strength and tier 
connectedness) are important and have the potential to enhance performance. It is only 
necessary for authorities to facilitate the use of communication media and technology and 
health professionals will use it willingly and dynamically according to their needs. However, 
some activities that can build informal links should be planned, such as trans-unit training and 
inter-organisational social activities. These will foster informal networks, which can be 
utilised later during situations requiring coordination.  
The findings from all the proposed hypotheses and regression models in this research make it 
possible for healthcare policy managers and professionals to validate the implementation of 
the organisational policies that have been suggested in regard to communication and 
coordination matrices. If a policy development authority follows the findings of H1, for 
example, then he or she can investigate the success of the implementation of the H1 findings 
by applying the correlation model that was used for H1. However, H2, the informal 
coordination hypothesis, might be trickier since there is no pre-set plan for this. Hence, it 
might be advised that the policy development or training authority go through the process of 
surveying the health organisations and professionals that are part of the disease outbreak 
management network, and then use the correlation method for H2 to test whether these links 
are associated with improved performance. 
The survey itself can be considered a general contribution, since it was designed with no 
specific health organisation in mind. It can be applied in any health system that coordinates 
pandemic management in any geographical location (country, state) and also within any 
organisational format (more hierarchical, more networked, more decentralised).   
A note of caution is needed in interpreting the implications and outcomes of this research for 
general health management systems. The implications stated are not necessarily reflective of 
the whole population of health personnel in Australia or around the world, but they are at least 
worthy of consideration within the context of a disease outbreak. The level to which these 
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implications may be generalised is considered in the discussion of limitations at the end of this 
chapter. 
6.3. Future directions 
An aim of this research was to develop a framework for modelling coordination in the disease 
outbreak domain and then to understand how the collaboration networks, links and structure 
affect the performance of the overall system. The research was built bottom-up to create a 
complex theory, implementation, methodology, data collection instrument, and measurement 
and performance package. Like any other research initiative, this research presents many 
opportunities for future development and study.  
Firstly, the NSW Health system on which this dissertation is based is networked and 
decentralised by design. It would be interesting to perform a comparative study using the same 
model and constructs with a more centralised health system such as that in the state of Victoria 
in Australia. Comparison of the network measures and performance of both states would be 
illuminating.  
Secondly, future research could consider each local area health service within NSW and 
compare it to other local area health services within the same state from the perspective of 
network structure and performance.  
Thirdly, this research used as its performance measure (dependent variable) the speed with 
which a node joined the coordination network after the outbreak was announced within the 
state. To the author’s knowledge, no global performance measure has yet been developed. For 
example, mortality and morbidity rates are used to count cases or deaths. Yet this cannot be 
used when modelling performance, since there are many demographic differences between 
different countries and states for the same disease. Therefore, any such rate will be biased and 
not applicable in comparative studies. It would be interesting to work with clinical and health 
management authorities to develop compounded non-biased, preferably universal criteria to 
measure performance in the coordination of disease outbreaks.  
Fourthly, this research studied pandemic coordination during two major phases, before and 
during. Yet the “during the pandemic” phase can be further subdivided into more phases. In 
- 233 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Australia these are “delay, contain and protect” sub-phases. It would also be interesting to 
study the network patterns of each of those sub-phases and to investigate whether each phase 
has its individual performance measure or networking pattern, and how the positions of 
different nodes change across sub-phases. This would surely help practical coordination by 
informed changes of policy and designed plans appropriate to each sub-phase.  
 
6.4.  Limitations of the study 
This research is still embryonic in its domain and, as with all such research, it has limitations 
that need to be recognised and identified. The first limitation is the degree of generalizability 
of the results. Data was collected from about 70 health professionals and a model was 
developed and verified based on these results. However it cannot be claimed that these results 
are universally applicable and acceptable. Reiterating what was stated in the previous section 
about future directions, more research using the same methodology needs to be conducted in 
similar and different demographics and environments so as to further verify or maybe modify 
some of the outcomes of this study before taking them into the world of practice. This study 
can be used as a starting point in the domain of large-scale pandemic coordination, study that 
to the author’s knowledge has not been previously attempted. Furthermore, the domain of this 
study is complex, unique and ever changing. Emergency management personnel work in 
dynamic complex environments, which also mean that every disease outbreak coordination is 
different from the others. Many new factors join the theatre; pathogen change is only one of 
them.  
Another limitation of this study is that survey respondents were asked to remember events that 
in some instances had occurred one to two years earlier. This might cause some “memory 
prejudice” or motivational change through certain political considerations within 
organisations. Even though attempts were made through the survey design and interviews to 
alleviate such expected biases, it nevertheless remains important to evaluate the outcomes 
carefully and to reflect on the directions they might indicate for extra research validation. 
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One interesting note is that many of respondents asked if we wanted the links that emerged 
from their department or from themselves. We needed to emphasise that the formal 
communication is the departmental one and the informal one is the personal one. However, 
based on the responses, I assume that many of the respondents dealt with their personal entity 
and the determent one and hence the formal communication is a reflection of their own 
personal ones to some extent. 
Finally, this research gained real value by surveying health professionals in Australia who are 
extremely busy and always dealing with complex tasks. Some respondents were very generous 
with their time, information, and remarks. It is hoped that the results presented here create new 
discussions and produce new, valued questions about the relationship between social networks 
and inter-organisational relationships in complex adaptive environments. However, it is still 
essential to state at this point that the model suggested in this research does not claim or have 
the ambition to explain all the variances that accounted for coordination, but rather to explore 
the theoretical proposition that social network factors are significant social constructs, which 
contribute to enhanced performance. This study used social network theory to study complex 
coordination, but it is acknowledged that other theories might be able to do the same from 
other perspectives. I am confident that as human knowledge and tools develop, better theories 
and research methodologies will also be developed to investigate these environments. 
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Appendix A 
Qualitative questionnaire 
A- Situation:  
• Outbreak: How is the outbreak detected?  
• What is the information route from the time an infection is detected until containment is 
successful?  
• What are the criteria to categorise a disease spread as being DO? (Cases threshold/ Are 
there different thresholds for different disease types?) 
• What are the criteria for when a certain disease has been contained and a “back to normal” 
situation is declared?  
B- Coordination of actors:  
• Inter-organisational: 
o  Organisations that coordinate together whenever a DO is declared  
 name/ role(intervention, communication)  
 Jurisdiction (community/local/state/Federal/private/WHO ) 
 contact details  
 phase of mobilisation (is it called to join ) 
 area of work 
o Where: Area/jurisdiction/service covered by each organisation. (some 
organisations might cover geographical area; some might cover professional 
service; others might cover information or communication services ) 
o Workflow: how does involvement start, progress and finish for each 
organisation. 
• Intra-organisational: In order to research informal networks: What are specific 
departments within these orgs that get involved? Same questions as above. 
• Individuals: Individuals playing pivotal role in intervention and outbreak 
management and coordination. Name/contact/position/role before DO/role during 
DO/communication procedures or protocols. 
• Action: An overview of how the coordination process (communication and 
intervention) takes place. 
• Is there a communication plan/protocol/standards?  
o Is it predefined? 
o Does it change and how? 
o Are historical data available?  
o How does involvement start, progress and finish for each organisation? 
C- Processes for real-time decision support  
• How does the Decision Support Systems work, inputs /feeds /real-time data/ 
situational information?  
• How is information added, processed and distributed to relevant parties (who, where, 
when and how)? 
D- Determinants for success coordination/intervention:  
• How do you measure coordination gaps?(e.g., are there WHO standards) 
• What are the criteria to determine a successful intervention? (e.g. Do you use 
epidemiological measures, comparing against historical data, etc.)  
• Any performance indicators? 
• How do you measure intervention efficiency? (if it is different from success) 
• Has any reflective analysis been done to check past and present efficiency of 
response? 
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E- Resource management: Resource optimisation is the direct outcome of the coordination 
process.  
• Generally, what are the resources needed or exchanged during a disease outbreak? 
• How are resources ordered?  
• How are they received? 
• Do you consider information exchange as a resource? 
• Resource deployment: is it centralised or decentralised? 
• How do you measure resource efficiency? 
• How do you measure resource gaps?  
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Appendix B 
The Survey 
 
 
The University Of Sydney 
Project Management Research Group. 
 
Disease Outbreak Coordination Survey  
 
    
  This page is the Key for the survey. It contains explanations for the symbols that will be used 
in the survey tables. Please tear this page off the survey, and keep it near you as you are 
filling up the survey. 
1- Type of agency : (I=International, F=Federal, S=State, L=Local, P=Private, O=Other) 
 
2- Training carried:  (M=Monthly, Q=Quarterly, S=semi-annually, A=annually) 
 
3- Frequency of communication: (W=weekly, M=monthly, S=semi-annually, 
A=annually) 
 
4- Communication type: (IP=Providing info, IR=Receiving info, RR=Resource Request, 
RS=Resource Supply, M=meeting, FW=Field Work, O=other please specify) 
 
5- Phase:   (D=Delay, C=Contain, P=Protect)  
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To return the survey please contact Fadl Bdeir 
 
Tel: 0414 968 401  
Fax: 2 9351 8642 
Email: fadl.bdeir@sydney.edu.au  
 
Thanks and appreciate your contribution and support. 
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The University Of Sydney 
Project Management Research Group. 
 
Disease Outbreak Coordination Survey  
 
Name: _____________________________  Tel: ___________________________ 
Email:__________________________ 
 
 
Section 1: About your organisation  
This section asks general questions about your organisation which participates in disease outbreak coordination 
 
 
* 1) 
   
Name of your organisation? 
(Organisation might be like NSW public health, Western Sydney Public 
Health Unit...)  
    
 
 
  
 
 
* 2)                              Which department or unit - within the organisation mentioned above- 
do you work? 
      
 
 
  
 
 
* 3)    What is your position within the department? 
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 4
) 
  
 
Which of the following activities describe the duties of your 
department / unit  in dealing with disease outbreaks? 
Choose more than one answer if applicable. 
  
   
 
Leadership and guidance 
 
Collecting information  
 
Information analysis and dissemination 
 
Training other organisations 
 
Epidemiology 
 
Detection (including Surveillance) 
 
Community education 
 
Emergency care (Emergency Department and Intensive care unit). 
 
Other, please specify: 
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 5
) 
  
 
Does your department provide resources to others, please specify type of resource 
and other departments/organisations name: 
(resources like PPE ,Personal  Protective Equipment; Vaccine, ...) 
    
 
Type of agency  Name of agency Type of resource 
    
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 6
) 
  
 
Do you employ external agencies during transport of any disease outbreak related 
equipment or material? 
(equipment transported like ventilators; material transported like samples, vaccines) 
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Type of agency  Name of agency What are the transported 
materials? 
    
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
0 
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 7
) 
  
 
How does your department get notified when a disease outbreak is announced? – 
Provide more than one answer if applicable. 
   
 
Email 
 
Fax 
 
Phone call 
 
Meeting 
 
Other, please specify: 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 8) 
   
Which organisation / department notify you that disease outbreak is declared? 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 9
) 
  
 
 How does your department get notified when a disease outbreak is finished? – 
Provide more than one answer if applicable.  
     
 
Email 
 
Fax 
 
Phone call 
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Meeting 
 
Other, please specify: 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 10) 
   
Which organisation /department notify your department when outbreak 
is finished? 
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Section 2: Planning and developing policies 
 
This section is about planning coordination before the Disease Outbreaks. 
 
 11) 
   
In your opinion, how important is it to have a prepared coordination 
plan to deal with disease outbreaks 
 
 
Not important 
 
Somewhat important 
 
Good to Have 
 
important 
 
Very important 
 
  
 
 
 12) 
   
In case your department collaborated with other organisations / 
departments /units to develop the disease outbreak operating 
procedures; can you please list those organisations / departments 
/units? 
    
 
Type of agency  Name of agency 
    
1 
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
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5 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
10 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 13) 
   
How often your organisation meets or exchange information with 
other departments / units to update these plans? 
    
 
Name of agency Meeting: weekly /monthly 
/semi-annually/annually 
    
1 
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
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7 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
10 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 14
)   
 
In case you provide input to policy development for other 
departments/units/organisations.  Can you please indicate 
which level you provide input to? -  Provide more than one 
answer if applicable. 
     
 
Federal. 
 
State. 
 
Local. 
 
Your organisation only. 
 
Other, please specify: 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Section 3: Internal Training: 
 
This section is about internal training that might take place prior to Outbreaks 
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 15) 
   
Does your organisation conduct periodical internal training exercises on Disease 
outbreak management?  (Internal means: not in conjunction with any 
other  organisations) 
    
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
  
 
 
 
 16) 
   
 
How often are these exercise scenarios conducted? 
     
 
Monthly  
 
Quarterly 
 
Semi-annually 
 
Annually 
 
Other, please specify: 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 17) 
   How many employees participated in the internal training exercises? 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Section 4: Trans-unit Training  
 
The section is about trans-unit disease outbreak training exercises that are conducted with other 
organisations/departments/units.  
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 18)    
Have your department / unit participated in joint training or exercises  with 
other organisations / departments/ units: 
  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
  
 
 
 19
) 
  
 
Please list these organisations / departments and the period in which these 
training exercises were conducted? 
  
 
Type of agency  Name of Agency Training carried  
  
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
10 
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 20) 
 
Which organisation / department was leading the training or exercises? 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 21) 
 
 How did you measure your preparedness after the training compared to 
what it was before the training? 
 
 
No difference 
 
Somewhat better 
 
Better 
 
Excellent 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Section 5: Formal Coordination: 
 
This section - and the one follows - are the main parts of the survey. This one discusses formal coordination with other 
organisations. Formal being coordination carried according to the formal reporting and communication lines.  
 
 22) 
   
Prior to any disease outbreaks Does your department communicate with other 
organisations/ departments about outbreaks? 
Such communication might be exchanging information, sending or receiving updates about 
cases.    
  
 
Name Organisation type Frequency of 
communication  Communication  
 
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
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3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
10 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 23
) 
   
Which Organisations/departments / units do you coordinate with during any of the three  phases of 
the disease outbreak?  
Note: Use the last column to indicate the phase; if the coordination happened in more than one phase then use 
combination of the first letters of each phase like "DC" for delay/contain phases. 
    
 
Name Type of agency  Communication 
frequency 
Communication 
type  
Phase - use more than one 
letter if needed 
(D=Delay,C=Contain,P=Protect
) 
 
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
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3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
5 
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1
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     2
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 24
) 
  
Which organisations/ departments/units that you don’t normally coordinate with (they are not 
part of the coordination and communication plan), but needed to do that during the any of 
the three  phases of the outbreak management?  
Note: Use the last column to indicate the phase; if the coordination happened in more than one 
phase then use combination of the first letters of each phase like "DC" for delay/contain phases. 
  
 
Name Type of agency  Communication 
frequency: 
Communication 
type  
Phase - use more than one 
letter if needed 
(D=Delay,C=Contain,P=Protect
) 
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
4 
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5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
10 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
11 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
12 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
13 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
14 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
15 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
16 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
17 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
18 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
19 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
20 
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Section 6: Inter-organisational Informal communication and 
coordination:  
Informal communication can be defined as the communication that takes place outside the standard hierarchy or channels 
in order to “get the job done” like when someone knows a person in another organisation or department, then he/she 
contacts that person directly rather than going through the normal channels . It is important to study this type of commination 
since it helps to understand how the real coordination really takes place besides the "blue print" one. This section deals with 
"Inter-organisational informal communication" i.e. with other organisations (outside your organisational boundaries) 
 
 2
5) 
  
 
Which other organisations/departments/units do 
you informally coordinate with during the any of the three phases of the 
outbreak management?  
Reminder: This question applies for Inter-organisational boundaries.   
Note: Use the last column to indicate the phase; if the coordination 
happened in more than one phase then use combination of the first letters 
of each phase like "DC" for delay/contain phases. 
  
    
 
Name Type of 
agency  
Communicatio
n frequency 
Communicatio
n type 
Phase - use more 
than one letter if 
needed 
(D=Delay,C=Contain,P=
Protect) 
    
1 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
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6 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
8 
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1
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     2
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
2
6)   
 
Which organisations that you don’t normally coordinate with (they are not 
part of the coordination and communication plan), but needed to 
create informal communication channels during  any of the three  phases 
of the outbreak management?  
Note: Use the last column to indicate the phase; if the coordination happened 
in more than one phase then use combination of the first letters of each phase 
like "DC" for delay/contain phases. 
    
 
Department 
name 
Type of 
agency  
Communicati
on 
frequency:  
Communicati
on type: 
How many 
days the 
coordination 
started after 
outbreak. 
Phase - use more 
than one letter if 
needed 
(D=Delay,C=Contain
,P=Protect) 
    
1 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
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7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
10 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     1
9 
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2
0 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 27) 
   
How efficient was informal coordination in “getting things done” 
compared to formal one? 
    
 
Not 
efficient at 
all 
 
Sometimes 
efficient 
 
Efficient 
 
Efficient 
Most of the 
times 
 
Very 
Efficient 
 
  
 
 
 28) 
   
At which stage of the coordination you realised the need for 
informal coordination? 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 29) 
   
How do you rate the importance of informal coordination in 
bridging coordination gaps?  
  
 
It is not needed at all. 
 
Can be used sometimes. 
 
Useful. 
 
Needed most of the times. 
 
It is essential! 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Section 7: Intra-organisational informal coordination 
 
This page is about informal coordination that takes place within the same organisation (it might be another department or unit in your 
organisation) and is called Intra-organisational informal communication. 
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 30
) 
  
 
Which departments, within your organisation, do you informally 
coordinate with during  any of the three  phases of disease outbreak? 
Note: Use the last column to indicate the phase; if the coordination happened in more 
than one phase then use combination of the first letters of each phase like "DC" for 
delay/contain phases. 
    
 
Department 
name Type of agency  
Communication 
frequency:  
Communication 
type: 
Phase - use more than 
one letter if needed 
(D=Delay,C=Contain,P=P
rotect) 
    
1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
2 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
3 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
4 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
5 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
6 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
7 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
8 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
9 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
10 
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11 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
12 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
13 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
14 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
15 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
16 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
17 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
18 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
19 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
20 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
Section 8: Coordination measures: 
 
 
 31) 
   How updated was the formal outbreak coordination plan that you had? 
   
 
Non Existent    
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Old and obsolete 
 
Partially relevant 
 
Mostly relevant 
 
Up to date 
  
 
 32)   
 
Please rate which communication methods were most effective: 
(1 = least effective, 7 = most effective)  
    Land line phone   
 
Mobile phone   
 
Fax   
 
Mobile Text message   
 
Email.   
 
Web portal   
 
Others, please specify:   
 
 Comments: 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 33) 
   
How long did it take the coordination to start after the outbreak is declared 
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 34) 
   
How long did you perceive for the implementation of the plan to be optimal after 
its initiation? 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 35) 
   What are the additional resources did you use during the outbreak? 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 36) 
   
What are the main three errors/mistakes that were done (or usually happen) 
during the outbreak intervention please list from the most important to the least 
important? 
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 37) 
   
Please list the three most important factors that informal coordination facilitated 
your work, from most to least important: 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
To return the survey please contact Fadl Bdeir 
Tel: 0414 968 401  
Fax: 2 9351 8642 
Email: fadl.bdeir@sydney.edu.au  
Thanks and appreciate your contribution and support. 
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Appendix C 
Ethics approval documents 
Below is the ethics application that was submitted to ethics committee: 
- 299 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 - 300 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
- 301 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
- 302 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
- 303 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
- 304 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
 
- 305 - 
Disease Outbreak Coordination   Fadl Bdeir 
Ethics approval document is presented on the next page: 
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Appendix D 
Histograms for independent variables: 
Formal coordination before the outbreak: 
1-Degree centrality histogram: 
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2- Tie strength histogram: 
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3- Connectivity histogram 
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Formal coordination during the outbreak: 
1- Degree centrality histogram: 
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2- Tie strength histogram: 
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3- Conndectedness histogram: 
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Informal coordination during the outbreak: 
1- degree centrality histogram 
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2- Tie strength histogram 
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3-Tier connectedness histogram 
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Appendix E 
List of general positions interviewed along with the general 
task decription 
Organisation name Department  Position 
Western Sydney Local Health 
District 
Centre Infectious and 
Microbiology 
Infectious Diseases and 
Microbiology 
Specialist 
Centre for Infectious Diseases and 
Medical Laboratory Services 
Clinical Virology Clinical Research 
South Eastern Sydney Local 
Health District 
Public Health Unit Director of Health 
NSW ministry of Health Center for Health 
Protection/Communicable 
Disease Branch 
Public Health 
Laboratory 
Surveillance  (PHLS) 
NSW Ministry of Health Centre for Health Protection -/ 
Communicable Disease Branch 
(CDB) 
Medical 
Epidemiologist 
Western Sydney Area Health 
Service 
ICPMR - CIDMLS (Centre of 
infectious disease and 
microbiology laboratory 
service) 
Public Health Liaison  
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Sydney West Public Health Unit PHU Manager 
Nepean Blue Mountains Local 
Health District 
PHU / Health protection team Senior infectious 
disease surveillance 
officer 
NSW health Bioprepardness unit principle project officer 
and medical advisor 
Sydney South West PHU  PHU  Acting director  
Sydney South West PHU PHU Communicable diseases Team Leader for the 
Communicable disease 
team  
Sydney West Area Health Service PHU (Communicable Disease 
and Immunization ) 
Public Health 
Epidemiologist 
Ambulance Service NSW Health Emergency 
Management Unit (CDU) 
Director  
Westmead Children's Hospital Emergency Department Medical Head 
NSW Ministry of Health Centre for Health Protection, 
AIDS/Infectious Diseases 
Branch 
Senior Policy Analyst 
Royal Price Alfred Hospital  Emergency Department   Medical Director 
Napean Blue Mountains Local 
Health District  
Epidemiology Senior Research and 
Evaluation  
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Pharmacy Director 
Sydney West Area Health Service Public Health Unit Environmental Health 
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Officer 
CDU for Napean Blue Mountain 
and Western Sydney Local Health 
District 
CDU Director 
NSW Ambulance Service State Wide Service - 
Aeromedical Retrieval 
Services 
Director 
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital ICU Director of ICU (also 
Cochair of NSW IC 
task force) 
Ambulance Service of NSW Special Operations Unit Manager of Special 
Operations Logistics 
(Napean / BM AHS) Population Health Unit Senior Environmental 
Health Officer 
Australian General Practitioners 
network 
NA Immunization 
coordinator 
South Eastern Sydney Area Health 
Service - Pathology 
Microbiology Lab  Microbiology Registrar  
North Coast Area Health Service North Coast PHU Director  
NSW Ministry of Health Health emergency management 
unit  
Alternate State Medical 
Controller 
Napean Hospital  Infection Control - pathology Clinical Nurse 
Consultant 
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Napean Hospital Executive Director Nursing and 
Midwifery 
ICPMR (Centre of Infectious 
disease and microbiology 
services)025 
ICPMR (Centre of Infectious 
disease and microbiology 
services) 
Director 
South East Area Laboratory 
Services  
Microbiology Assitant Director 
Microbiology 
Westmead Hospital Infection control department Co-manager 
NSW Ministry of Health Centre of Health protection Manager of 
Surveillance - 
Epidemiologist 
Greater Southern Area Helath 
Service 
Public Helath Unit Surveillance officer  
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Infection Control Unit Clinical Nurse 
Consultant 
NSW Police force District Emergency 
Management  
District Emergency 
Management officer 
Balmain Hospital GP Consulting Director 
NSW Ministry of Health Director of NSW Health CDU 
within the AHS in the 
Ambulance 
Director 
Bankstown Hospital Inetsive Care 
Unit 
Intensive  Care Unit (ICU) ICU Consultant (Senior 
ICU specialist ) 
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Sydney west area health service community health in the family 
health team 
Community health 
nurse 
Hunter New England Public 
Health Unit 
Public Health Unit Epidemioligist 
NSW Ministry of Health Microbiology Staff microbiologist 
Npapean Blue Mountains GP 
network 
Immunization  Project Coordinator 
NSW Ministry of Health Development branch State wide coordinator 
for critical care  
Centre for population health Western Sydney and Napean 
Blue Mountains local health 
district. 
Director 
Greater Southern Local Health 
District 
PHU Clinical Nurse 
Consultant 
Sydney West AHS centre for population health office coordinator 
Greater Southern AHS  Public Helath Unit Senior Enviornmental 
Health officer 
GP NSW Immunization practice Immunization 
coordinator 
Western Sydney Area Health 
Service 
Epidemiology Senior evaluation 
officer 
Sydney South West AHS Health Service Functional Area 
Coordinator (HSFAC) 
HSFAC director and 
director of population 
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health and planning 
NSW Ministry of Health Coordination and policy unit Manager of emergency 
response coordination  
NSW Ministry of Health Emergency Management unit Deputy director 
Greater Southern AHS  PHU Epidemiologist 
NSW Ministry of Health  Centre of epidemiology and 
research 
Senior epidemiologist 
Greater Southern AHS  Infectious disease surveillance Infectious disease 
surveillance officer 
Greater Southern AHS  PHU Director of PHU 
NSW Ministry of Health Centre of Epidemiology and 
research 
Manager for population 
health information 
branch 
Hunter New England AHS HSFAC Bio preparedness 
offcier 
GP Access Operation Management Pandemic Coordination 
Hunter New England AHS communication unit Communication officer 
Hunter New England AHS HNE population Health Bio-preparedness 
epidemiologist  
NSW Ministry of Health Centre for Health protections Manager 
Hunter New England AHS HSFAC Area director of 
Nursing and HSFAC 
disaster manager 
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Dept of Primary Industries Biosecurity Preparedness Leader of Biosecurity 
preparedness 
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